

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

United States Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations

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Chairman John Kerry (D-MA)



Family: Wife, Teresa Heinz Kerry; Two Children, Three Stepchildren

Education: Yale U., B.A. 1966 (Political Science); Boston College, J.D. 1976

Military Service: Navy, 1966-70

Career: Lawyer; County Prosecutor

Elected To U.S. Senate: 1984

Committees:

- Commerce, Science & Transportation (Communications, Technology, And The Internet – Chairman)
- Finance
- Foreign Relations – Chairman
- Small Business and Entrepreneurship

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan May 12-16 post-UBL; was briefed by SRAP Grossman and Gen. Lute on reconciliation prior to the trip; Also traveled to Pakistan in January and February.
- Launched a series of six hearings that began in May to examine U.S. strategy in the region and “to debate the end-state” in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Kerry has called for a new paradigm in our relationship with Pakistan based on a narrow set of shared interests; he remains supportive of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman authorization, but is discouraged by the slow pace of funding and lack of communications strategy on U.S. assistance to Pakistan; the Senator supports enactment of ROZ legislation for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Kerry’s SFRC staff released a report on June 8 titled “Evaluating U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan,” which was highly critical toward the efficacy of USG assistance programs in Afghanistan, and questioned the long-term sustainability of civilian goals.
- Kerry has grown disenchanted by the mission in Afghanistan, especially on the sustainability of our civilian assistance and is critical of the size of the ANSF, which he views as an obstacle for Pakistani support of the reconciliation process.

Recent Statements on Afghanistan

Key Statements/Questions from the May 10 SFRC hearing on “Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan”:

- A precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a mistake and I, for one, would take that option off the table. Instead, we should be working toward the smallest footprint necessary, a presence that puts Afghans in charge. ...But make no mistake,

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it is unsustainable to continue spending \$10 billion a month on a massive military operation with no end in sight.

- The Administration should send a clear signal that it supports reconciliation efforts, instead of the mixed messages coming from different parts of our government. Our lack of clarity has caused Afghanistan, Pakistan and many other players to start hedging their bets and planning for the worst rather than the best.

Key Statements/Questions from the June 8 nomination hearing for Amb. Ryan Crocker:

- **The report argues that U.S. assistance needs to make -- meet three basic conditions before that money is dispensed: the projects have got to be necessary, achievable and sustainable.** So over the next few months there's a lot on the table for the Congress and for the president, and Ambassador Crocker is going to have an essential role, a critical role to play in making sure that we get it right.

Recent Statements on Pakistan

Excerpts from the Senator's appearance on CBS's *Face the Nation*, May 8, 2011:

- Asked about a possible support network for bin Laden in Pakistan, Senator Kerry said, "I think it's very, very hard to believe that at some level there wasn't somebody or some group as the President alluded to in Pakistan that wasn't aware of this."

Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on "Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan":

- Despite bin Laden's death, the fight against Al Qaida and other extremist groups that threaten the United States and our allies is far from over. Going forward, we have to act thoughtfully. And no matter what, we have to remember the big picture, the larger strategic interest, and the full nature of our relationship with Pakistan. We should not rush into a situation that, in fact, hurts our own interests.
- We have raised this issue forcefully in terms -- with the embassy and with the State Department and others -- **there needs to be a much more effective communications strategy [in Pakistan, with respect to U.S. assistance].**
- **\$120 billion is the budget for Afghanistan. But we've got a pittance going into Pakistan, which by all of our judgments is infinitely more strategically important in terms of the nuclear weapons, the center of terror, and other things.**

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Barbara Boxer (D-CA)



Residence: Rancho Mirage, California

Born: November 11, 1940; Brooklyn, N.Y.

Religion: Jewish

Family: Husband, Stewart Boxer; Two Children

Education: Brooklyn College, B.A. 1962 (Economics)

Military Service: None

Career: Congressional Aide; Journalist; Stockbroker

Elected: 1992

Committees:

- Commerce, Science & Transportation
- Environment & Public Works – Chairwoman
- Foreign Relations (International Operations & Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women's Issues – Chairwoman)
- Select Ethics – Chairwoman

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Advocate and a long time supporter of women's rights in Afghanistan; Chair of the SFRC Global Women's Issues Subcommittee, which she helped to create in 2009
- Introduced legislation in Jan. 2011, the *Safe and Responsible Redeployment of United States Combat Forces from Afghanistan Act of 2011*, expressing support for the President's plan to begin to withdraw combat forces from Afghanistan in July 2011 and requiring the President submit to Congress a plan for phased redeployment, including an end date for its completion (Press Release, 2/8/11)
- Co-signer of May 25 letter to the Secretary urging that the Department take action to regulate Ammonium Nitrate from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 10 SFRC hearing on "Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan":

- So if 10 years of American sacrifice haven't convince[d] the region that the U.S. is a reliable ally and all this money that's going into that region, why are you confident that more time, more money and the loss of more American lives will change that view? And do people there have a right to assume we're going to continue this level – this level of assistance forever? Isn't there a time when every country has to say we believe in our country, we're going to defend ourselves, especially since we've trained all these troops?

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- I don't think you [Dr. Seth Jones] give enough credits to the people of Afghanistan who don't want the Taliban and who have these trained police and who have these trained military and nobody is saying we wouldn't have counterterrorism forces there. And I think your critique of that misplaced. ...I think you paint way too drastic a picture and – as what would happen if we don't have the boots on the ground and no one's suggesting we don't have a presence.
- Pakistan is now the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, receiving \$4.3 billion in FY 2010. We know that's not only controversial but I assume we're going to keep helping Pakistan and I'm one who believes we have to with more strength.

Op-Ed in Los Angeles Times titled "For the U.S., it's time to get out of Afghanistan", May 27, 2011:

- Although we must remain vigilant in our efforts to defeat Al Qaeda and must continue our support for the Afghan people, there is simply no justification for the continued deployment of 100,000 American troops in Afghanistan. This July, the president should expedite his promised withdrawal of our combat forces. Moreover, we should now set an end date for the U.S. deployment there.
- We have to be realistic about what we can achieve in Afghanistan. The notion that the United States can build a Western-style democracy there is a myth. Instead, we should focus on what we can and must accomplish: preventing Al Qaeda from threatening the United States, and supporting Afghans as they determine the way forward.
- Recently, I heard an expert on Afghanistan state that withdrawing U.S. troops would be risky because it "reaffirms the regional perception that the United States is not a reliable ally." I was startled by this statement. We did not go into Afghanistan with the intention of rebuilding the country or maintaining a large, permanent presence. Furthermore, the United States has sacrificed tremendously in Afghanistan. We are spending an estimated \$10 billion a month there, and our total so far is almost half a trillion dollars. We have trained 125,000 members of the Afghan police and 159,000 members of the Afghan army, and spent an estimated \$26 billion equipping them.

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Robert Menendez (D-NJ)



Family: Divorced; Two Children

Education: Saint Peter's College, B.A. 1976 (Political Science & Urban Studies); Rutgers U., J.D. 1979

Military Service: None

Career: Lawyer

Elected: 2006; Appointed to the Senate in 2005 to succeed Jon Corzine (D) who became Governor

Note: DSCC Chairman

Committees:

- Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs (Housing, Transportation & Community Development – Chairman)
- Energy & Natural Resources
- Finance
- Foreign Relations (International Development – Chairman)

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Supports “a forceful, targeted military offensive to attack and destroy Taliban and al Qaeda groups along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border” but believes that we “should resist engaging our troops in a broader, indefinite effort to act as Afghanistan’s de facto national police force.” (Press Release, 9/1/10)
- Led Senate efforts to add the Pakistani Taliban to the list of foreign terrorist organizations.
- Has led efforts for increased oversight of U.S. assistance to Pakistan and U.S. strategy; introduced legislation (enacted into law as part of the Defense Authorization bill in Oct. 2009) that mandates a certification by the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, before Pakistan is reimbursed with Coalition Support Funds, that the payment is both in the national security interests of the U.S., and will not affect the balance of power in the region. (Senator’s Website)

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 3 SFRC hearing on “Afghanistan: What is an acceptable end-state, and how do we get there?”:

- [E]ven if we are willing to make the enormous economic commitment to build a democracy, and to fund the necessary security elements at a cost of tens of billions of dollars per year, what’s the likelihood of our success? It seems to me the government is corrupt. Our working relationship is strained, to say the least. Our focus on building security forces is challenged because its membership largely excludes Pashtuns in the

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south, which is the base of the Taliban. Is there an amount of money or plan that can actually work here?

- I've always thought that we should have a counterterrorism strategy. And I – I'm – and I've been supportive of the administration so far, but I have a real hard time as we move forward.

Press Release, May 2, 2011:

- Although Osama Bin Laden's demise will not end terrorist threats, his death is a significant blow to the leadership of the al-Qaeda organization and sends the message that the U.S. will find, destroy and dismantle al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that seek to threaten the United States and its citizens at home or abroad.

Key Statements/Questions from the June 8 nomination hearing for Amb. Ryan Crocker:

- Questions the commitment of the Karzai government with respect to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan: "From 2002 to 2010, we have spent \$19 billion in assistance, \$19 billion in assistance. And much of which is not sustainable is subject to endemic corruption. And I know that there is a report about to be released suggesting that we have only limited success. That this huge attempt at nation-building may not survive an American withdrawal, and is a real concern to me. Is this a good use of United States taxpayer dollars?"
- Well, I'll just say that when I see the reports, both public and private, about where our money has gone here, where the corruption is at, and when I see Karzai talk about the United States as an occupying force, I have real problems having American lives shed and having American treasure continuing to be shed. I mean, my understanding is that for FY '02 to '10, we spent \$672 million on education. That's far from \$19 billion of success.

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Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)



Family: Wife, Myrna Edelman Cardin; Two Children (One Deceased)

Education: U. Of Pittsburgh, B.A. 1964 (Economics); U. Of Maryland, Baltimore, LL.B. 1967

Military Service: None

Career: Lawyer

Elected: 2006

Committees:

- Budget
- Finance
- Environment & Public Works (Water & Wildlife Chairman)
- Foreign Relations
- Small Business & Entrepreneurship

Chairman: Helsinki Commission

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Cardin applauded Administration's December 2010 review plans for beginning troop withdrawals in the summer of 2011, but voiced concerns about the extent of political and civilian accomplishments.
- Told Ambassador Crocker during their consultation meeting that he "doesn't have great comfort in the administration's end game in Afghanistan."

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on "Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan":

- On increasing conditions for civilian assistance to Pakistan: "We have to be prepared to cut off aid, or at least to suspend aid if in fact the conditionalities are not being met. And we have responsibility to the taxpayers of this country. We have to make some tough decisions in our budget. And, quite frankly, there is concern as to whether the value is being properly used as it relates to Pakistan. Of course, the bin Laden issue just puts a big spotlight on that."
- [W]e also need to make sure that the type of projects [funded by U.S. assistance] are signature enough that the United States is recognized as being a partner with the Pakistani people for their economic future. And I don't think we've done that as effectively as we need to.

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- The death of bin Laden provides us with an opportunity to reach out to the Pakistani people so that they understand that the gravest threat they face is not from the U.S. military, but from terrorists who are using their country as a safe heaven. We need to do a better job of helping Pakistanis understand that it is in their economic and security interests to partner with the United States.

Key Statements/Questions from the June 8 nomination hearing for Amb. Ryan Crocker:

- Regarding the SFRC Majority staff report on U.S. assistance in Afghanistan: "It's rather critical of the efficiency of the deliverance of our aid to accomplish any long-term economic stability for the people of Afghanistan. It also questions as to whether we really are operating with a leadership in Afghanistan that can deliver the type of economic promise for the people. And probably worse than that, that we're creating an arbitrary economic activity in the country based upon a war economy that will not be sustainable, and that we are in effect creating an inflationary situation within Afghanistan that will cause a serious problem as we transition to a country that can take care of itself, admittedly with international assistance."

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Bob Casey (D-PA)



Family: Wife, Terese Casey; Four Children
Education: College Of The Holy Cross, A.B. 1982
(English); Catholic U. Of America, J.D. 1988
Military Service: None
Career: Lawyer; Campaign Aide
Elected: 2006
Committees:

- Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry
- Foreign Relations (Near Eastern & South & Central Asian Affairs – Chairman)
- Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
- Joint Economic Committee – Chairman

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Generally supportive of U.S. mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but increasingly concerned about prospects for progress and stability in both countries.
- In recent hearings has called for more clarity regarding what our basic objective is and what an achievable and acceptable end-state would be in Afghanistan.
- Remains concerned about the civilian Pakistani government's commitment to rooting out extremist elements and concerned about of Pakistan's nuclear command/control.
- Co-signed a letter to Secretaries Clinton and Gates regarding allegations of extrajudicial killings by Pakistani soldiers (10/21/2010).

Ammonium Nitrate

- Senate leader in pushing for increased international pressure to stop the flow of ammonium nitrate – the main component of IEDs – into Afghanistan.
- Sponsored a Senate resolution –passed by unanimous consent in June 2010 – calling for continued support for and an increased effort by the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and other central Asian countries to effectively monitor and regulate the manufacture, sale, transport and use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer (S.Res.570).
- In Nov. 2010, Sen. Casey chaired an SFRC hearing on the subject.
- Asked the Secretary for a progress report on DoS efforts on the issue at her March 2, 2011 hearing before SFRC.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 3 SFRC hearing on "Afghanistan: What is an acceptable end-state, and how do we get there?":

- I think the American people need to hear from a lot more of us a basic description of what our goal is in Afghanistan not in a page or a volume, but literally in a sentence or two, so we can focus on the goal.

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Jim Webb (D-VA)



Family: Wife, Hong Le Webb; Five Children, one step daughter

Education: U. of Southern California, Attended 1963-64; U.S. Naval Academy, B.S. 1968; Georgetown U., J.D. 1975

Military Service: Marine Corps, 1968-72

Career: Author; Screenwriter; Journalist; U.S. Defense Department Official; Congressional Aide; Lawyer

Elected: 2006

Committees:

- Armed Services
- Foreign Relations (East Asian and Pacific Affairs – Chairman)
- Veterans Affairs
- Joint Economic

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Wrote a letter to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates on February 17, 2011, raising concerns about press reports that cite Pakistan's "ambitious efforts to modernize and expand its nuclear weapons"; and, absent clear assurances from the Administration, announcing his intent to re-introduce an amendment that would require certification that no funds appropriated for assistance to Pakistan would be used to advance programs that fall outside of direct security interests.

Wartime Contracting

- With Senator McCaskill, introduced a bill to establish the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Jan. 2008, to examine contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The Commission continues to hold hearings and investigate contracting issues involving both the Department of Defense and the Department of State, including the transfer of responsibility for U.S. operations in Iraq by the end of 2011.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the June 8 nomination hearing for Amb. Ryan Crocker:

- Questioned cost/benefits of U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan: "How much do we actually need to achieve in Afghanistan with respect to our national interests?"
- "I don't disagree with the objective, but you can pretty well fight international terrorism without remaking an entire societal structure."

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Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)



Family: Husband, Bill Shaheen; Three Children

Education: Shippensburg State College, B.A. 1969 (English); U. Of Mississippi, M.S.S. 1973 (Political Science)

Career: University Public Affairs Institute Director; Campaign Aide; Jewelry Store Owner; Teacher

Elected: 2008

Committees:

- Energy & Natural Resources (Water and Power – Chairwoman)
- Foreign Relations (European Affairs – Chairwoman)
- Small Business & Entrepreneurship

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Supportive of Administration's plan in Afghanistan but has called for setting clear and realistic expectations and metrics on how Administration plans to measure success.
- Praised the administration's appointment of a the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan in Jan. 2010; but has since raised concerns (at the Secretary's SFRC hearing on 3/2/11 and in the SASC hearing on 3/15/11 with Gen. Petraeus) that he lacks oversight authority, particularly in combating waste, fraud and abuse of assistance funding.
- Particularly concerned about protection of women's rights.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the June 8 nomination hearing for Amb. Ryan Crocker:

- Regarding the SFRC Majority staff report: "I think it does provide a renewed perspective on how difficult the challenges are in Afghanistan, particularly the, the civilian challenges ...but the report certainly underscores the need for our reconstruction projects in Afghanistan to be necessary, achievable and sustainable. And I know there have been some concerns about the projects undertaken under the CERP Program, I certainly share concerns about how those dollars are distributed."

Key Statements/Questions from the May 10 SFRC hearing on "Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan":

- Obviously, we're on an unsustainable course given the current level or the target level [of ANSF troops], it would require about \$10 billion a year. And the Afghan government takes in about a 100 billion in revenue a year, so, obviously, there's a

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disconnect there. ...In terms of funding that level of security forces, of the U.S. ultimately footing the bill if that's what we do?

- [A]s you were all were talking about what a negotiated settlement might look like, one of the things that no one mentioned was what happens to protect the rights of Afghan women as part of any kind of settlement? And what can we – what should we be doing to ensure that those rights aren't negotiated away as we might be talking to the Taliban or any other forces within Afghanistan?

Key Statements/Questions from the May 3 SFRC hearing on "Afghanistan: What is an acceptable end-state, and how do we get there?"

- [W]hat impact will the death of Osama bin Laden have on that end game? Obviously, it was a huge national security and military and intelligence triumph for the United States, but what will the real impact be, if any, on the Taliban, who are operating in Afghanistan, and does it have any impact on our allies as we look at the fight ahead?

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Chris Coons (D-DE)



Election: Defeated Christine O'Donnell, R, to succeed Ted Kaufman, D, who retired
Residence: Wilmington
Born: Sept. 9, 1963; Greenwich, Conn.
Religion: Presbyterian
Family: Wife, Annie Lingenfelter; three children
Education: Amherst College, A.B. 1985 (chemistry & political science); Yale U., J.D. 1992, M.A.R. 1992 (ethics)
Career: Lawyer; education foundation aide; campaign aide
Political highlights: New Castle County Council president, 2001-05; New Castle County executive, 2005-present
Committees:

- Budget
- Energy
- Foreign Relations (Subcommittee on African Affairs – Chair)
- Judiciary

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and Jordan over the February 2011 recess (Feb. 16-25); met with Afghan President Karzai, Pakistani President Zardari, local tribal leaders, as well as Gen. Petraeus and other U.S. military officials.
- Reported steady progress in Afghanistan following his trip, but says that is not matched by sustained progress in Pakistan; concerned about Pakistan's willingness to go after extremists.
- Believes that success cannot be achieved in Afghanistan until Pakistan stops providing sanctuary to the Taliban who attacking U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan.
- Believes that reintegration of Taliban fighters is proceeding too slowly to be effective.

Recent Statements

Op-ed on Afghanistan in June 15, 2011 *Delaware News Journal*:

- A recent Foreign Relations Committee study reinforced what I'd seen on the ground months before: that our \$19 billion in economic assistance to help build a "good enough" national government has thus far produced very uneven progress. On our current course, I suspect that we will be no closer to a truly secure and stable Afghanistan five or ten years from now than we are today. Our current counterinsurgency strategy does not appear to be producing an advantage that will ensure the progress we are making can be sustained after the planned complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2014.

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Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on "Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan":

- What does Pakistan's inability, just taking it at face value, to detect Osama bin Laden within Pakistan say about the security of its nuclear arsenal? It's one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals in the world. There is a widespread presumption that the Pakistani military is stable and capable of controlling its nuclear arsenal, but this raises some real concerns for me just accepting for the moment at face value, if you would, the idea that they had absolutely no idea that bin Laden was, I believe, less than a mile from their equivalent of West Point.
- One of my concerns [about Kerry-Lugar-Berman assistance] is that I didn't see that we were getting enough visibility or credit for what assistance we're providing. One of my concerns is that the timeline on which we operate as a nation doesn't necessarily lend itself toward long-term strategic development aid. If we're going to get the Pakistani regime and intelligence and security apparatus to rethink their relationship, vis-as-vis India, what advice would the three of you have about conditioning of assistance?

Key Statements/Questions from the June 8 nomination hearing for Amb. Ryan Crocker:

- A lot of focus on the immediate decision about a drawdown, but I'm really equally, if not more, interested in the post- 2014 structure and what it looks like and was very surprised to hear in-country assertions that we were committed to sustaining a more than 300,000-member Afghan national security force, which meant paying for it, and to a sustained U.S. military presence for the foreseeable future a decade or more.
- So far, reintegration of the Taliban is going quite slowly. It isn't proceeding at anything like the pace you and others were able to accomplish in Iraq. Do you think reintegration is going to be critical? Because, frankly, the size of the Afghan national security force required is partly directly correlated to the size of the ongoing insurgency or Taliban or other extremist activity.

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Richard J. Durbin (D-IL)



Residence: Springfield

Born: Nov. 21, 1944; East St. Louis, Ill.

Religion: Roman Catholic

Family: Wife, Loretta Durbin; three children (one deceased)

Education: Georgetown U., B.S.F.S. 1966 (international affairs & economics), J.D. 1969

Military Service: None

Career: Lawyer; gubernatorial and state legislative aide

Elected: 1996 (3rd term)

Note: Assistant Majority Leader

Political Highlights: Democratic nominee for Ill. Senate, 1976; Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor, 1978; U.S. House, 1983-97

Committees:

- Appropriations (Financial Services – Chairman)
- Foreign Relations – new Member in the 112th Congress
- Judiciary (Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights Subcommittee – Chairman)
- Rules & Administration

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- In recent hearings, raised concern about whether our strategy is sustainable in Afghanistan, citing corruption, waste and potential diversion of U.S. assistance to fund our enemy; also noted that there are other countries around the world, including in the Middle East and Africa that harbor terrorists and threaten the U.S.
- Told Amb. Crocker in consultation meeting that “there is confusion among Members on the goals in Afghanistan” and urged the administration to provide a clear plan.
- Continues to support the July 2011 timeline to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and shifting responsibilities to the Afghans.
- Outspoken supporter for U.S. and international efforts to respond to Pakistan’s floods.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on “Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan”:

- A billion dollars in aid, which I know is off to a rocky start, but certainly has the best of intentions and some good goals to it. How likely is it that this billion dollars will translate into any credit for the United States in what we’re trying to do? Does virtue have to be its own reward when it comes to development aid?

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- Durbin quoted Zardari's statement in the *Washington Post*: "Pakistan has never been and never will be the hotbed of fanaticism often described by the media. Radical religious parties have never received more than 11 percent of the vote.' Can you comment on that statement by Zardari in light of the reaction by the public, as well as by the government leaders, to the assassinations of Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti?"

Key Statements/Questions from the May 3 SFRC hearing on "Afghanistan: What is an acceptable end-state, and how do we get there?":

- I voted for the invasion of Afghanistan, and I've voted for it to go after Al Qaida for what they did to us on 9/11 and to find and if necessary kill Osama bin Laden. Now here we are, almost 10 years later. And I have to tell you, if you would have asked me whether I was signing up for the longest war in American history, which has no end in sight, even after the killing of Osama bin Laden, I would have to seriously say that wasn't the bargain. That isn't what I thought I was voting for.
- I mean, they tell us we could gather all of the known Al Qaida, active Al Qaida in Afghanistan in this room – in this room. And yet we are spending \$10 billion or \$12 billion a month in a war with the Taliban which – I've asked this basic question. Can we achieve what we want to achieve in Afghanistan without defeating the Taliban?

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Tom Udall (D-NM)



Residence: Santa Fe

Born: May 18, 1948; Tucson, Ariz.

Religion: Mormon

Family: Wife, Jill Z. Cooper; one child

Education: Prescott College, B.A. 1970 (government & political science);
Cambridge U., B.L.L. 1975; U. of New Mexico, J.D. 1977

Military Service: None

Career: Lawyer; congressional aide

Elected: 2008 (1st term); Defeated Steve Pearce, R, to succeed Pete V.
Domenici. R. who retired

Political Highlights: Assistant U.S. attorney, 1978-81; sought Democratic nomination for U.S. House, 1982; Democratic nominee for U.S. House, 1988; N.M. attorney general, 1991-99; U.S. House, 1999-2009

Committees:

- Commerce, Science, and Transportation
- Environment and Public Works
- Foreign Relations
- Indian Affairs
- Rules and Administration

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Has stated his concern about U.S. exit strategy, accelerating the transition to the Afghans, corruption in the Karzai government, and safe havens in Pakistan.
- Even prior to the UBL raid, expressed strong concerns about Pakistan's willingness to combat insurgent safe havens within their borders. (December 15, 2010 floor speech)
- Author of Merkely-Udall letter to President Obama that states: "We write to express our strong support for a shift in strategy and the beginning of a sizable and sustained reduction of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, beginning in July 2011."

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 10 SFRC hearing on "Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan":

- Somehow, now, we've gotten ourselves to the position where we're not talking anymore about an accelerated transition to an Afghan-led operation in July 2011, we've now moved to 2014... what is it that has happened that keeps moving it down the road? Is it the failure of the Afghans to step up to the plate? Is it the corruption? Is it the inadequate partnership? I mean, what's going on here that has caused that?"

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Ranking Member Richard G. Lugar (R-IN)



Residence: Indianapolis

Born: April 4, 1932; Indianapolis, Ind.

Religion: Methodist

Family: Wife, Charlene Lugar; four children

Education: Denison U., B.A. 1954; Oxford U., M.A. 1956 (Rhodes scholar)

Military Service: Navy 1957-1960

Career: Manufacturing company executive; farm manager

Elected: 1976 (6th term)

Political Highlights: Indianapolis School Board, 1964-67; mayor of Indianapolis, 1968-75; Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, 1974; Sought Republican nomination for president, 1996

Committees:

- Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry
- Foreign Relations - Ranking Member

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Lugar has outlined several key concerns in recent hearings: 1) we are spending enormous resources in Afghanistan – just one country while most of our assistance projects are being cut; 2) the threats that emanate from Afghanistan may not be the most serious in the region and may not be the most likely source of a terrorist attack (citing threats from Yemen and Pakistan); 3) our activities have expanded to nation-building and our not sustainable 4) the U.S. continues to bear the heaviest economic and military burden. (SFRC hearing, 5/3/11)
- Is concerned about growing costs of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan; as Lugar is facing a contentious primary with a Tea Party-backed candidate, he has grown more focused and vocal on budgetary concerns.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 10 SFRC hearing on “Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan”:

- Afghanistan has an undeniable symbolic importance and can still be a source of threats to United States’ security. On that, we are all agreed. The question before us is whether Afghanistan is important enough to justify the lives and massive resources that are being spent there, especially given our nation's debt crisis, or can we achieve the most important national security goals in Afghanistan, especially preventing the Taliban from taking over the government and preventing Afghan territory from being used as a terrorist safe haven at a far less expense.

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- [A] reassessment of our Afghanistan policy on the basis whether our overall geostrategic interests are being served by spending roughly \$10 billion a month in that country was needed before our troops took out bin Laden. Our geostrategic interests are threatened in numerous locations, not just by terrorism, but by debt, economic competition, energy and food prices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and numerous other forces. And solving these problems will be much more difficult if we devote too many resources toward one country that historically has frustrated nation-building experiments.
- Congress needs to know much more about the prospective strategy partnership agreement that's under discussion with the Afghan government. The cancellation of bilateral talks scheduled for last March underscored that progress on this agreement has been slow. The president and his team also need to establish much greater confidence regarding coalition efforts to train Afghan security forces.

Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on "Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan":

- ...distancing ourselves from Pakistan would be unwise and extremely dangerous. It would weaken our intelligence gathering, limit our ability to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan, further complicate military operations in Afghanistan, end cooperation on finding terrorists, and eliminate engagement with Islamabad on the security of its nuclear weapons.

Key Statements/Questions from the May 3 SFRC hearing on "Afghanistan: What is an acceptable end-state, and how do we get there?":

- Senator Lugar called on the President to be "forthcoming on a definition of success in Afghanistan based on U.S. vital interests and a sober analysis of what is possible to achieve." Further, he stated that "it's exceedingly difficult to conclude that our vast expenditures in Afghanistan represent a rational allocation of our military and financial assets" and stated that "with al Qaeda largely displaced from the country, but franchised in other locations, Afghanistan does not carry a strategic value that justifies 100,000 American troops and a \$100 billion per year cost, especially given current fiscal restraints."

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Bob Corker (R-TN)



Family: Wife, Elizabeth Corker; Two Children

Education: U. Of Tennessee, B.S. 1974 (Industrial Management)

Military Service: None

Career: Commercial Real Estate Developer; Construction Company Owner

Elected: 2006

Committees:

- Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
- Energy and Natural Resources
- Foreign Relations (International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection – Ranking Member)
- Special Aging, Ranking Member

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in February 2011 (his third trip).
- Stated in Amb. Crocker's June 8 hearing that he does not think civilian assistance in Afghanistan is sustainable; has repeatedly questioned strategy in Afghanistan as an act of nation-building.
- Sent a letter to Secretary Clinton on May 3 requesting "details as to the extent of the cooperation received from the Pakistanis and their role in the final operation" that led to the death of UBL.
- In recent hearings has stated his view that we are spending too much – both DoD and State – on civilian initiatives; believes that we should focus on building the security forces and downgrading the Taliban so that we can more quickly exit.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 10 SFRC hearing on "Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan":

- [H]ow does the fact that in essence any kind of Afghanistan... if we get to good enough, Afghanistan will not exist without us. They're going to be our supplicant. There's no way that they can ...take care of the army and the police on the ground."
- I think all of us who go there are frustrated by the sense, it feels like we're fighting the mafia in many ways and our soldiers are really fighting criminality mostly on the ground. I mean, that's mostly what's happening.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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- I think [President Karzai] wanted to make some accommodations with some of the warlords early on and wanted us to have less – less troops on the ground... Our State Department, on the other hand, was focused on a sort of a western democracy type situation with a judicial system and all types of things happening there. Is the State Department in sync with what the military is – is now envisioning is good enough?

Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on “Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan”:

- Regarding the death of UBL: “[Pakistanis] don’t act rationally as it relates to their own strategic interest. [...] As has been said, either they’re in cahoots or incompetent, but this gives us an opportunity now to sort of rearrange that relationship.”
- I think somehow or another, Afghanistan and what’s happening in the FATA areas has got to be a central element of why we’re having foreign aid [in Pakistan]. And I think all of us need to talk about – talk about that and look – look at that, because it seems to me having those divergent views, and us providing \$22 billion in aid since 2002 don’t add up in the right way.

Key Statements/Questions from the May 3 SFRC hearing on “Afghanistan: What is an acceptable end-state, and how do we get there?”:

- So what is it about Afghanistan...that makes it more of a safe haven, if you will, than some of the other places that we might consider having 100,000 troops?
- I do hope we’ll look at civilian spending, and I agree that it’s happening both through the military and through our State Department. And hopefully, that’s something, since ...all three of you [witnesses] agree with the fact that we’re spending too much money there on the civilian side.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

James E. Risch (R-ID)



Pronounced: Rhymes with "Wish"

Family: Wife, Vicki Risch; Three Children

Education: U. of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Attended 1961-63; U. of Idaho, B.S. 1965 (Forest Resources Management), J.D. 1968

Career: Lawyer; Rancher; Trailer Company Owner; Property Management Company Owner; College Instructor

Elected: 2008

Committees:

- Energy and Natural Resources
- Foreign Relations (Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs – Ranking Member)
- Select Ethics
- Select Intelligence
- Small Business and Entrepreneurship

Afghanistan and Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan in April 2009.
- Supported President Obama's decision to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, but does not agree with setting the July 2011 drawdown date.
- At Amb. Crocker's June 8 nomination hearing, stated that he is "very skeptical" about how we will be able to end our military presence while achieving our civilian goals.

Recent Statements

Key Statements/Questions from the May 5 SFRC hearing on "Assessing U.S. Policy And Its Limits In Pakistan":

- In the very near future there's going to be massive cuts in spending by the United States government... every dollar [the USG] spends in – in Pakistan – building a bridge for instance in the Swat Valley or – or anywhere where there were floods over there is strapping their children and grandchildren with a horrendous debt while we need bridges right here at home. [...] you might start thinking about it. Because in the future there is going to be massive cuts in federal spending. And I suspect this is one area that's going to get looked at pretty closely.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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Marco Rubio (R-FL)



Election: Defeated Kendrick B. Meek, D, to succeed George LeMieux, R, who retired

Residence: West Miami

Born: May 28, 1971; Miami, Fla.

Religion: Roman Catholic

Family: Wife, Jeanette Rubio; four children

Education: Tarkio College, attended 1989-90; Santa Fe Community College, attended 1990-91; U. of Florida, B.S. 1993 (political science); U. of Miami, J.D. 1996

Career: Lawyer; campaign aide

Political highlights: West Miami City Commission, 1998-00; Fla. House, 2000-2008 (majority leader, 2003-06; Speaker, 2006-08)

Committees:

- Commerce, Science, and Transportation
- Foreign Relations
- Small Business and Entrepreneurship
- Select Intelligence

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan January 14-19, 2011 and reported progress: "we are headed in the right direction." He believes 2011 will be a critical year for Afghanistan security forces to step up and play a bigger role.
- Opposes withdrawal date for the war in Afghanistan.

Terrorism

- Applauded the Administration's decision to seek military trials for Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other 9/11 conspirators; co-sponsored legislation to prohibit civilian trials for 9/11 conspirators (Press Release, 4/4/11)

Recent Statements

Press Release, May 2, 2011:


- On bin Laden's death: "While this diabolical terrorist's death at America's hands is a moment to celebrate, we must never forget the serious terrorist threats that remain and will demand an enduring vigilance."

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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James M. Inhofe (R-OK)



Pronounced: IN-hoff

Residence: Tulsa

Born: November 17, 1934; Des Moines, Iowa

Religion: Presbyterian

Family: Wife, Kay Inhofe; four children

Education: U. of Tulsa, B.A. 1973

Military Service: Army, 1957-58

Career: Real estate developer; insurance executive

Elected: 1994

Committees:

- Armed Services
- Environment & Public Works – Ranking member
- Foreign Relations (East Asian and Pacific Affairs – Ranking member)

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan January 2011.
- Speaking upon return from his trip to Afghanistan in Jan. 2011: “My assessment of our progress in Afghanistan is positive but results are mixed. I remain concerned about President Karzai’s ability to form a central government that is trusted by the Afghan people and that can provide adequate governance and security throughout Afghanistan. To assist the Afghan government, the State Department has increased its presence from approximate 300 to over 1100 personnel. While these personnel are providing assistance across the spectrum of the government and ministries, they cannot focus their efforts on Kabul. They must continue to expand and engage throughout Afghanistan in order to link provinces and villages back to the central government.” (Press Release, 1/3/11)
- Strongly opposed to the July 2011 timeline: “It sends the wrong signal to the Afghan people, our Coalition partners and the Taliban.”
- Stated post-UBL that there is “no doubt in my mind” that Pakistani officials knew of his whereabouts.
- Stressed that bin Laden’s death should not change the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Jim DeMint (R-SC)



Family: Wife, Debbie DeMint; Four Children

Education: U. Of Tennessee, B.S. 1973 (Communications); Clemson U., M.B.A. 1981

Military Service: None

Career: Market Research Company Owner; Advertising And Sales Representative

Elected: 2004

Committees:

- Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
- Commerce, Science and Transportation
- Foreign Relations (European Affairs – Ranking Member)
- Joint Economic

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Supported sending more troops to Afghanistan: “President Obama is our commander-in-chief, and I hope his new plan will achieve victory in Afghanistan. I’m concerned about the months of delay and the message it has sent to our enemies about our commitment to win this fight.” (Press Release, 12/1/09)
- Expressed concern about religious freedom at the Secretary’s March 2, 2011 budget hearing: “So my question to you is, while we hear these reports [about the growing problem with religiously motivated violence], and the media seems to informally document them, is the state department actually trying to track and quantify these crimes in Afghanistan and other countries where we support with foreign aid? What are we doing? What can we do to stop it, to express our concern?”
- In May 5 SFRC hearing “Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan”, DeMint praised use of enhanced interrogation methods and the use of secret CIA-run detainee centers: “There is no question the CIA’s secret prisons and successful interrogation methods played a crucial role in finding bin Laden. Neither of those programs, however, is utilized today.”

Foreign Aid/State Department

- Supports better coordination by the State Department in facilitating private sector, non-for-profit, and religious groups in humanitarian efforts.
- Calls for more accountability from those that receive U.S. aid, and more transparency at the UN.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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Johnny Isakson (R-GA)



Family: Wife, Dianne Isakson; Three Children

Education: U. Of Georgia, B.B.A. 1966 (Real Estate)

Military Service: Ga. Air National Guard, 1966-72

Career: Real Estate Company President

Elected: 2004

Committees:

- Commerce, Science & Transportation
- Foreign Relations (African Affairs – Ranking Member)
- Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
- Select Ethics – Ranking Member
- Veterans' Affairs

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Believes in the necessity of the U.S. mission in the region.
- Supportive of the President's strategy in Afghanistan, including the troop increase – but opposes the setting of "an arbitrary timeline for withdrawal" because it "sends the exact wrong signal to the enemy." (Senator's Website)
- Co-signed a letter to Sen. Kerry, requesting he hold hearings requiring the administration to "clearly define its view on 'success' on the civilian front in Afghanistan," noting that, "To date, all responses to this question have been vague and lacked clarity." (*Politico*, 6/25/10)

Terrorism

- Called the Administration's decision to try 9/11 suspects in military commissions "long-overdue" and praised the President's change of course. (Press Release, 4/5/11)

Recent Statements

Weekly e-Newsletter to Constituents, May 6, 2011:

- On the death of UBL: "As far as Pakistan's involvement is concerned, Pakistan has been a periodically reliable ally in a very unsettled part of the world. We need to continue to work for better consistency and better reliability in their support. Any U.S. funding for Pakistan should be conditioned upon our satisfaction that our relationship with Pakistan is trustworthy and strong."

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John Barrasso (R-WY)



Pronounced: Buh-rass-O

Family: Wife Bobbi Brown; Three Children

Education: Georgetown, B.S. 1974 (Biology), M.D. 1978

Military Service: None

Career: Surgeon

Appointed: 2007

Committees:

- Energy & Natural Resources
- Environment & Public Works
- Foreign Relations (Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps & Global Narcotics Affairs – Ranking Member)
- Indian Affairs – Vice Chairman

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- Traveled to Afghanistan in January 2011 (his fourth trip in four years)
- Supports the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, even after the death of UBL.
- Supported the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (Press Release, 7/30/08)

Recent Statements

Interview on MSNBC's *Morning Joe*, June 13, 2011:

- I've supported the president in his efforts all the way through. I've been to Afghanistan four times, most recently this year. We need to make sure that the Afghan people are ready and prepared to stand up for themselves. They're getting closer. And I'm not going to quibble with the president about the number of troops that he brings home. They're talking different numbers. I'm going to let it to General Petraeus and Secretary Gates and the men and women in the field to make those recommendations to the president.
- I was at the Kabul military training center earlier this year. I've been there a couple of years ago. I think they're doing a much better job of training and preparing these troops." Asked about whether funding for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan should be cut: "Defense cuts have to be on the table.

Interview on MSNBC's *Daily Rundown*, June 7, 2011:

- Realize, the Afghan people, I mean, they're classic hedgers. They hedge their bets. And they believe we're leaving and then they have to be concerned about what's going to be leftover with the Taliban. And what I want them to be left with is a country where they have their own Afghan people trained and prepared to deal with the Taliban.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Mike Lee (R-UT)



Election: Defeated Sam Granato (D) to succeed Robert F. Bennett (R), who was not renominated

Residence: Alpine

Born: June 4, 1971; Mesa, Ariz.

Religion: Mormon

Family: Wife, Sharon Lee; three children

Education: Brigham Young U., B.A. 1994 (political science), J.D. 1997

Career: Lawyer; gubernatorial aide

Political highlights: Assistant U.S. attorney, 2002-05

Committees:

- Energy and Natural Resources
- Foreign Relations
- Judiciary
- Joint Economic
- Co-founder of the Senate Tea Party Caucus

Afghanistan/Pakistan

- “My policy on Afghanistan is simple: our troops are there to take out military targets – i.e., things that present a clear and present threat to our national security – and should be brought home as soon as possible after all such targets have been destroyed or neutralized and the Afghan National Army has been trained sufficiently to protect their own land from further Taliban incursion.” (Campaign Website, 2010)
- Believes that our assistance efforts should be driven by national security interests and should have buy-in from local populations to ensure they are sustainable.
- Told Amb. Crocker in private meeting that he’d like to see a move towards a more counter-terrorism focused mission and believes a large-scale COIN presence is unsustainable.

Recent Statements

Blog Post, May 2, 2011:

- Stated that death of bin Laden “brings relief to the United States and her allies in the war on terror. The brave men and women of our armed forces who successfully achieved their mission have sent a strong message to al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and the many others who carry out such cowardly attacks, that justice, no matter how long and difficult the pursuit, will prevail.”

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EVALUATING U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, June 8, 2011.

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This report takes a close look at how the United States is spending civilian aid dollars in Afghanistan to make sure we are pursuing the most effective strategy in support of our national security objectives. We spend more on aid to Afghanistan than any other country and the environment in which the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) operate is difficult and dangerous. With the upcoming transition to an Afghan security lead in 2014 and the increased responsibilities our civilians will absorb from the military, we have a critical planning window right now to make any necessary changes to support a successful transition.

This report is meant to continue a close working relationship between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Obama administration on ensuring that our assistance programs in the region meet their objectives. Given this committee's jurisdiction to conduct oversight of the State Department and USAID and the levels of funding in Afghanistan, I asked the committee's majority staff to conduct a thorough review of U.S. civilian assistance. This report is the product of two years of staff research and travel. It is intended to provide constructive and timely guidance for administration officials at every level who are working to guarantee that our taxpayer-financed aid to Afghanistan is spent in the most effective and efficient manner possible.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KERRY,
Chairman.

(V)

EVALUATING U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been at the forefront of examining progress in Afghanistan. This report—which is the most comprehensive congressional investigation to date of our foreign assistance to Afghanistan—continues that effort. Building on 2 years of staff research and travel, the report focuses on funding appropriated by Congress to the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the Function 150 account. It does not cover U.S. military aid, such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which we believe deserves closer scrutiny.

The committee provided a draft of this report to the State Department and USAID. In a response letter to Chairman John F. Kerry on June 6, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides underscored the importance of sustainability and expressed support for our recommendation to develop a multiyear assistance strategy. His comments are reproduced in Appendix VI. USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah acknowledged the need to do more to spend our aid money effectively in Afghanistan and provided several recent examples of how USAID is addressing the issues raised in this report. His comments are reproduced in Appendix VII.

Today, the United States spends more on foreign aid in Afghanistan than in any other country, including Iraq. After 10 years and roughly \$18.8 billion in foreign aid, we have achieved some real successes.¹ There has been a sevenfold increase in the number of children attending school and significant improvements in health care. But we should have no illusions. Serious challenges remain that will prevent us from achieving our goals unless they are addressed.

Foreign assistance can be a vital tool for promoting stability in Afghanistan. Given the security challenges and limited resources at its disposal, USAID has performed admirably and assumed considerable risks in support of the President's civil-military strategy for

¹ The figure of \$18.8 billion refers to total Function 150 assistance to Afghanistan between FY2002–2010, which excludes total Function 050 assistance for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), CERP, and counternarcotics. See Appendix I for more details.

Afghanistan.² However, we believe the administration can be more effective in how it spends aid in Afghanistan. U.S. assistance should meet three basic conditions before money is spent: our projects should be *necessary, achievable, and sustainable*.

The State Department and USAID are spending approximately \$320 million a month on foreign aid in Afghanistan.³ In part, the administration has been using aid to "win hearts and minds." For instance, roughly 80 percent of USAID's resources are being spent in Afghanistan's restive south and east. Only 20 percent is going to the rest of the country.⁴ Most of the funds in Afghanistan's south and east are being used for short-term stabilization programs instead of longer term development projects, though that balance may now be changing.

The evidence that stabilization programs promote stability in Afghanistan is limited. Some research suggests the opposite, and development best practices question the efficacy of using aid as a stabilization tool over the long run. As discussed below, the unintended consequences of pumping large amounts of money into a war zone cannot be underestimated.

We must understand the impact of our assistance—positive and negative—on the local population. For instance, we are investing heavily in agriculture to provide alternatives to joining the Taliban and discourage poppy cultivation. While this may be the right approach, the strategy has raised expectations and changed incentive structures among Afghans. The administration is pursuing an assistance strategy based on counterinsurgency theories that deserve careful, ongoing scrutiny to see if they yield intended results.

Foreign aid, when misspent, can fuel corruption, distort labor and goods markets, undermine the host government's ability to exert control over resources, and contribute to insecurity. According to the World Bank, an estimated 97 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP) is derived from spending related to the international military and donor community presence. Afghanistan could suffer a severe economic depression when foreign troops leave in 2014 unless the proper planning begins now.⁵

The administration is understandably anxious for immediate results to demonstrate to Afghans and Americans alike that we are making progress. However, insecurity, abject poverty, weak indigenous capacity, and widespread corruption create challenges for spending money. High staff turnover,⁶ pressure from the military,

² USAID and its implementing partners have lost over 370 personnel in Afghanistan over the last 7 years. Administrator Rajiv Shah, Ninth Annual Princeton Colloquium to address "Re-thinking U.S. Foreign Aid and Policy," Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, April 9, 2011.

³ Conversations with senior Embassy Kabul officials, May 2011.

⁴ For more information, see Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 21 and 22. Note that we include the "southwest" in our calculations for USAID resource allocations in Afghanistan's "south and east." See Appendixes II and III for funding breakdowns by province for FY 2009–2010 and FY 2011. According to USAID's Rajiv Shah, "roughly 65–70 percent of all our resources are being spent in those [south, southwest, and east] areas." Shah's comments are reproduced in Appendix VII.

⁵ Dr. Ashraf Ghani, "Preparing for Transition: A Policy Note on Development," policy memo sent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, May 12, 2011.

⁶ According to a former development specialist at USAID's Mission in Kabul, the staff turnover rate in Afghanistan is more than 85 percent a year. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. military dismayed by delays in 3 key development projects in Afghanistan," Washington Post, April 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-dismayed-by-delays-in-3-key-development-projects-in-afghanistan/2011/04/22/APD6jq8E_story.html.

imbalances between military and civilian resources,⁷ unpredictable funding levels from Congress, and changing political timelines have further complicated efforts. Pressure to achieve rapid results puts our civilians under enormous strain to spend money quickly.

We need to take a closer look at how we are spending money in Afghanistan and the impact it is having on the Afghan state. The U.S. Government relies heavily on contractors in Afghanistan, but multiple reports and the recent crisis at Kabul Bank have raised alarms about the lack of robust oversight. Most U.S. aid bypasses the Afghan Government in favor of international firms. This practice can weaken the ability of the Afghan state to execute its budget, lead to redundant and unsustainable donor projects, and fuel corruption. The United States has committed to funding more aid directly through the Afghan Government, but stronger measures must first be taken to ensure greater accountability of our funds.

The U.S. strategy is focused on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to deliver basic services. The State Department and USAID are currently spending approximately \$1.25 billion on such efforts.⁸ But our overreliance on international technical advisors to build Afghan capacity may undermine these efforts. Our aid projects need to focus more on sustainability so that Afghans can absorb our programs when donor funds recede.

The administration is taking welcome steps to improve oversight. We support USAID Administrator Shah's initiatives such as USAID Forward, which will incorporate more vigorous measurement and accountability tools, streamline contracting rules, and fund smaller, local agents of change. USAID has also established the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (A3) to ensure dollars are not being diverted from their purpose by extortion or corruption. These and other steps, including planned improvements to USAID's acquisition strategy and support for third party monitoring and evaluation, will help ensure proper use of U.S. taxpayer funds.

We believe additional action is needed and provide recommendations throughout the report. Perhaps the single most important step the U.S. Government can take is to work with the Afghan Government and other donors to standardize Afghan salaries and work within Afghan Government staffing constraints. Donor practices of hiring Afghans at inflated salaries have drawn otherwise qualified civil servants away from the Afghan Government and created a culture of aid dependency.

As we draw down our troops in Afghanistan, our civilians will have to absorb missions currently performed by the military. The State Department and USAID will need adequate resources to en-

⁷ According to James Kunder, former USAID acting deputy administrator, "It's time to focus on the underlying reason our fighting forces feel inadequately supported: There are a thousand Defense Department personnel for every one USAID employee around the world. Administrations and Congresses controlled by both parties allow this preposterous imbalance in capability to continue. This particular Congress has gone one better, deeply cutting USAID and State Department funding despite warnings from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and uniformed commanders that inadequate civilian capacity means more American soldiers deployed and, regrettably, more dead and wounded." James Kunder, "Afghan Aid Efforts are Crucial to the War Effort," Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, May 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/afghan-aid-programs-are-crucial-to-the-war-effort/2011/05/01/AFFhLZjF_story.html.

⁸ The figure of \$1.25 billion includes USAID estimated costs on capacity-building in Afghanistan (see Appendix IV) and INL current task order year spending on capacity-building projects in Afghanistan (see Appendix V).

sure a smooth transition and avoid repeating the mistakes we made in Iraq.⁹ Transition planning should find the right balance between avoiding a sudden dropoff in aid, which could trigger a major economic recession, and a long-term phaseout from current levels of donor spending.

There must also be unity of effort across the U.S. Government and international community. If we conclude that a civilian program lacks achievable goals and needs to be scaled back, no other actors should take over the effort. Too often, when our civilians determine that a project is infeasible, we simply transfer the program to other actors, such as the U.S. military or other donors.

The theme echoed throughout this report is that our strategies and projects should meet the conditions of being *necessary, achievable, and sustainable* before funding is allocated. The report describes how these principles have been applied in practice through the cases of the National Solidarity Program and Basic Package of Health Services (Case Study A) and the ongoing effort to improve sub-national governance through the Performance-Based Governors Fund (Case Study B).

Finally, this report offers three overarching recommendations for the administration to pursue a more effective assistance strategy in Afghanistan:

(1) *Consider authorizing a multiyear civilian assistance strategy for Afghanistan.* The administration and Congress should consider working together on a multiyear authorization that includes: (a) a clearly defined assistance strategy; (b) the tools, instruments, and authorities required for a successful development approach; (c) a plan as to how U.S. funding will leverage and partner with Afghan domestic policies, with multilateral efforts—including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank—and with private sector financing; (d) the civilian resources needed for a successful military draw down and transition; (e) the steps needed to ensure accountability, oversight, and effectiveness; and (f) metrics that measure performance and capture outcomes. The strategy should also establish benchmarks for the Afghan Government to fulfill its international commitments, outline goals for improving donor coordination, and include specific annual funding levels. This process would clarify the U.S. assistance strategy, offer greater predictability on future funding levels, and provide Congress with robust tools for oversight.

(2) *Reevaluate the performance of stabilization programs in conflict zones.* We must challenge the assumption that our stabilization programs in their current form necessarily contribute to stability. The administration should continue to assess the impact of our stabilization programs in Afghanistan and reallocate funds, as necessary.

(3) *Focus on sustainability.* We should follow a simple rule: *Donors should not implement projects if Afghans cannot sustain them.* Development in Afghanistan will only succeed if Afghans are legitimate partners and there is a path toward sustainability. The Afghan Government must have sufficient technical capability and

⁹U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print, Majority Staff, 112th Cong., 1st sess., "Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort," January 31, 2011, <http://foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=C4ABBB7E-FFD6-4162-BB55-878EC62FE445>.

funding to cover operation and maintenance costs after a project is completed. A sustainability strategy would consolidate our programs, increase on-budget aid, streamline our rules and controls, and pursue a limited number of high-impact programs that do not require complex procurement or infrastructure. We should also focus on raising domestic revenue, reducing aid dependency, and developing partnerships with the private sector to create jobs. Success should not be measured by outputs or the amount of money spent, but by the ability of Afghan institutions to deliver services, the Afghan private sector to generate jobs and grow the economy, and Afghan civil society and public institutions to provide avenues for citizens to hold their government accountable and participate in political and civic life. More thought should be given to the type of projects we fund. Our aid should be visible among Afghans, and we should have a robust communications strategy in place so Afghans know what U.S. civilian aid in Afghanistan is accomplishing.

WHY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN MATTERS

Foreign assistance is critical to advancing U.S. policy interests overseas. When implemented effectively, it can play a valuable role in promoting security, building governance, fostering economic development, and supporting civil society. Development can help consolidate military gains and support our diplomatic efforts, which is why both President George W. Bush and President Obama elevated development to accompany defense and diplomacy in their respective national security strategies. The goal of our assistance in Afghanistan is to create the conditions for a more stable, democratic government capable of resisting attempts by Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups from returning and establishing safe havens from which to launch attacks on the U.S. homeland.

The administration's fiscal year 2012 request for Afghanistan includes roughly \$3.2 billion in foreign aid.¹⁰ This funding level reflects the pivotal role the State Department and USAID are expected to play to help consolidate our military gains and ensure a successful transition. It gives our Embassy and USAID Mission in Kabul the necessary resources to build basic Afghan capacity.

Our military leaders, including General David Petraeus, strongly support this request.¹¹ It represents a roughly 22-percent decrease from FY 2010-enacted levels, which we believe is a responsible reduction. The cut reflects our shared desire to find the right-sized footprint in Afghanistan, which will provide needed civilian resources without engaging in long-term nation-building.

¹⁰ Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Annual Regional Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2012, pp. 604 and 664.

¹¹ On March 4, 2011, General Petraeus wrote to Senator Graham about the dangers of further cuts to the State Department budget. He stated that the proposed cuts will "undermine our plans for a conditions-based transition to Afghan lead and our long-term goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. During this [transition] period, [the State Department] will shoulder important responsibilities for economic development and national and subnational governance capacity-building, which includes support for ministry development, rule of law, and long-term economic development and infrastructure projects. Without a fully resourced [State Department] role, the hard-earned progress our troops have made could be put at risk. Indeed, as we look beyond 2014, it is clear that the State Department will shoulder the lion's share of requirements to support our enduring commitment to Afghanistan. The funding required to build that capacity must start now and continue for the foreseeable future."

We support the President's FY 2012 request and recognize the value of foreign assistance in achieving our national security objectives. However, we believe the administration can be more effective in how it spends money in Afghanistan. As we begin the transition process to Afghan-led security and as our civilians absorb more tasks from the military, our civilian assistance strategy must focus on what is *necessary, achievable, and sustainable*. While the U.S. Government will continue to support the government and people of Afghanistan with foreign assistance after our troops come home, in the words of USAID Administrator Shah, we must provide assistance "in a way that allows our efforts to be replaced over time by efficient local governments, thriving civil societies and vibrant private sectors."¹²

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN

In March 2009, President Obama's initial interagency review of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan found that "a complete overhaul of our civilian assistance strategy is necessary," which would require "a significant change in the management, resources, and focus of our foreign assistance."¹³

Congress appropriated approximately \$2.8 billion in FY 2009 and \$4.2 billion in FY 2010 funds for Afghanistan to increase our civilian presence in the field, build the capacity of Afghan institutions, and support military operations.¹⁴ According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, these budget increases properly funded "a mission that in past years was poorly defined and underresourced."¹⁵ Former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Richard Holbrooke led an interagency effort that resulted in a "whole-of-government" approach.

Today, the focus of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan is to build the capacity of Afghan institutions and promote economic development in order to create jobs and weaken popular support for the insurgency. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has argued that this approach is "far from an exercise in nation-building" because it aims "to achieve realistic progress in critical areas" and is aligned with our security objectives.¹⁶ The goal is to transition to an Afghan lead for security responsibility by the end of 2014.

To accomplish this mission, the State Department and USAID dramatically increased the number of civilians on the ground in Afghanistan from 531 civilians in January 2009 to about 1,300 today,

¹² Administrator Rajiv Shah, Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington, DC, April 1, 2011, p. 4, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-04-01_testimony-Shah.pdf

¹³ "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 2009, pp. 1-2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf

¹⁴ These figures refer to total 150 budget function assistance in FY 2009 and FY 2010. For more information, see Appendix I.

¹⁵ Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, December 8, 2009, p. 2, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/December/Eikenberry%2012-08-09.pdf>

¹⁶ Department of State, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, "Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Plan," Updated February 2010, p. 2, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>

with approximately 920 in Kabul and 380 in the field.¹⁷ The number of civilians is expected to peak at roughly 1,450 by mid-2014, according to Embassy officials. But overall funding levels peaked in 2010. This means that the Embassy will have more civilians in the field with fewer resources in 2014, just as the security transition is in full swing.

Safely maintaining civilians in Afghanistan is costly. According to senior Embassy officials, each U.S. civilian costs about half a million dollars. This figure covers training, salaries, and travel expenses but excludes security costs covered by the military, which civilians will have to absorb as we begin drawing down troops. It also excludes the cost of emergency protection details (EPD) that transport our civilians in theatre. An EPD for an Ambassador in Kabul, for instance, can cost approximately \$8 million a year.¹⁸

In light of funding constraints, the State Department and USAID may want to consider a smaller civilian footprint—a “civilian ebb”—that gives priority to the key aspects of the civilian mission that are *necessary, achievable, and sustainable*.

President Obama’s review of our assistance strategies in the region resulted in a profound change in the coordination of U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Traditionally, USAID leads our foreign assistance efforts with policy guidance from the State Department. Under the President’s new strategy, SRAP housed at the State Department in Washington, DC, is charged with overseeing all civilian operations. The Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad have followed suit by establishing new Assistance Coordinator positions staffed by senior Foreign Service officers to oversee the aid.

The migration of foreign assistance responsibilities from USAID to the State Department was intended to increase coordination among government agencies, reduce stove-piping, and ensure that development supports U.S. foreign policy.

This “whole-of-government” approach has succeeded to some degree. For instance, Embassy Kabul’s Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA), led by an Ambassador-level coordinator, supervises the work of 14 sections and agencies at the U.S. mission, including USAID, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Treasury attaché, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Transportation. Similarly, the Embassy’s Rule of Law Directorate, a civilian-military effort led by an Ambassador-level coordinator supported by senior military officers, coordinates and supervises agencies working on rule of law and law enforcement programs. These include USAID, the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the Department of Homeland Security. Both these functions have served the U.S. Ambassador and Embassy Kabul in their efforts to coordinate our development and assistance programs.

¹⁷ Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Report of Inspection,” Report Number ISP-I-10-32A, February 2010, p. 11, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/138084.pdf>

¹⁸ Conversation with senior Embassy Kabul officials, April 2011

However, this new approach has also added multiple Ambassador-level officials at the Embassy in addition to the SRAP, created new layers of bureaucracy, diminished USAID's voice at the table, and put decisionmaking on development issues in the hands of diplomats instead of development experts.

USING DEVELOPMENT DOLLARS TO SUPPORT COIN

The U.S. counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) in Afghanistan calls on the military to secure key areas—"clear" and "hold," while USAID and its counterparts follow up with the "build" and "transfer" phases. The goal is to provide security, strengthen local government institutions, and build critical infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and clinics. In theory, these steps can improve lives and weaken popular support for the insurgency.

This past year saw a marked shift in resources from Kabul to the regional, provincial, and district levels in nearly all of the 34 provinces, particularly in the south and east where the U.S. military surge is concentrated. The shift responded to the need for increased civil-military cooperation at the provincial and district levels to hold territory cleared by military operations.

Roughly 77 percent—or about \$1.65 billion—of USAID's total FY 2009–10 resources are being spent in Afghanistan's south and east. In FY 2011, according to USAID projections, roughly 81 percent—or about \$872 million—will go to these regions.¹⁹ Most of the funds in Afghanistan's south and east are being used for short-term stabilization programs instead of longer term development projects. Given these levels and the trend lines indicating increased funding for the south and east as a percentage of total FY 2011 funds, our stabilization strategy deserves closer scrutiny.²⁰

Stabilization projects are designed to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction requirements in areas of instability. Practitioners in the field argue that stabilization is not development and that stabilization projects, if pursued over an extended period, can have negative consequences. Working closely with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and district support teams (DSTs), USAID plans to shift from stabilization to transitional development as security improves.

This section examines the theory guiding our stabilization efforts and our agricultural investments. It also considers the consequences of our stabilization strategy on the local population.

COIN THEORY AND STABILIZATION

Our stabilization strategy assumes that short-term aid promotes stability in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and "wins hearts and minds" by improving security, enhancing the legitimacy and reach of the central government, and drawing support away from the Taliban. It presumes that the international community and the

¹⁹ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 21 and 22. Note that we include the "southwest" in our calculations for USAID resource allocations in Afghanistan's "south and east." For more information, see: Appendixes II and III. According to USAID's Rajiv Shah, "roughly 66–70 percent of all our resources are being spent in those [south, southwest, and east] areas." Shah's comments are reproduced in Appendix VII.

²⁰ See Appendixes II and III.

Afghan Government have shared objectives when it comes to promoting longer term development, good governance, and the rule of law.²¹

These assumptions may not be correct. In March 2010, a conference at Wilton Park in the United Kingdom brought together leading experts on the role of development in counterinsurgency. The conference report found "a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives" in Afghanistan.²²

The key is to understand the root causes of insecurity, which may differ in each province and district. Take the case of the United Kingdom's stabilization program in Helmand province between 2006 and 2008. According to a recent Tufts University study, the stabilization model adopted by the British during this period assumed that poverty and a limited government presence were fueling the negative perceptions of governmental authorities and international development projects.²³ Field research, however, suggests that local residents in Helmand are more concerned about the lack of security and poor governance.²⁴ Taliban intimidation and rampant insecurity beyond the main towns of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk have deterred the population from cooperating with the government. Poor governance has exacerbated these trends, allowing the Taliban to exploit the grievances of politically marginalized groups.²⁵

Administrator Shah agrees that "we must strive to uncover the true drivers of instability in a region, based . . . on local perspectives . . . What we've found is that it is generally not the case that a lack of schools or roads drives conflict. Often the situation is far subtler, having to do with local power dynamics or long-held grudges."²⁶ Our aid strategy cannot assume that poverty or unemployment alone fuel the insurgency. For example, according to the World Bank, poverty rates in the insurgency-plagued Helmand and Kandahar provinces are less than 30 percent. By contrast, in the more peaceful central and northern provinces, poverty rates run from between 42 and 58 percent in Bamyan and Ghor to upward of 58 percent in Balkh province.²⁷

In a recent study of the drivers of political violence, USAID found limited evidence linking poverty and low education to support for radical groups.²⁸ Development aid can have violence-reducing effects when used to help local governments deliver basic serv-

²¹ "Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations," Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, March 2010, p. 1, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/com/repository/Assessing_Effectiveness_of_Development_Aid_in_COIN_4281_Apr_10%28.pdf.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Stuart Gordon, "Winning Hearts and Minds: Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Helmand Province," Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2011, <https://wikis.ut.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=44797077>.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁶ Administrator Rajiv Shah, "Insights," USAID Frontlines, December 2010/January 2011, http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_jan11/FL_jan11_insights.html.

²⁷ "The World Bank in Afghanistan," International Development Association Results, May 2011.

²⁸ "Dampening Processes of Radicalization at the Individual and Societal Level," Development to Counter Insurgency, USAID Evidence Summit, 2010, pp. 5-6.

ices, but achieving this in Afghanistan remains challenging.²⁹ Providing legitimate employment opportunities may be part of the solution, but the literature is inconclusive.³⁰

Security and governance matter. Development spending can strengthen the government and weaken insurgents in areas that are secure and enjoy good governance. It can also have the opposite effect when security and governance are poor or absent. As historian Mark Moyar observes:

... the United States spent more than \$100 million repairing and upgrading the Kajaki hydropower plant to provide electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but last year half of its electricity went into areas where the insurgents control the electric grid, enabling the Taliban to issue electric bills to consumers and send out collection agents with medieval instruments of torture to ensure prompt payment. The consumers in these places use the power for the irrigation of fields that grow poppies, which in turn fuel the opium trade from which the Taliban derive much of their funding.³¹

Aid carries risks and demands a sophisticated understanding of the local context, patterns of insurgent recruitment, and organizational structure of violent groups. Otherwise, our resources can inadvertently raise local tensions, cause infighting among local groups, and exacerbate rent-seeking behavior among corrupt actors.³²

Given the conflicting research on the effects of aid in promoting stability, more analysis is needed before we continue investing a significant amount of our aid in conflict zones.

AGRICULTURE AND THE CHALLENGES OF STABILIZATION

As we continue our assistance efforts in insecure parts of Afghanistan, we need to consider whether our aid will have a net positive effect. This is especially true in the area of agriculture, which forms the backbone of our strategy in the south.

The administration's "top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military agriculture development strategy to restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture sector with support from USAID, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Army National Guard Agri-business Development Teams."³³ Given that approximately 80 percent of Afghans rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, the focus is on immediate job creation, particularly in the insurgency-plagued provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Projects include cash-for-work programs and longer term agribusiness and

²⁹ "Disrupting the Formation of Groups Willing to Employ Terror and Other Political Violence to Achieve their Aims," Development to Counter Insurgency, USAID Evidence Summit, 2010.

³⁰ For a review of the literature on development and counterinsurgency, see Annex.

³¹ Mark Moyar, "Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide," *Orbis Operations*, March 2011, p. 5, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/development-in-afghanistan-in-moyar.pdf>

³² "Disrupting the Formation of Groups Willing to Employ Terror and Other Political Violence to Achieve their Aims," Development to Counter Insurgency, USAID Evidence Summit, pp. 7-8.

³³ Department of State, Office of the Special Representative of Afghanistan and Pakistan, "Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy," Updated February 2010, p. 5, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>.

irrigation initiatives to increase linkages between farmers and markets and enhance water management.³⁴

Since 2002, USAID has awarded about \$1.4 billion for agricultural programs. In a July 2010 report, however, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that USAID's agricultural programs "did not always establish or achieve their targets for each performance indicator."³⁵ Six of the eight programs that the GAO assessed failed to meet their annual targets and the three longest running programs declined in performance from 2006 to 2008.³⁶

According to an article in the Washington Post last spring, USAID spent about \$250 million over one year on agricultural programs in Helmand and Kandahar alone. In the district of Nawa in Helmand province, which has a population of about 75,000, USAID spent an estimated \$400 per person. By contrast, the country's per capita income is about \$300 a year.³⁷

The primary agricultural program is the Agricultural Vouchers for Increased Production in Afghanistan (AVIPA) Plus project, which was designed as a \$60 million national development program and then expanded to a \$360 million stabilization program, primarily in Helmand and Kandahar, with a significant cash-for-work component. As security improved last summer and fall, AVIPA Plus expanded into new districts and an additional \$89 million was added to the project at the request of the Agriculture Ministry to expand its seed/fertilizer voucher program to 32 provinces.

According to International Relief & Development, the implementing partner for AVIPA Plus, the project has resulted in 780 cash-for-work projects, employing 103,000 laborers and injecting nearly \$27 million in wages into the economy—the equivalent of creating 22,500 full-time jobs.³⁸

However, NGO representatives who have worked in the area for many years argue that such statistics conflate day laborers with full-time employment and distort labor markets. More importantly, these programs can generate unintended and potentially adverse consequences. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported in the Washington Post, the cash surge in Nawa

is sparking new tension and rivalries within the community, and it is prompting concern that the nearly free seeds and gushing canals will result in more crops than farmers will be able to sell. It is also raising public expectations for

³⁴ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print, Majority Staff, 112th Cong., 1st sess., "Avoiding Water Wars: Water Security and Central Asia's Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan," February 22, 2011, <http://foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=738A9FCF-FA1B-4ECD-9814-A1F6C6BE04D2>.

³⁵ United States Government Accountability Office, "Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID's Agricultural Programs," GAO-10-368, July 2010, Highlights page, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10368.pdf>.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "In Afghan region, the U.S. Spreads the Cash To Fight the Taliban," Washington Post, May 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/30/AR2010053003722.html?nav=emallpage>. Additionally, senior Embassy Kabul officials estimate that our military and civilian aid combined represents about four times the per capita gross domestic product. Conversation with senior Embassy Kabul officials, May 2011.

³⁸ Elizabeth Creel, International Relief & Development, e-mail message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, March 30, 2011.

handouts that the Afghan Government will not be able to sustain once U.S. contributions ebb.³⁹

In 2011, USAID plans to scale back AVIPA Plus as it implements longer term development programs under the Southern Region Agricultural Development Program (SRADP). But linkages between stabilization and development projects are not seamless. In agriculture, for instance, plans to construct cold storage facilities and build farm-to-market transportation networks may not be completed in time to sell additional crops and convince farmers not to return to opium farming. Moreover, scaling back may mean that many who benefited from artificially inflated incomes, temporary work, and subsidized seed will lose their benefits. We should use this opportunity to measure the real impact of our agriculture programs on security and design future programs accordingly.

CONSEQUENCES OF STABILIZATION ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES

U.S. stabilization projects have raised expectations and changed incentive structures in Afghanistan, according to development experts in the field. "There is no question that our foreign aid is distorting the economy," according to Embassy Kabul.⁴⁰ In some cases, we have been paying Afghans to clean ditches and repair irrigation canals, tasks that they have been doing for free for generations. Community leaders have at times risked the ire of the Taliban to side with the U.S. and Afghan Governments in supporting short-term aid projects on the understanding that we would not abandon them.

To be sure, stabilization projects may yield short-term results, such as developing relationships with community elders that can provide useful intelligence. But these successes do not necessarily translate into the desired strategic outcome of winning over the local population. Too much aid can have a destabilizing effect on local communities that are unable to absorb the cash surge.

Drawing on the work of economist Dr. Charles Wolf, counterinsurgency expert Dr. David Kilcullen sees two different trends taking place when we pour large amounts of cash into restive areas.⁴¹ On the one hand, there is a "substitution effect," whereby development dollars shift popular support away from the insurgents and toward the government. But our aid can also have an "income effect," whereby development programs increase the resources available to villagers and lead them to believe that they can improve their prospects of survival by entering into negotiations with the insurgents.⁴² Many factors can influence the outcome, and we must do a better job of understanding them when we design our aid programs.

Snapshots from the field suggest we may not be winning over the local population through our current aid practices:

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Conversation with senior Embassy officials, May 2011.

⁴¹ Meeting with Dr. David Kilcullen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Caerus Associates, March 21, 2011.

⁴² On the "income" and "substitution" effects of economic and social development programs in counterinsurgency, see: Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities," RAND Corporation, p. 7, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P31321.pdf>

Despite the considerable work that has been done, including the expansion of basic social services, major investments in roads and other infrastructure, and a communications revolution, negative perceptions persist that little has been done, the wrong things have been done, what was done is poor quality, the benefits of aid are spreading inequitably, and that much money is lost through corruption and waste. Research findings suggest policymakers should be cautious in assuming that aid projects help create positive perceptions of the deliverers of aid, or that they can help legitimize the government.⁴³

New survey research in Afghanistan lends credence to these findings. According to the International Council on Security and Development's May 2011 report:

The U.S. troop surge has brought unquestionable military success, with many Afghans . . . now believing that international and Afghan forces are winning the fight against the Taliban. However, these military successes have also created "Blowback," which is negatively impacting Afghan hearts and minds in the south . . . The negative impacts of the military operations . . . and the general backdrop of news in the south, give the Taliban an opportunity to "Pushback" and gain ground by capitalizing on the increasing resentment of the foreign presence within the local population, which is emotionally volatile, traumatized, isolated, and easily manipulated by outside actors.⁴⁴

We need more analysis of the effects—positive and negative—of our aid on the local population. We are pursuing a strategy based on counterinsurgency theories that deserve careful, ongoing scrutiny to see if they yield the intended results.

THE CHALLENGES OF SPENDING U.S. AID DOLLARS

Spending aid effectively in Afghanistan is extremely challenging, given the security climate, abject poverty, weak indigenous capacity, widespread corruption, and poor governance. High staff turnover,⁴⁵ pressure from the military, imbalances between military and civilian resources,⁴⁶ unpredictable funding levels from Con-

⁴³ "Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations," Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, March 2011, p. 3, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Assessing_Effectiveness_of_Development_Aid_in_COIN_1022_Apr_10%29.pdf

⁴⁴ "Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics," The International Council on Security and Development, May 2011, p. 8, <http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/bin-laden-local-dynamics.pdf>

⁴⁵ According to a former development specialist at USAID's Mission in Kabul, the staff turnover rate in Afghanistan is more than 85 percent a year. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Military Dismayed by Delays in 3 Key Development Projects in Afghanistan," Washington Post, April 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-dismayed-by-delays-in-3-key-development-projects-in-afghanistan/2011/04/22/AFD6jg8E_story.html

⁴⁶ According to James Kunder, former USAID acting deputy administrator, "it's time to focus on the underlying reason our fighting forces feel inadequately supported. There are a thousand Defense Department personnel for every one USAID employee around the world. Administrations and Congresses controlled by both parties allow this preposterous imbalance in capability to continue. This particular Congress has gone one better, deeply cutting USAID and State Department funding despite warnings from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and uniformed

Continued

gress, and changing political timelines have further complicated efforts. Pressure to achieve rapid results puts our civilians under enormous strain to spend money quickly.

Afghanistan is not Iraq, which had a functioning state and robust government and civil society institutions. After the fall of the Taliban, we were faced with the challenge of building a democratic-style government and modern economy. The U.S. effort began in earnest in 2009, when the administration and Congress recognized the need for properly resourcing the civilian effort.

Ongoing development aid will be needed for the foreseeable future to help Afghanistan become stable. This section examines how we can improve our assistance strategy. As discussed below, we must overcome the challenges that have undermined our efforts, including unrealistic timelines, lack of robust oversight, off-budget financing, capacity-building programs that rely heavily on technical advisors, and issues of Afghan ownership and fiscal sustainability.

POLITICAL VERSUS DEVELOPMENT TIMELINES

Development, when done properly, takes time and results cannot be measured immediately. In a country like Afghanistan, development will take generations. The U.S. Government has strived for quick results to demonstrate to Afghans and Americans alike that we are making progress. Indeed, the constant demand for immediate results prevented the implementation of programs that could have met long-term goals and would now be bearing fruit.

As recently as last summer, Embassy Kabul believed it had a 3- to 5-year window to accomplish its development goals. However, the political tide in the United States has been turning, with increased pressure to bring our troops home and draw down our military and civilian budgets in Afghanistan. Increasingly, the U.S. civilian strategy is linked to the shorter term military strategy on the ground. Resources are only appropriated from Congress on an annual cycle, which complicates efforts to undertake longer term civilian commitments.

Discussions are underway on a strategic agreement with Afghanistan that will frame the contours of our relationship following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. We expect there will be a longer term commitment of U.S. civilian resources for the people of Afghanistan. But the scope of this commitment is still under negotiation.

Given the emphasis on annual budget cycles in Washington and the lack of a multiyear authorization for Afghanistan that could provide a roadmap for future funding, the administration is again under pressure to demonstrate quick results to Congress. Many in Congress are fixated on "burn rates," or how fast the money is spent and how much money is left in the "pipeline." This results in undue emphasis at USAID and the State Department on getting money out the door to ensure future appropriations at significant levels. Political pressures create perverse incentives to spend money even when the conditions are not right.

commanders that inadequate civilian capacity means more American soldiers deployed and, regrettably, more dead and wounded." James Kunder, "Afghan Aid Efforts Are Crucial to the War Effort," Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, May 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/afghan-aid-programs-are-crucial-to-the-war-effort/2011/05/01/AFFhL2jF_story.html.

Cutting back our foreign aid budgets is not the most prudent solution. As we learned in Iraq, there will be tremendous pressure on our civilians to absorb missions currently performed by the military as our troops begin to draw down.⁴⁷ The State Department and USAID must have the resources they need to ensure a smooth transition.

Our goal should be to reduce some of the political pressure to spend money quickly, especially when the conditions are not right. Some ideas under discussion include a multiyear authorization bill or creating a trust fund that could disperse funds as needed and appropriate. We welcome further discussions with the administration on these and other options.

LIMITED CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT

The U.S. Government relies heavily on contractors and subcontractors in Afghanistan for aid projects. Contractors support direct-hire personnel, implement assistance projects, and address U.S. Government workforce shortfalls.

From FY 2007 to FY 2009, USAID obligated about \$3.8 billion to 283 contractors and other entities, including more than \$2 billion (53 percent) to 214 contractors, \$1.1 billion (nearly 30 percent) to 53 cooperative agreement partners, and \$625 million (17 percent) for 17 grants. Two contractors—Louis Berger International and Development Alternatives Inc.—accounted for about \$1 billion, or more than half the total of USAID's contracts.⁴⁸

During this same time period, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) obligated about \$2.3 billion to four contractors, with DynCorp International accounting for more than 80 percent of INL's total obligations.⁴⁹

Contractors run the gamut from companies who implement USAID programs to individual experts who serve as technical advisors within Afghan institutions and ministries, as Deloitte representatives did at the Afghan Central Bank.

While there are many good reasons to use contractors in Afghanistan, there are also reasons for concern. The case of the Louis Berger Group Inc. (LBG) is instructive. A New Jersey-based engineering consulting firm that accounted for over a third of USAID's total contract obligations in Afghanistan between FY 2007 and FY 2009, LBG recently admitted to submitting "false, fictitious, and fraudulent overhead rates for indirect costs . . . [resulting] in overpayments by the [U.S.] government in excess of \$10 million" from 1999 to 2007.⁵⁰ Such instances of fraud undermine our reconstruc-

⁴⁷ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print, Majority Staff, 112th Cong., 1st sess., Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort, January 31, 2011, <http://foreign.senate.gov/download?id=C4ABBB7E-FFD6-4162-BB56-878EC62FE445>.

⁴⁸ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, pp. 4 and 21, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/LoresSIGAR4Q_2010Book.pdf. See also: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Over \$17.7 Billion to About 7,000 Contractors and Other Entities for Afghanistan Reconstruction During Fiscal Years 2007-2009," Audit 11-4 Contract Performance and Oversight, October 27, 2010, pp. 9-17, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audit/SIGAR%20Audit-11-4.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ David Voreacos, "Berger Group Pays \$69.3 Million for Iraq Overbilling," Bloomberg Businessweek, May 6, 2011, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-05/berger-group-pays-69-3-million-for-iraq-overbilling.html>.

tion efforts in Afghanistan and highlight the need for vigorous oversight of our war-zone contracts.

In addition to the risk of contractor fraud, the use of large numbers of contractors raises other significant opportunities for waste and mismanagement. By contracting with U.S. and international contractors at western prices (the "primes"), donor funds can be lost to corruption through multiple subcontractors over which the U.S. Government has little to no control (the "subs"). Projects may be built at costs substantially less than the amount originally paid, using substandard materials and methods. Poor security conditions and a lack of contracting officers overseeing contractor performance could deter site visits to confirm whether the project was properly built, or even built at all. Afghanistan is littered with abandoned or half-built structures.

Multiple reports have raised concerns about the lack of robust contractor oversight. The GAO finds "oversight inadequate at times, thus raising questions about the agencies' ability to ensure accountability for multibillion dollar investments."⁶¹ The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) warns that "the large U.S. investment in Afghanistan remains at significant risk of being wasted or subject to fraud and abuse."⁶² The bipartisan Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan is particularly critical of overall U.S. Government assistance, noting that "tens of billions of taxpayers' dollars have failed to achieve their intended use in Iraq and Afghanistan."⁶³

Part of the problem is a lack of qualified contracting officers, contracting officer's representatives, and acquisition staff. Currently, USAID has approximately 85 Foreign Service contracting officers serving worldwide with three or more years of experience. Ten are serving in Afghanistan and USAID plans to increase this number to 18, which is an improvement from 2007 when there were only three contracting officers in Afghanistan.⁶⁴ However, this increase will not likely be sufficient to provide adequate oversight of contractor performance in Afghanistan. According to Maureen Shauket, USAID's Director of the Office of Acquisition and Assistance, in order to meet the U.S. Government's civilian average ratio of number of dollars per contracting officer, USAID would have to send nearly its entire overseas workforce to work only in Afghanistan.

Compounding the problem is the difficulty of getting contract staff with the right technical backgrounds to serve in places like Afghanistan. Congress needs to create incentives and find addi-

⁶¹ Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers, United States Government Accountability Office, "Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," Testimony before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, March 3, 2011, Highlights page, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11419t.pdf>.

⁶² Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, p. vi, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/SIGAR4Q_2010Book.pdf.

⁶³ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, "At What Risk: Correcting Overreliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations," Second Interim Report to Congress, February 24, 2011, p. 7, http://www.warimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-lowres.pdf.

⁶⁴ Kate Beale, USAID, e-mail message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, April 21, 2011.

tional funding for USAID to build a corps of contract officers willing to serve in war zones.

The Kabul Bank incident underscores the importance of such a move. In 2010, massive fraud was uncovered at Kabul Bank, including loans totaling \$900 million to shareholders at the Bank, which is nearly 5 percent of Afghanistan's current Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Fraud of this scale resulted from failures at every level, including internal bank control; Kabul Bank's auditors—A.F. Ferguson & Co., a Pakistani affiliate of PricewaterhouseCoopers; Afghanistan's Central Bank; the Central Bank's advisors, Deloitte, under a USAID contract; the political establishment; and USAID.

At the time, USAID had only one contracting officer's technical representative overseeing the \$92 million contract with Deloitte to provide technical assistance to the Central Bank. An investigation undertaken by the USAID Office of Inspector General determined that Deloitte knew or should have known that there were serious problems at Kabul Bank and failed to alert USAID officials in Kabul.⁵⁵

The failures do not end with Deloitte or USAID's lack of adequate oversight. Independent of its relationship with Deloitte, USAID should have known or suspected that there were serious problems at Kabul Bank. Within Afghanistan, the fraud at Kabul Bank has been described as an open secret, known and discussed by market participants. And yet, it appears that no one at USAID had the technical knowledge or private sector relationships to see what many others in the sector saw.

According to a former USAID Kabul Mission Director:

Because of the ill planned downsizing of USAID's technical staff over the past years and the difficulty in finding senior technical Foreign Service officers to serve in Afghanistan, the management of the Kabul Bank Deloitte contract was relegated to a junior officer. While he worked to the best of his ability, this important project demanded strong technical oversight and similar programs of this level of strategic importance will demand senior management expertise and a different system with USAID to ensure the availability of senior technical staff.

In another case involving an education project for teachers, USAID's contracting officer was unaware and did not consent to the award of subcontracts and did not approve of significant subcontract modifications totaling \$23.4 million out of a \$94 million contract.⁵⁶ These modifications included changes in the duration of subcontracts and terms of subcontractor performance, as well as significant funding increases.⁵⁷

With respect to international narcotics and law enforcement programs, INL manages approximately \$927 million in contract services in Afghanistan. Yet it has only one Contracting Officer Rep-

⁵⁵ Tim Cox, "Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Bank Supervision Assistance Activities and the Kabul Bank Crisis," Report No. F-306-11-003-S, USAID Office of Inspector General, March 16, 2011.

⁵⁶ Department of State, Office of Inspector General, "Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Building Education Support Systems for Teachers Project," Audit Report No. 5-306-10-006-P, January 29, 2010, p. 9, <http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/t10rpts/5-306-10-006-p.pdf>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

representative (COR) in Washington overseeing five Civilian Police (CivPol) Program task orders amounting to \$800 million and seven In-country Contract Representatives (I-CORs) providing on-the-ground administrative contract support.⁵⁸

The administration is taking welcome steps to improve oversight. We support initiatives such as USAID Forward, which will incorporate more vigorous measurement and accountability tools, streamline contracting rules, and fund smaller, local agents of change.⁵⁹ USAID has also established the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (A3) to ensure dollars are not being diverted from their purpose by extortion or corruption. These and other steps, including planned improvements to USAID's acquisition strategy and support for third party monitoring and evaluation, will help ensure proper use of U.S. taxpayer funds.

Embassy Kabul is working closely with Task Force 2010 and Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJITF)-Shafafiyat ("Transparency") to improve the quality of contractors and to prevent contracts with Afghan contractors who are corrupt or have ties to the insurgency. The United States is also working with the Afghan Government to change the way security is provided to our contractors. The military has ordered changes in the way goods and services are procured. SIGAR and the USAID Inspector General are investigating allegations of corruption relating to U.S. funds and have successfully prosecuted cases involving U.S. citizens.

More can still be done to reduce our reliance on contractors and ensure proper oversight of prime and subcontractors. For instance, as discussed below, more U.S. funding could be channeled to national Afghan programs and Afghan civil society organizations instead of large, international contractors. The State Department and USAID should take immediate steps to ensure sufficient staffing levels and relevant professional expertise of contracting officers before contracts are awarded, including steps to recruit and train people with the proper financial oversight backgrounds. Recommendations put forth by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan should also be implemented.⁶⁰

ON-BUDGET VERSUS OFF-BUDGET FUNDING

Most international donors, including the United States, channel much of their aid "off-budget," meaning it does not go through the Afghan Government. Off-budget funding is appealing because it provides more financial and programmatic control to the donor, which is important in an environment where there are significant concerns about weak government capacity and corruption.

However, off-budget funding has significant downsides. It can weaken the ability of the Afghan state to control resources, which

⁵⁸ Of the seven I-CORs, four are located in Kabul, one in Kunduz, one in Jalalabad, and one in Kandahar. Christine Leming, Department of State, e-mail message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, May 3, 2011.

⁵⁹ Administrator Rajiv Shah, Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington, DC, April 2, 2011, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-04-01_testimony-Shah.pdf

⁶⁰ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, "At What Risk: Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations," Second Interim Report to Congress, February 24, 2011, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-Inwres.pdf

results in donor duplication, and can fuel corruption. It has also led to the creation of thousands of donor-driven projects without any plan for sustaining them, including 16,000 CERP projects funded by the military at a cost of over \$2 billion.⁶¹ As USAID notes, there is a daily tension between "building capacity in the Afghan Government, putting U.S. taxpayer money on-budget, and ensuring that urgent [Afghan] government functions happen."⁶²

Ultimately, the Afghan Government must be a genuine partner for our assistance efforts to succeed. It cannot be held accountable for processes over which it has little to no control. Thus, the U.S. Government is working to meet its Kabul Conference commitment to fund up to 50 percent of our aid "on-budget" by FY 2012 from approximately 21 percent in FY 2009, 35 percent in FY 2010, and 37–45 percent in FY 2011.⁶³

According to the London and Kabul conference communiqués, delivering aid through the Afghan Government is "conditioned on the Government's progress in further strengthening public financial management systems, reducing corruption, improving budget execution, developing a financial strategy and Government capacity towards the goal."⁶⁴

For instance, the Afghan Government committed at the Kabul Conference to pass an improved Audit Law as part of its effort to improve public financial management. This is also an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) benchmark. Yet the U.S. Treasury Department and many at Embassy Kabul believe that the Audit Law passed by the government is insufficient and does not meet the Afghan obligation under the ARTF benchmark. Failure to meet the benchmark would mean that for the first time, a certain amount of funds—approximately \$17 million—would not be disbursed to the Afghan Government, sending a signal that these commitments matter.⁶⁵ However, the U.S. Government's current position is to accept the deficient Audit Law, despite strong internal opposition, in order to avoid a confrontation with the Afghan Government.

The United States has committed to funding more aid directly through the Afghan Government, but stronger measures must first be taken to ensure greater accountability of our funds.

Most of USAID's on-budget aid—an estimated \$2.08 billion—is provided through the ARTF, a multidonor trust fund administered

⁶¹Josh Boak, "U.S.-funded infrastructure deteriorates once under Afghan Control, report says," *Washington Post*, January 4, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/03/AR2011010302175.html?hpid=topnews>.

⁶²See Appendix VII.

⁶³Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 13 and 14. According to USAID, "we currently spend approximately 38 percent of our funds on-budget." For more information, see Appendix VII.

⁶⁴Tim Cox, "Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Ministerial Assessment Process," Review Report No. F-306-11-001-S, November 6, 2010, p. 2, <http://www.usaid.gov/ocg/public/fy11rpt/f-306-11-001-s.pdf>.

⁶⁵The ARTF is comprised of two "windows" 1) a recurrent window that covers the costs of the government for operations, maintenance, and salaries for teachers, health workers, and civilian staff in the ministries and provinces, and 2) an investment window that supports government capacity-building projects and technical assistance.

by the World Bank.⁶⁶ ARTF is a valuable instrument through which the United States can disburse its aid.

But ARTF has its own challenges. It requires some structural changes to improve absorptive capacity and ensure adequate field oversight. Today, World Bank supervision is constrained by the Bank's limit of 100 personnel in-country, who are expected to oversee 46 small programs.⁶⁷ Donors should push for more robust supervision from the World Bank. Additionally, donors should consider using the ARTF for a smaller number, i.e., 5 to 7, of big "national programs" like the National Solidarity Program (NSP) to improve focus and oversight instead of dozens of smaller programs. Finally, since ARTF is World Bank-administered, USAID does not have authority to audit the ARTF and its programs directly. But the United States could argue for more rigorous application of the metrics and benchmarks of the ARTF performance fund.

Aside from ARTF, the U.S. Government also delivers money on-budget through Afghan ministries. To date, \$307 million has been transferred directly to Afghan ministries.⁶⁸ USAID expects to deliver at least \$509.4 million through Afghan ministries after having completed assessments to determine which ministries can manage USAID funds. Currently, 14 ministries and agencies receive direct assistance from the State Department and USAID.⁶⁹

The administration's assessment of these ministries for specific projects has also run into challenges. As of September 2010, USAID had performed assessments of six ministries,⁷⁰ but USAID's Inspector General found that they "did not provide reasonable assurance of detecting significant vulnerabilities" that could result in the waste or misuse of U.S. Government resources.⁷¹ USAID and the State Department do not follow the same standard assessment process. SIGAR has also expressed concern that "the United States and other donors do not have a process in place to assess whether Afghan institutions have the capacity to manage and account for donor funds."⁷²

Embassy Kabul has taken some action to change the assessment process of ministries to ensure proper safeguards of U.S. funds.

⁶⁶ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 18.

⁶⁷ Scott Guggenheim, email message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, April 18, 2011.

⁶⁸ Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 18.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Finance (\$30 million), Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (\$1 million), Ministry of Public Health (\$236.6 million), USAID Salary Sup Special Posts (\$2 million), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (\$85 million), Ministry of Finance and World Bank (\$2,079.5 million), Ministry of Education (\$25 million through Danish Development Agency), Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation (\$6 million), Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Ministry of Women's Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office, and Ministry of Interior. For more information, see: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 15 and 16.

⁷⁰ Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Public Health. For more information, see: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, Nos. 18 and 19.

⁷¹ Tim Cox, "Review of USAID/Afghanistan's Ministerial Assessment Process," Review Report No. F-306-11-001-S, November 6, 2010, p. 4, <http://www.usaid.gov/cig/public/fy11rpts/f-306-11-001-a.pdf>

⁷² Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, p. 10, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lorus/SIGAR4Q-2010Book.pdf>

More must be done. The U.S. Treasury Department, which has expertise in budgetary assessments and oversight, could assist with assessments in conjunction with the World Bank to ensure that our standards are harmonized with other donors. Increasing on-budget funding should be conditioned on the Afghan Government's success in meeting its Kabul Conference commitments. The Afghan Government must comply with International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements to resolve the Kabul Bank crisis. Finally, the FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010 requires the Secretary of State to certify that progress has been made in the areas of fighting corruption and improving governance before Economic Support funds and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds can be disbursed.⁷³

Measurable progress on the part of the Afghan Government in these areas will demonstrate that it is committed to improving public financial management and able to protect money from fraud and abuse. Steps must also be taken to simplify the Afghan Government's public financial control systems, which are too complicated and limit disbursement rates.

CAPACITY BUILDING USING TECHNICAL ADVISORS

Ultimately, success will depend on the ability of the Afghan Government to provide basic services and security in a transparent, accountable, and effective manner. The United States should focus its assistance on the core state functions that are necessary for success. Donors will not be able to keep paying for the costs of running the Afghan Government indefinitely.

Given this reality, the U.S. strategy is focused on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to deliver basic services. But our over-reliance on international technical advisors to build Afghan capacity may undermine these efforts.

According to Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan's former Finance Minister and current Presidential advisor, in 2001 Afghanistan had approximately 240,000 civil servants, including doctors and teachers.⁷⁴ The international aid effort, with its inflated salaries, may have chipped away at this elementary form of governmental capacity. Instead of investing in vocational and higher education that would have given Afghans the skills to run their country, donors hired technical advisors to do these jobs at roughly 10 times the cost.⁷⁵

For instance, in the last fiscal year, the Afghan Ministry of Education's entire budget for vocational and higher education was only \$35 million.⁷⁶ In contrast, the State Department and USAID are currently spending approximately \$1.25 billion on capacity-building

⁷³ U.S. Congress, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 4899, Section 1004, subsection c(1).

⁷⁴ According to Dr. Ashraf Ghani, as reported in *The Times*, "When we started in 2001 we had 240,000 civil servants willing to work for a government salary of £25 a month. By 2004 all the talented ones had left to become drivers for the UN, the World Bank or charities." Christina Lamb, "Afghans Plead for £25bn in Aid as Disorder Grows," *The Times*, June 8, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4087300.ece>.

⁷⁵ Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness, email message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, April 24, 2011.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

efforts.⁷⁷ A significant portion is spent on technical advisors. The United States is currently funding approximately 260 civilian advisors, according to senior Embassy officials.

Technical advisors work with an organization for a limited time to generate institutional capacity, train Afghans to perform effectively, and enable them to teach their own successors. Their work can be critical in such areas as fiscal policy and pension reform, where highly specialized technical assistance is needed. There are a number of cases where technical advisors have made a positive impact in Afghanistan.

But there can be substantial downsides. Technical advisors are expensive—each one can cost between \$500,000 and \$1 million annually.⁷⁸ They can be difficult to supervise, given the shortage of qualified contracting personnel. They may fail to report evidence of corruption or wrongdoing, believing their allegiance is to the Afghan ministry rather than the U.S. Government. They may do the job of Afghans themselves or impose their own vision on the institution rather than train the Afghan staff or advise the Afghan minister. Or they may introduce unsustainable high-tech methods.

Once they are trained, Afghans may leave their ministry to take a job for inflated wages with international firms or missions, resulting in brain drain from Afghan institutions. The Afghan Government finds it nearly impossible to retain competent workers when foreign governments, aid agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies offer them inflated salaries and benefits (“top-up salaries”)—sometimes 10 to 20 times the amount of base government salaries—to perform jobs within Afghan Government institutions.

For instance, wage levels for Afghan Government staff such as teachers, health workers, and administrative staff are in the realm of \$50 to \$100 per month, but drivers, assistants, and translators for aid projects are paid upward of \$1,000 per month.⁷⁹ According to a State Department official, 40 Afghans working in professional positions within the government received between \$3,000 and \$5,000 per month in salary supplements from the U.S. Government, although this particular program ended in March 2011.⁸⁰ Many of these donor-supported positions are not even authorized in the government’s staffing charts.⁸¹ These practices undermine the

⁷⁷ The figure of \$1.25 billion includes USAID estimated costs on capacity building in Afghanistan (see Appendix IV) and INL current task order year spending on capacity-building projects in Afghanistan (see Appendix V). USAID’s \$1.1 billion capacity-building projects include \$219 million to assist the Civil Service Institute to build the capacity of line ministry employees, \$102 million to create effective municipal governance, \$94 million to improve teacher performance and build capacity within the Ministry of Education, \$92 million to develop economic and regulatory policy and support the private sector, \$84 million to build the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health, and \$41 million to develop the institutional capacity of the National Assembly.

⁷⁸ Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness, email message to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, April 24, 2011.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Conversation with senior Embassy Kabul officials, April 2011.

⁸¹ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2010, p. 11, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/SIGAR4Q-2010Book.pdf>. “Since 2002, the United States and other international donors have paid the salaries of thousands of civilian government employees and technical advisors to help build the capacity of the GIRoA. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance estimated that 17 donors were paying more than \$45 million a year in salary support for 6,600 civilian employees and advisors. This support is separate from the money provided by the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The ARTF pays for much of Afghanistan’s regular civil service through its contribution to Afghanistan’s operating budget. Since 2002, the United States has provided

goal of generating long-term Afghan capacity and are unsustainable.

In order for technical advisors to play a constructive role, they must be monitored effectively. But our overreliance on them and minimal oversight has proved costly and made it harder for them to do their jobs. The administration should consider other options. For example, the Scott Family Liberia Fellows program recruits young professionals, including qualified Liberians, to support the Government of Liberia at a fraction of the cost.⁸² Too often, our aid programs assume that building capacity can only be done through hiring international experts to provide technical assistance. The Scott Family Fellows program suggests an alternative model from which to draw best practices.

Embassy Kabul is addressing these issues. For instance, the Embassy now meets with technical advisors twice a month to monitor their work and ensure proper oversight. The Embassy should also examine the efficacy of its technical advisors and limit their use where they are not making progress.

Perhaps the most important step the U.S. Government can take in conjunction with the Afghan Government and other donors is to standardize Afghan salaries and work within Afghan Government staffing constraints. This single step would have a significant and lasting effect on improving the capacity of the Afghan Government. Until this problem is resolved, programs such as the Afghan Civil Service Support program, which is an \$84 million USAID program to train 4,000 civil servants in Kabul and 12,000 more in all 34 provinces, may have limited impact in building Afghanistan's civil service.⁸³

TRANSITIONING TO AFGHAN OWNERSHIP

Increasing and improving on-budget funding, paring back the number of technical advisors, and standardizing salaries are important first steps for strengthening the capacity of the Afghan Government. But ultimately, Afghans have to be able to absorb donor programs. The United States must focus its assistance programs on Afghan ownership and sustainability, especially as we prepare for the 2014 transition.

Too often, this is not the case. For example, in the past 5 years, the State Department has spent approximately \$2 billion on coun-

nearly \$922 million to the ARTF. The United States pledged \$590 million for 2010 and has contributed \$215 million of this amount to date." *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸² "The Scott Family Fellows program aims to recruit young professionals to support the Government of Liberia as it recovers from 14 years of brutal civil war. These young professionals fill a huge capacity gap and work in Liberia as 'special assistants' to senior Liberian government officials, primarily Cabinet members. They typically have a Masters degree and one or two years of relevant experience. The program puts a special emphasis on encouraging qualified Liberians to apply. The Fellows work long hours in a range of activities from mundane administrative tasks to more profound policy issues, all with the goal of helping Liberia in its urgent reconstruction and development efforts. The Scott Family Fellows program is funded by a generous \$1,000,000 grant from the family of Edward W. Scott, Jr. When announcing the program in February 2007, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said, 'This is just the kind of support we need from our friends. I am very grateful to Ed Scott and his family for their generous support.' Since its inception, the program has expanded to include other fellows funded by Humanity United, the McCall MacBain Foundation, the Open Society Institute and the Nike Foundation." Scott Family Liberia Fellows, Center for Global Development, Initiatives, accessed April 19, 2011, <http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/active/scottfellows>.

⁸³ Embassy of the United States, Kabul, Afghanistan, "Afghanistan Civil Service Commission and U.S. Government Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Begin Civil Service Support Program," February 22, 2010, <http://kabul.usembassy.gov/pre-2202.html>.

ternarcotics programs in Afghanistan, including \$60 million since 2007 to support two counternarcotics compounds near the Kabul airport⁸⁴ and in Kunduz province. While it is a U.S. objective to transfer responsibilities and ownership of these compounds from the United States to Afghanistan, the State Department's Inspector General found the Department still "has not addressed how and when the Afghan Government will be able to assume control and sustain day-to-day operations."⁸⁵

In other instances, we have transferred programs to Afghan control even when the capacity does not yet exist. For example, despite a request from Afghanistan's Ministry of Education (MoE) for a longer extension, USAID is granting a no-cost, 3-month extension for a successful 5-year program that expands access to primary education classes for more than 84,000 children, over 63 percent of which are girls. The \$31 million program, called the Partnership for Advancing Community-Based Education (PACE-A), involves four prominent international NGOs—CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, and the Aga Khan Foundation—who have experience providing education in areas not served by the MoE.

To support the sustainability of these efforts, the NGOs work closely with the MoE to integrate classes into the formal education system and strengthen the MoE's ability to assume responsibility for these classes.⁸⁶ Turning this program over to the MoE prematurely could end access to education for many students, particularly girls, and jeopardize the relationships built in these communities with village mullahs that defied the Taliban to allow their girls to attend school.

FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY FOR THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

Strengthening the capacity of the Afghan Government to undertake basic government functions is important, but it will require fiscal sustainability to succeed. According to the World Bank, an estimated 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is derived from spending related to the international military and donor community presence. A precipitous withdrawal of international support, in the absence of reliable domestic revenue and a functioning market-based economy, could trigger a major economic recession.⁸⁷ USAID and the State Department recognize these challenges and their current planning is "anticipating both the impact of the U.S. troop withdrawal on the Afghan economy, and on U.S. civilian resources."⁸⁸

⁸⁴The Kabul compound is home to two specialized Afghan counternarcotics units—the National Interdiction Unit and the Specialized Investigative Unit—and is designed to support up to 400 Afghan counternarcotics agents to work, train, and live while on duty. For more information, see Department of State, Office of Inspector General, "Performance Evaluation of PAE Operations and Maintenance Support for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' Counternarcotics Compounds in Afghanistan," Report Number MERO-I-11-02, February 2011, p. 7, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/157927.pdf>

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶According to one of PACE-A's implementing partners, approximately 51 percent of the schools in the entire consortium project have been integrated into the Ministry of Education, a process that usually takes three years.

⁸⁷Dr. Ashraf Ghani, "Preparing for Transition: A Policy Note on Development," policy memo sent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, May 12, 2011.

⁸⁸See Appendix VII.

At present, donors are picking up most of the costs of running the Afghan Government. Scott Guggenheim, formerly with the World Bank, has noted that domestic revenues only cover one-fifth of public spending and two-thirds of public spending is off-budget, which means that donors pay for most development services.⁸⁹

Achieving fiscal sustainability will require the Afghan Government to (1) substitute donor grants for the operating and development budget; (2) assume external budget obligations on the operating budget; (3) pay for a share of technical assistance for core civil service functions; (4) fund the Kabul process; and (5) invest in operations and maintenance for acquired assets. Transition planning should find the right balance between avoiding a sudden drop-off in aid, which could trigger a major economic recession, and a long-term phaseout from current donor levels.

These are daunting tasks. Analysts estimate that it could cost between \$6 and \$8 billion a year alone to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, depending on the final size of the force. Without significant domestic revenue generation, the Afghan state will not be self-sufficient for decades and donors, particularly the United States, will have to bear the costs. With the right planning, Afghanistan may be able to generate substantial revenues from its sizeable mineral deposits in the future, but we do not see any signs of near-term revenue generation from its mineral wealth.

In the short term, it will be critical to build the private sector and attract foreign investment. Our aid programs should be designed with foreign capital in mind. Our capacity-building efforts should focus on key ministries and institutions that must work for the Afghan Government to deliver rather than an across-the-board approach to strengthen all ministries. Instead of creating additional off-budget assets like schools, clinics, and roads, our attention must turn to how the Afghan Government will sustain and staff what the donor community has already built.

CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY A: SUCCESS OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS WITH LOCAL BUY-IN—THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM AND BASIC PACKAGE OF HEALTH SERVICES

The National Solidarity Program and Basic Package of Health Services illustrate how national-level programs that are on-budget and have significant Afghan buy-in can achieve more with less. These programs exemplify the goals of being “necessary, achievable, and sustainable.”

⁸⁹The World Bank notes that domestic revenue collection in Afghanistan reached \$1.65 billion in 2010/2011, double the 2007/2008 rate as a result of significant efforts by the Ministry of Finance. Afghanistan's core budget in this period, a combination of domestic revenue and off-budget expenditures, was \$4.8 billion. Its external budget, comprised of donor-financed off-budget expenditures, was reported by the Ministry of Finance to be \$6 billion, though the actual amount may be as high as \$16 billion. For more information, see: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 17.

Imposing governance from the center has never been effective in Afghanistan.⁹⁰ According to anthropologist Thomas Barfield:

While governments in the developed world are the unquestioned suppliers of governance to their local communities, this has not been the case historically in Afghanistan. Here one finds adequate local governance in the absence of formal government institutions . . . Successful regimes in Afghanistan have recognized this reality by devolving considerable informal decisionmaking power to local communities, letting them solve their own problems so that the state does not have to intervene. In return, local communities have recognized the sovereignty of the Afghan national state and have not challenged its legitimacy.⁹¹

As Barfield's analysis suggests, our goal should be to strengthen local traditions of governance even as we work to develop the central institutions of the Afghan state. Assistance programs that are successful in Afghanistan involve strong participation and ownership from local communities. As President Karzai noted at the Kabul conference.

Despite some noteworthy achievements, we have learned together that delivering our resources through hundreds of isolated projects will not generate the desired results, achieve public visibility, or support the establishment of good governance. It is time to concentrate our efforts on a limited number of national programs and projects to transform the lives of our people, reinforce the social compact between state and citizens, and create mechanisms of mutual accountability between the state and our international partners.⁹²

The best example of this is the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which is the Afghan Government's principal community development program. The United States is the largest NSP donor, giving \$528 million from June 2002 to September 2010, including \$225 million from FY 2010 funds through the ARTF.⁹³ NSP promotes subnational governance by setting up community development councils (CDCs) and training them to manage small-scale projects funded by block grants. The program currently reaches 23,000 villages, covering 351 of Afghanistan's 398 districts in all 34 provinces.⁹⁴

According to Guggenheim, who largely designed the program, NSP works because the government apex role is strong but simple, execution is outsourced to the communities, disbursements are transparent, standardized, and streamlined, and there is strong

⁹⁰ Thomas Barfield and Neamatollah Nojumi, "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability," *Middle East Policy* 17 (December, 2010): 40-52.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁹² Statement by President Karzai at International Kabul Conference, July 20, 2010.

⁹³ Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program Has Reached Thousands of Afghan Communities, but Faces Challenges that Could Limit Outcomes," March 22, 2011, pp. ii and 5, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGARAudit-11-8.pdf>

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

monitoring and evaluation with expatriate help. SIGAR's recent audit of NSP found strong community oversight of NSP funds:

The high level of community involvement in NSP activities—CDC elections, social audits, and community contributions—has resulted in a degree of local ownership of NSP-funded projects which helps safeguard assets. Facilitating partners reported that, in some cases, community members intervened and recovered money when block grant funds were stolen by thieves or embezzled by CDC members. According to one facilitating partner, the Taliban are less likely to burn NSP schools because communities defend them.⁹⁶

While NSP is one of the best development programs in Afghanistan, it too can be improved. Currently, unpredictable donor contributions block strategic planning and communities only receive one-time bloc grants, despite having created significant community social infrastructure that could be used to further ongoing governance and development programs. Ensuring consistency in funding will be critical as NSP expands into less permissive areas. NSP could become a key pillar of transition because it can provide villages with a tangible dividend from peace.

The United States could also work with the Government of Afghanistan to improve oversight and internal controls, strengthen reporting mechanisms on local governance, and ensure that block grants and payments to facilitating partners are disbursed in a timely fashion.⁹⁶ By opening its transport system to senior Afghan staff, the United States could facilitate monitoring and oversight of NSP disbursements. There are a number of national programs that were initially designed for Afghanistan in addition to NSP that could work well with donor support.

Another successful model of delivering assistance in Afghanistan is the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS).⁹⁷ Established in 2003, BPHS provides a standardized package of basic services, including maternal and newborn health, child health, and public nutrition, at the four primary health care facilities within the Afghan health system: health posts at the community level, basic health centers, comprehensive health centers, and district hospitals.

BPHS has proved a remarkable success, given the state of health care 8 years ago. It has helped unify Afghanistan's health system; improved coordination among the Afghan Government, donors, and NGOs; and dramatically increased the percentage of the population with access to primary health care. National coverage rates have risen from an estimated 9 percent in 2003 to 85 percent in 2008 and under-5 mortality rates have dropped by 26 percent since

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

⁹⁷ According to USAID, the Ministry of Public Health was "the first Afghan ministry certified in 2009 to receive \$239 million in direct funding from the U.S. government to implement the BPHS in 13 provinces," including Badakhshan, Baghlan, Bamiyan, Faryab, Ghazni, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and Takhar. For more information, see: U.S. Agency for International Development, "Fact Sheet: Health Service Delivery Grant - Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH)," July 2010.

2002.⁹⁸ Between FY 2002 and FY 2010, the United States provided roughly \$798 million in health assistance to Afghanistan.

With the right investments and leadership within the Ministry of Education, the BPHS model could be extended to the area of education. While the United States has dedicated considerable resources to support basic and higher education, teacher trainings, and textbooks for primary schools in Afghanistan, international donor efforts in the education sector are piecemeal and not coordinated for maximum effect.⁹⁹ According to one U.S. official:

The Afghan Government is constantly outraged by the fact that they see the Germans build a school here, the French supply schoolbooks there, and the Belgians do a teacher meeting at a third location, which means you have three separate projects that fail, rather than one project that would succeed if, indeed, you knew about them and were able to steer them to work together.¹⁰⁰

CASE STUDY B: ISSUES OF SUSTAINABILITY –THE PERFORMANCE-BASED GOVERNORS FUND

The Performance-Based Governors Fund illustrates how the design of our aid programs impacts the outcome. While it may be "necessary" in its second phase, the program in its current design may not be "achievable" or "sustainable."

The Performance-Based Governors Fund is a program run by the Asia Foundation that aims to empower provincial governors by providing them with operational budgets to improve their relationships with constituents and their overall management capacity. Most provincial governors receive relatively few resources from the federal government and lack capacity to execute their modest budgets.

In the first phase, the program gave each governor \$25,000 per month to spend on specified administrative expenses and a financial advisor to help identify budget priorities, make expenditures, and account for them. The goal was to teach governors how to execute budgets. Funds could be used for (1) vehicles, utilities, furniture, and equipment; (2) travel and transportation; (3) maintenance and repair of public facilities; (4) computer, information technology, and communications; (5) capacity building; and (6) community outreach.

Development experts criticized the design of the program because it had no impact on the governor's actual performance. Every governor, even those known to be corrupt, received the funds.

To address these concerns, the second phase of the program has been expanded to include incentives to improve governance. The program now has a mechanism that can increase or reduce the monthly amount based on the governor's performance. It also added a development component: a well-performing governor can

⁹⁸ "Building on Basics in Health Care," The World Bank, Last updated June 2009, <http://web.worldbank.org>.

⁹⁹ Between FY2002–2010, the United States spent an estimated \$672 million on education assistance in Afghanistan.

¹⁰⁰ Center for Complex Operations official, relaying comment made by a PRT member in Afghanistan, April 2011.

receive an additional \$75,000 per month to spend on local development projects determined in consultation with provincial councils and other local groups.

Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. USAID has yet to bring the program fully on-budget in part as a result of concerns expressed by the Government of Afghanistan that it lacked the capacity to implement the program effectively at the central and provincial levels. Off-budget funding of the program renders it susceptible to the problems noted earlier. In addition, the Ministry of Finance has a budget execution rate of approximately 35 percent, which means that donor funds are replacing national government funds that are available but not reaching the provincial level. Oversight will be difficult since field audits are limited. USAID and its implementing partner may not have enough supervisory personnel to ensure that funds are properly spent and accounted for.

Absorptive capacity is another concern. In some provinces, the governors have the capacity to allocate a \$1.2 million annual budget. However, in less-developed provinces, this amount represents a tidal wave of funding that could hamper the ability of local officials to spend the money wisely. Excess funding could lead to corruption and waste. Finally, the program is not sustainable unless concrete steps are taken to build the capacity of the Afghan Government to execute the program and include it within its budget. Currently, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance does not have the capacity to run this program.

In sum, the program in its current form may not be achievable or sustainable. USAID should only go forward with the program if it can eventually be put on-budget, reduce funding in provinces where absorptive capacity is low, and ensure sufficient oversight. As donor funding declines for this program in outlying years, steps must be taken to replace these funds with domestic resources. We look forward to working with USAID as it explores options to bring the program on-budget over the next 18 months.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We urge the administration to focus its assistance strategy on what is *necessary, achievable, and sustainable*. Below are the three overarching steps that would help lay the foundation for more successful development outcomes in Afghanistan.

- 1) *Consider authorizing a multiyear civilian assistance strategy for Afghanistan.* The administration and Congress should consider working together on a multiyear authorization that includes: (a) a clearly defined assistance strategy; (b) the tools, instruments, and authorities required for a successful development approach; (c) a plan as to how U.S. funding will leverage and partner with Afghan domestic policies, with multilateral efforts—including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank—and with private sector financing; (d) the civilian resources needed for a successful military draw down and transition; (e) the steps needed to ensure accountability, oversight, and effectiveness; and (f) metrics that measure performance and capture outcomes. The strategy should also establish benchmarks for the Afghan Government

to fulfill its international commitments, outline goals for improving donor coordination, and include specific annual funding levels. This process would clarify the U.S. assistance strategy, offer greater predictability on future funding levels, and provide Congress with robust tools for oversight.

- 2) *Reevaluate the performance of stabilization programs in conflict zones.* We must challenge the assumption that our stabilization programs in their current form necessarily contribute to stability. The administration should continue to assess the impact of our stabilization programs in Afghanistan and reallocate funds, as necessary.
- 3) *Focus on sustainability.* We should follow a simple rule: *Donors should not implement projects if Afghans cannot sustain them.* Development in Afghanistan will only succeed if Afghans are legitimate partners and there is a path toward sustainability. The Afghan Government must have sufficient technical capability and funding to cover operation and maintenance costs after a project is completed. A sustainability strategy would consolidate our programs, increase on-budget aid, streamline our rules and controls, and pursue a limited number of high-impact programs that do not require complex procurement or infrastructure. We should also focus on raising domestic revenue, reducing aid dependency, and developing partnerships with the private sector to create jobs. Success should not be measured by outputs or the amount of money spent, but by the ability of Afghan institutions to deliver services, the Afghan private sector to generate jobs and grow the economy, and Afghan civil society and public institutions to provide avenues for citizens to hold their government accountable and participate in political and civic life. More thought should be given to the type of projects we fund. Our aid should be visible among Afghans, and we should have a robust communications strategy in place so Afghans know what U.S. civilian aid in Afghanistan is accomplishing.

Annex—Academic Literature Review: Development and Counterinsurgency

There is a burgeoning literature on development and counterinsurgency (COIN). Recent work on the development-COIN nexus has modeled insurgencies as competitive governance systems that seek to capture the support of the local population. In a competitive governance environment, civilians will condition their support for the government on sustainable and transparent service provision. To that end, various scholars have recommended building Afghan Government capacity to provide services at the local and provincial levels through small, community-based projects that are informed by local needs. Development resources can be violence-reducing and prompt defection within the insurgent's ranks,¹⁰¹ but only under certain conditions:

- *Knowledge of community needs:* Counterinsurgent forces should be dispersed, less mechanized,¹⁰² and should interact closely with local political leaders to gain information about community needs. Knowledge of local needs, as opposed to the size of one's forces, can enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of service provision. For instance, Berman, Shapiro, and Felter find that small-scale reconstruction spending allocated through CERP reduced violence in post-surge Iraq when operational changes in U.S. strategy encouraged greater contact and engagement with the local community.¹⁰³
- *Small projects in secure areas:* Small grants implemented through community-based mechanisms in secure areas stand a greater chance of success than large, big-ticket infrastructure projects. One working study, which uses a randomized field experiment spanning 500 villages across 10 Afghan districts, finds that NSP has led to "a significant improvement in villagers' perception of their economic well-being as well as in their attitudes toward all levels of government."¹⁰⁴
- *Employment and Counterinsurgency:* Providing legitimate employment opportunities may increase popular support for the

¹⁰¹ On the vulnerability of certain violence-producing groups to government service provision, see: Eli Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).

¹⁰² Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63 (2009): 67–106.

¹⁰³ Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," NBER WP #14606, March 2009, Last revised April 2011, <http://sgcc.ucsd.edu/DACOR>.

¹⁰⁴ The authors "find some evidence that the program [NSP] improved perceptions of the security situation, but do not find any effects on the actual occurrence of security incidents in and around villages." Andrew Beath, Pontus Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Working Paper, Last revised: April 11, 2011, <http://www.nsp-ie.org/papers/hearts.pdf>.

government, but only under certain conditions. Collier and Hoeffler argue that improved economic opportunities can increase the cost of insurgent recruitment and diminish potential rebel supply.¹⁰⁵ Berman, Callen, Felter, and Shapiro, however, find a negative correlation between unemployment and insurgent violence in Iraq, the Philippines, and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶ They posit that higher unemployment rates lower the price of obtaining information from the population about the insurgent's whereabouts and result from certain COIN tactics such as establishing security checkpoints that disrupt legitimate commerce. While the literature remains inconclusive, it suggests that we should pay careful attention to the conditions of each sector, resource endowments, local perceptions, and levels of income inequality at both the national and subnational levels when designing programs to improve labor market opportunities for communities in conflict areas

¹⁰⁵ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 563–95.

¹⁰⁶ Eh Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, published online March 22, 2011, <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/16/082202710393920.full.pdf+html>.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I: Total U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan by Fiscal Year
(appropriations/allocations in \$ millions)

Fiscal Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011-2012 Total
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	117.5	239.3	894.8	1,280.3	423.4	1,710.7	1,399.5	1,048.0	3,346.0	11,009.8
Development Assistance (DA)	18.7	42.5	153.1	169.6	187.0	166.8	149.4	0.4	0.0	887.1
Global Health/Child Survival (GHCS)	7.5	49.7	31.4	38.0	41.5	100.8	63.1	58.2	94.3	486.5
Refugee Accounts (MRA/ERMA)	160.5	61.5	63.3	47	36.0	53.8	44.3	86.8	10.0	553.3
Food Aid ^a	206	74.5	99.0	96.7	108.3	69.5	219.7	77.5	27.4	978.4
Int'l Disaster Asst (IDA)	197.1	86.7	1.2	4.3	0.0	0.0	17	77.3	2.8	346.4
INCLE (Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement)	60.0	0.0	220.0	709.3	232.7	251.7	307.6	484.0	589.0	2,854.3
NADR (Nonprofit Anti-Terror Donations)	44.0	34.7	66.9	38.2	18.2	36.6	26.6	-8.6	57.8	371.6
Int'l Med Ed & Training (IMET)	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.8	1	1.6	1.4	1.5	8.3
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	57.0	191.0	43.7	396.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,058.5
Other ^c	39.8	24.6	41.3	17.8	0.3	1.2	36.0	16.3	3.4	180.7
Total ISG Budget Function	907.8	804.8	1,997.3	2,795.5	1,098.2	1,892.2	2,264.8	2,848.5	4,172.2	18,784.8
DOD - Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	0.0	0.0	0.0	995.0	1,908.1	7,406.4	7,750.0	5,606.9	9,162.8	27,829.2
DOD - CERP	0.0	0.0	40.0	136.0	215.0	209.0	488.3	550.7	1,000.0	2,439.0
DOD - Counternarcotics	0.0	0.0	7.8	224.5	08.1	29.0	189.6	270.1	370.2	1,425.3
DOD - Other	7.5	165.0	285.0	540.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	997.3
Total DOD Budget Function	7.5	165.0	332.8	1,895.5	2,231.2	7,906.4	8,427.9	6,387.7	10,473.0	32,891.0
DEA Counternarcotics	0.6	2.9	3.7	16.8	23.7	20.4	49.6	18.8	0.0	127.5
Total U.S. Assistance	916.0	972.7	2,334.8	4,711.2	3,353.1	9,819.0	10,742.3	9,255.0	14,645.2	51,803.3

Sources: S.G.A.R. Report to Congress, July 30, 2010; Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS calculations.

Notes: The ISG budget function encompasses International Affairs spending and is mostly appropriated in the State/Foreign Operations bill; fund aid is appropriated in the Agriculture appropriations. The DOD budget function is Defense appropriations. Funding does not include Inspector General oversight or State/USAID operations which are calculated by the SIGA at roughly \$ 3 billion since 2002.

- a. Includes Migration and Refugee Assistance and U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
- b. Includes P.L. 480 Title II Food for Education, Food for Progress, 416b Food Aid, Emerson Trust, and USAID CCC
- c. Other ISG accounts include USAID Other, Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Technical Assistance, and Peacekeeping accounts

Source: Curt Tarnoff, *Afghanistan U.S. Foreign Assistance*, Congressional Research Service, R40699, August 12, 2010, p. 12, <http://www.crs.gov/Products/pdfr40699.pdf>

APPENDIX II: USAID Funding by Province in Afghanistan, FY 2009-2010

FY 2009-10* Funding Projections based on Afghan Info Reporting			
	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2009-10
	Est. FY 2009 Disbursements	Est. Total FY 2010 Disbursements	Est. Total FY 2009-10 Disbursements
NC-A			
Bamyan	488,795,703	736,487,884	1,225,283,587
Chaghay	5,385,000	22,308,800	27,693,800
Chaghay	11,931,852	35,820,000	47,751,852
Kabul	277,420,000	4,078,751	281,498,751
Kapisa	535,436	9,047,000	9,582,436
Khost	32,341,851	42,038,207	74,380,058
Kunar	3,719,630	16,590,830	20,310,460
Laghman	17,860,000	10,680,890	28,540,890
Logar	5,76,924	1,133,360	6,904,284
Maidar Warzak	1,887,710	15,420,790	17,308,500
Nangarhar	42,277,643	50,431,834	92,709,477
Nuristan	4,494,306	3,562,241	8,056,547
Paktia	20,261,405	9,900,000	30,161,405
Paktiya	36,290,071	36,210,731	72,500,802
Paristan	893,501	7,640,253	8,533,754
Pawar	2,005,085	12,574,640	14,579,725
NC-B			
Badrakhtan	18,545,325	44,481,111	63,026,436
Bagram	6,730,252	34,011,704	40,741,956
Balkh	22,376,044	42,297,532	64,673,576
Faryab	6,216,270	12,865,493	19,081,763
Jawzjan	0,272,682	12,16,768	12,440,450
Kanduz	9,303,491	54,631,432	63,934,923
Sarongwar	4,117,778	4,398,427	8,516,205
Takhar	3,718,521	11,715,526	15,434,047
Takhar	6,465,535	17,774,412	24,239,947
NC-C			
Daykundi	1,513,359	13,795,981	15,309,340
Kandahar	21,996,622	119,865,351	141,861,973
Juzgan	2,847,026	17,221,956	19,068,982
Zabul	4,404,111	13,174,112	17,578,223
NC-D			
Herat	36,627,942	154,537,128	191,165,070
Herat	25,111,806	28,450,587	53,562,393
Herat	416,136	6,094,162	6,510,298
NC-E			
Farah	43,123,947	91,144,598	134,268,545
Farah	3,702,325	6,381,623	10,083,948
Farah	11,154,100	15,844,973	26,999,073
Ghor	1,512,801	4,834,781	6,347,582
Herat	1,664,100	54,167,301	55,831,401
Grand Total	726,648,308	2,402,488,747	3,129,137,055

*Estimates do not include funds provided to national level mechanisms such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, projects that provide direct services to USAID (e.g. Audit Firms, Construction Designs, etc.), or program funds attributed to supporting USAID (e.g. PASA, PSCs, FSCs, Embassy A/C, etc.). These numbers only reflect USAID resources and not other agencies such as the Dept. of State and USA.

Source: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 21

APPENDIX III: USAID Funding by Province in Afghanistan, FY 2011

FY2011 Funding* Projections based on Afghan Info Reporting					
Row Labels	FY11 Q1 Projection	FY11 Q2 Projection	FY11 Q3 Projection	FY11 Q4 Projection	FY11 Total Projections
RC-E	\$ 169,161,201	\$ 159,160,153	\$ 171,558,046	\$ 163,848,735	\$ 663,728,135
Balkh	\$ 1,692,022	\$ 1,692,022	\$ 1,692,022	\$ 1,692,022	\$ 6,768,088
Badkhash	\$ 5,994,386	\$ 8,411,039	\$ 10,122,963	\$ 10,778,885	\$ 35,317,273
Kabul	\$ 107,435,311	\$ 107,435,311	\$ 107,435,311	\$ 107,435,311	\$ 430,741,244
Kapisa	\$ 1,018,154	\$ 2,068,672	\$ 2,142,986	\$ 1,305,084	\$ 6,534,900
Khost	\$ 6,507,783	\$ 10,449,332	\$ 12,838,876	\$ 13,491,194	\$ 43,287,185
Kunar	\$ 4,657,614	\$ 5,946,707	\$ 6,504,967	\$ 4,168,554	\$ 21,177,842
Laghman	\$ 2,406,285	\$ 3,476,343	\$ 3,568,995	\$ 994,113	\$ 10,445,736
Nangarhar	\$ 2,790,611	\$ 3,593,128	\$ 4,243,781	\$ 1,607,269	\$ 12,234,800
Noristan	\$ 3,962,344	\$ 3,931,379	\$ 4,047,606	\$ 1,341,055	\$ 13,282,384
Paktia	\$ 9,496,645	\$ 16,767,111	\$ 19,635,751	\$ 14,976,721	\$ 59,875,228
Paktika	\$ 187,735	\$ 41,760	\$ 259,426	\$ 412,281	\$ 898,202
Pandjshir	\$ 1,053,623	\$ 2,717,690	\$ 6,135,825	\$ 5,271,174	\$ 15,178,312
Parsa	\$ 2,082,475	\$ 4,470,191	\$ 8,713,142	\$ 4,767,746	\$ 28,033,554
Panjshir	\$ 1,457,777	\$ 464,078	\$ 8,398,874	\$ 181,374	\$ 10,992,103
Parwan	\$ 2,235,521	\$ 2,771,953	\$ 3,220,553	\$ 7,216,020	\$ 15,443,047
RC-N	\$ 40,018,720	\$ 46,275,080	\$ 50,561,775	\$ 20,549,870	\$ 157,405,445
Badkhash	\$ 12,012,609	\$ 15,181,822	\$ 2,938,148	\$ 1,111,146	\$ 31,243,725
Baghlan	\$ 7,469,708	\$ 8,842,357	\$ 8,282,405	\$ 4,777,008	\$ 29,371,478
Balkh	\$ 9,119,864	\$ 6,752,133	\$ 7,257,711	\$ 4,993,550	\$ 28,123,258
Kandahar	\$ 2,544,580	\$ 3,429,884	\$ 3,501,88	\$ 2,216,660	\$ 11,792,912
Kapisa	\$ 1,990,392	\$ 2,771,446	\$ 2,725,022	\$ 2,013,122	\$ 9,500,000
Kunduz	\$ 4,531,631	\$ 4,480,822	\$ 5,095,311	\$ 1,311,124	\$ 15,418,888
Samangan	\$ 275,091	\$ 1,275,664	\$ 374,854	\$ 906,523	\$ 2,831,132
Sar-e-Pul	\$ 757,180	\$ 2,597,969	\$ 2,112,411	\$ 964,767	\$ 6,432,327
Takhar	\$ 2,297,172	\$ 1,068,688	\$ 5,985,676	\$ 1,491,84	\$ 10,843,380
RC-S	\$ 33,651,338	\$ 33,917,304	\$ 38,912,729	\$ 25,306,496	\$ 131,787,867
Daykundi	\$ 3,296,081	\$ 3,439,349	\$ 4,482,406	\$ 4,550,011	\$ 15,767,847
Kandahar	\$ 22,634,075	\$ 19,414,345	\$ 22,121,172	\$ 9,216,321	\$ 73,386,913
Logar	\$ 3,754,583	\$ 5,381,245	\$ 5,748,644	\$ 4,736,814	\$ 19,621,286
Nasir	\$ 3,727,019	\$ 2,191,436	\$ 6,048,520	\$ 6,703,728	\$ 18,670,703
RC-SW	\$ 13,570,467	\$ 25,028,399	\$ 40,585,547	\$ 8,241,612	\$ 87,425,925
Helmand	\$ 12,608,866	\$ 17,514,401	\$ 37,438,04	\$ 1,265,753	\$ 68,826,664
Nimroz	\$ 961,601	\$ 2,514,008	\$ 7,147,507	\$ 2,991,859	\$ 13,584,975
RC-W	\$ 10,570,277	\$ 18,864,422	\$ 17,824,362	\$ 10,816,086	\$ 58,075,127
Badkhash	\$ 1,532,306	\$ 755,134	\$ 1,897,384	\$ 382,612	\$ 4,567,436
Farah	\$ 2,211,202	\$ 6,652,606	\$ 4,579,121	\$ 1,729,875	\$ 15,172,804
Ghor	\$ 218,435	\$ 1,194,462	\$ 3,931,721	\$ 1,111,111	\$ 6,455,729
Herat	\$ 5,946,212	\$ 7,254,090	\$ 7,429,734	\$ 1,092,464	\$ 21,722,500
Total	\$ 369,882,911	\$ 393,345,768	\$ 404,418,076	\$ 208,756,807	\$ 1,376,403,562

*Estimates do not include funds provided to national level mechanisms such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) disbursement \$800 million; projects that provide direct services to USAID (e.g. AUSAID, Construction, etc.) or program funds attributed to supporting USAID (e.g. PASA, PSAs, etc.). These numbers only reflect USAID resources and not other agencies such as the Dept. of State and USOA.

Source: Response to Questions for the Record submitted to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by Chairman John Kerry, March 2, 2011, No. 22.

APPENDIX IV: USAID/Afghanistan: Capacity Development Programs with GIROA

#	Program	Start Date	End Date	Total Est. Cost (\$)
1	Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP)	9/30/2009	9/30/2011	10,000,000
2	Ministry of Women's Affairs Initiative to Strengthen Policy and Advocacy (MISPA)	1/1/2006	1/31/2011	7,161,650
3	Tech Serve	7/1/2006	6/30/2010	83,548,457
4	The Building Education Support Systems for Teachers (BEST)	1/27/2006	1/26/2011	91,828,299
5	Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival (BASICS) II	9/30/2008	10/1/2011	3,367,201
6	Afghan eQuality Alliances (AeQA)	7/8/2006	6/15/2011	12,000,000
7	Higher Education Project (HEP)	1/23/2006	1/30/2011	49,917,975
8	Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)	5/28/2009	12/31/2010	58,500,000
9	Afghan Civil Service Support Program (ACSS)	2/1/2007	3/31/2011	218,576,488
10	Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program (APAP)	9/29/2004	10/31/2010	40,556,170
11	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)	9/3/2008	9/3/2011	74,788,163
12	Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMPU) (East & South)	7/7/2009	11/1/2011	101,745,096
13	Performance-Based Governors' Fund (PBGF)	11/1/2009	10/31/2010	13,999,768
14	Support to the Electoral Process (STEP)	7/1/2008	7/1/2011	79,300,000
15	Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP)	7/5/2009	6/4/2011	34,458,720
16	Rule of Law Program (Formal)	5/19/2010	6/18/2011	18,132,732
17	The Economic Growth and Governance Initiative (EGGI)	8/15/2009	8/15/2011	92,452,859
18	Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAFAs)	11/19/2009	11/18/2011	63,900,000
19	Human and Institutional Capacity Building for Afghanistan Energy and Natural Resources Sector (AECBS)	7/3/2008	7/3/2011	17,102,129
20	Technical Assistance to the Technical Secretariat of Supreme Council on Water Affairs and to the Ministry of Energy and Water through the Human Resources and Logistic Support - HRLS Program of USAID/IRD	3/1/2006	2/28/2011	Cost Imbedded in HRLS project budget
21	Commercialization of Afghanistan Water and Sanitation Activity (CAWWSA)	11/12/2008	11/11/2011	8,508,717
22	Road Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Capacity Building Program (TOR14)	Nov. 2007	Oct. 2010, ext to Dec. 2011, pending	Cost imbedded in TOR14 of RP project budget

Source: Response from State Department to SFRC majority staff, February 9, 2011.

APPENDIX V: Capacity Building Programs in Afghanistan—INCLE

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, provides capacity building to Afghanistan ministries focused on the provision of internal security, rule of law, and enforcement of Afghanistan's illicit narcotics laws. INL's capacity building programs in Afghanistan help build the organizational and human capacity of Afghan Government Ministries to effectively and independently fulfill their core functions.

INCLE funds the following capacity building programs:

- **Justice Sector Support Program** (\$64 million for current task order year May 2010–May 2011): Launched in 2006, the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) is the primary capacity building vehicle of INL's criminal justice assistance through training, mentoring, and technical support. JSSP supports capacity building efforts within the following Ministries: the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and Attorney General's Office (AGO) and, to a lesser degree, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Women's Affairs, and the Supreme Court. Through the creation of close partnerships between JSSP advisors and Afghan Government officials, the program's main goal is to help create sustainable improvements in the Afghan Government's delivery of justice to the Afghan people. In terms of nationwide reach, JSSP is the largest justice assistance program in Afghanistan today, with 93 Afghan legal experts, 65 American advisors, and over 100 Afghan support staff.
- **Corrections System Support Program** (\$63 million for current task order year May 2010–May 2011): Launched in 2006, INL's Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) partners with the Afghan Ministry of Justice's (MOJ) Central Prison Directorate (CPD) to build a safe, secure, and humane prison system that meets international standards and Afghan cultural requirements. CSSP focuses on CPD headquarters capacity building, basic and advanced nationwide training, infrastructure program management, advising provincial prison leadership on secure and humane corrections practices, and providing mentoring and support at the Counter Narcotics Justice Center. CSSP currently has 71 American corrections advisors and over 200 Afghan staff. CSSP is based in Kabul and has seven regional teams located at the RTCs in Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Bamiyan, and Paktia and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar.
- **Ministry of Counternarcotics Advisors** (\$800,000 for first program year; \$25 million planned): INL has provided the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) with two advisors, an Executive Advisor and a Capacity Building Advisor. These advisors provide advice and support on MCN policies and programs and assess capacity building requirements. To further advance the goal of building MCN capacity, INL proposes a new, multi-year, \$25 million program to develop the MCN's human and bureaucratic capacity in order to promote its independence and effectiveness. The MCN capacity building program will provide expatriate and Afghan advisors for the MCN's Kabul headquarters and provincial offices as well as support for the Ministry's human resources, information technology, commodities, logistics, and engineering.
- **Ministry of Interior—Counternarcotics** (\$2.4 million for current task order year): As part of its larger contract supporting operations and facilities maintenance for the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan's vetted units, which are mentored by DEA, INL provides six additional advisors/mentors to the National Interdiction Unit and the Sensitive Investigative Unit. These individuals work to assist DEA in building the capacity of the vetted units not just operationally, but also in the areas of administration, logistics, and management.

Source: Response from State Department to SFRC majority staff, February 9, 2011.

**APPENDIX VI: Letter From Deputy Secretary of State
Thomas R. Nides to Chairman John F. Kerry on June 8, 2011**

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Majority Staff's draft "Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan" report. We look forward to further discussion of the report's conclusions and we appreciate the report's recognition that, despite the many operational challenges that we face, we are seeing progress in achieving our civilian goals in Afghanistan. Enclosed is a letter from Dr. Rajiv Shah, which includes a comprehensive response to the assistance-related elements of the report.

As the report recognizes, while we still have work to do to overcome the operational challenges we face in Afghanistan, we have already made progress in improving our ability to safeguard U.S. government funds. For example, we have developed a Vetting Support Unit in Kabul that will be responsible for vetting all non-U.S. government contractors. This effort feeds into the broader Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative, which focuses on increasing oversight and accountability through two pre-award processes and two post-award processes. We are also committed to working with the Afghan government to improve the transparency and accountability of its ministries, both at the national and sub-national levels. We are encouraged by the steps that President Karzai and his government have taken to follow through on anti-corruption commitments, but also recognize that other key steps, such as the need to pass a firm anti-corruption law to support the Major Crimes Task Force, are slow to develop.

As the report points out, sustainability is an important consideration as we begin the transition process. We are currently working with the Afghan government to streamline and enhance national-level programs, following some of the successful models mentioned in the report, such as the nation-wide Basic Package of Health Services. In cooperation with other donors, we are building Afghan institutional capacity and sustainability of our programming by


The Honorable
John F. Kerry, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

increasingly channeling our resources through on-budget Afghan government mechanisms. Such mechanisms include proven Afghan programs such as the National Solidarity Program, which is highlighted as a success in your report. To reinforce this effort and building Afghan capacity over the long-term, we also provide support to the Afghan Civil Service Commission to help professionalize the Afghan civil service and enable Afghans to assume greater responsibility for their country's economic development.

One of the recommendations in your report is to develop a multi-year civilian assistance strategy for Afghanistan that compliments the now underway security transition process. This issue is playing an important role in our Strategic Partnership Declaration negotiations with the Afghan government, which will cement our cooperation in a number of critical areas such as security, governance, and development. Parallel to this, the U.S. government is also implementing a number of initiatives to foster private sector development, which will also contribute to the sustainability of our efforts. As we move toward the 2014 transition deadline and beyond, the private sector will be increasingly important as military and international spending gradually decrease.

Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,



Thomas R. Nides

Enclosure

As stated.

APPENDIX VII: Letter From USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah to Chairman John F. Kerry on June 1, 2011



The Administrator

June 1, 2011

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review your Majority Staff report Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. Though we do not endorse all the conclusions in this report, we appreciate the report's recognition that USAID has performed admirably in a very complex and insecure environment. We also acknowledge that we can always do more to more effectively spend our aid money. We hope to move forward in a spirit of partnership with your Committee and look forward to continued cooperation in the future.

USAID is an essential component of our critical national security strategy in Afghanistan. Over the last 18 months USAID has tripled its staff in Afghanistan, aligned our efforts with our military and civilian partners; and demanded far greater accountability of ourselves, our contractors, and the Afghan government and local Afghan institutions. The results we are achieving attest to this progress. Even as the conflict there continues, the economy, food security, literacy employment, and life expectancies all continue to rise, the government is more capable, and the democratic system more resilient. Afghan women's access to education, health care, economic opportunity, and political representation continue to rise. Once shattered bazaar in Kandahar and Helmand are now thriving, and former opium fields are planted with high-yield seed. Millions of Afghans are seeing the possibility of a better, stable future. As the largest donor, by far, to these efforts, the generosity of the American people and USAID's careful stewardship of taxpayer resources stands behind all these gains. The sustainability of these gains is critical to our strategy.

There are some very important recent developments in how USAID does business that are not adequately captured in the report. Over the past 18 months, we have undertaken significant

U.S. Agency for International Development
305 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20523
www.usaid.gov

analysis and review of our programs in Afghanistan, and we have changed, in some cases, very fundamentally, the way which we spend U.S. taxpayer money in order to increase the impact of our development engagement. Below are a few key areas that highlight these changes.

Impact, Afghan capacity and on-budget assistance USAID is committed to building the capacity of the Afghan government, and spending a substantial portion of our development assistance through the Afghan budget, while ensuring the accountability, integrity, and transparency of those funds. We have had great success by focusing on a few important Afghan institutions - such as the Ministries of Finance, Public Health, Agriculture, Education, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development - so that Afghans can increasingly fund and deliver critical services on their own. Indeed, the enormously successful National Solidarity Program, which has reached over 22,000 Afghan villages, is funded through the government.

Overall, we currently spend approximately 38 percent of our funds on-budget. We plan to increase direct funding, but only when ministries are able to execute the development funds that they do receive, and do so accountably. An important innovation deserves mention, the Civilian Technical Assistance Program. USAID, in concert with other donors has provided the Ministry of Finance with funds to hire qualified Afghan advisors to provide capacity building to government ministries throughout the government. Salaries are consistent, resources are on budget, and we are building capacity in the Afghan government ministries while they are managing and spending our funds accountably and effectively.

Contracting Where the Afghan government or civil society does not have adequate capacity to achieve results and account for money, we often contract out services to national and international firms and NGOs. We design and conduct these efforts in a manner intended to strengthen Afghan institutions and prevent corruption. Indeed a mixture of off-budget and on-budget investments is necessary to achieve the most effective results. Even the Ministry of Health's Basic Package of Health Services and the MRRD's National Solidarity Program, cited as successes in the report, involve contracting out for services, while at the same time building the capacity of the Ministry to lead and manage its programs.

Moreover, USAID has developed robust systems to improve contractor accountability. In a speech I gave at the Center for Global Development this past January, I highlighted our intention to increase scrutiny of contractors both for financial and impact accountability. The Agency has created a new Division within the Office of Acquisition and Assistance called Compliance and

Oversight of Partner Performance (COPP). The Division was formally inaugurated in February 2011 and has already completed more than 40 suspension and debarment actions, based largely on referrals from the Office of the Inspector General. The Academy for Educational Development (AED) is perhaps one of the most publicized examples of our use of the full range of tools increasing accountability of contractors.

Corruption and A³: Corruption is of course a real concern for both on budget and off budget assistance. I launched the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A³) initiative in the fall of 2010 to help ensure that the Agency is taking the necessary steps to limit the likelihood of assistance directly or inadvertently supporting malign groups or being diverted from their development purpose by extortion or corruption. As a result, USAID is implementing safeguards in four areas, two of which strengthen our pre-award processes and two that strengthen our post-award implementation.

A number of changes have been made that significantly improve contractor oversight. First, USAID/Afghanistan now includes a subcontractor clause in new awards that permits USAID to restrict the number of subcontract tiers, requires the prime contractor to perform a certain percentage of the work, and prohibits subcontract "brokering" or "flipping", which is when a subcontractor passes the work to someone else and increases the risk for corruption.

Second, we are increasing our financial controls through a joint program with the USAID Inspector General to audit all locally incurred costs of program-funded implementing partners. Audits will be performed by internationally-accredited regionally based audit firms and checked by the Inspector General. Third, USAID/Afghanistan is also increasing its Project Oversight through the establishment of On-Site Monitors (OSMs) in USAID field offices for project monitoring. Each USAID project will be assigned an OSM that will provide real time data to contract staff in Kabul on project performance and accountability.

Kabul Bank: USAID takes oversight of its awards seriously – at all levels. With regard to the well-documented crisis at Kabul Bank, USAID has terminated this part of the Deloitte contract in Afghanistan to ensure that our technical assistance is as effective as possible in light of changed and difficult conditions. Nevertheless, we do not believe that Deloitte, or USAID could have stopped the massive fraud that occurred at Kabul Bank. Deloitte, with USAID funds supported the Afghan Central Bank by providing trainers and experts to build the capacity of its Bank Supervision Unit. Oversight of the Afghan financial sector is conducted by Afghan

authorities, and actual bank supervision is a sovereign function of the Afghan government. The fraud committed by Kabul Bank officers was a criminal act, deliberately concealed by major shareholders and senior bank management. While there was private speculation about possible financial difficulties at Kabul Bank based in part on the crash of the Dubai real estate market all donors were essentially caught by surprise at the Kabul Bank collapse. Kabul Bank's shareholder/officers alleged frauds and self-dealing caused these massive losses and hid them from Central Bank examiners through fake documentation and obfuscating accounting techniques to hide this from the Central Bank and other authorities. The initial outline of this fraud and revelation of the unprecedented level of loss did not occur until the Chairman of the Board of Kabul Bank began talking with Central Bank Authorities in the summer of 2010

Transition and Development planning USAID and State Department are very engaged in anticipating both the impact of the U.S. troop withdrawal on the Afghan economy, and on U.S. civilian resources. We are working on a longer term economic strategy, which looks to transition at the end of 2014 and beyond. We are aligning resources against critical "foundational investments" in economic growth, infrastructure, and human capital that will enable transition, and make it durable. These "foundational investments" require significant up-front financial and policy engagement in the start phase, with financial costs and policy engagement tapering off once systems or infrastructure are in place or private sector takes over. These investments, for example, in extractive industries or in promotion of mobile phone money transfers, will best leverage the higher levels of financial resources that we currently have to ensure sustainability of our other investments as well as the security transition in the future. The report also notes that State has undertaken a massive uplift in civilians. USAID has been an important part of that civilian uplift and we are working hard both to ensure we have adequate staff on the ground now, and to plan for the future decrease in numbers as the security transition occurs.

Performance-Based Governors Fund The Performance-Based Governors Fund is a relatively young, but important new program that is explicitly designed to move toward sustainability. USAID explored options of bringing PBGF fully "on budget" this year, but was informed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) that the capacities to effectively implement this program do not yet exist at either the central or provincial levels. Building GIROA capacities to be able to take on these functions are an explicit element of PBGF.

- 5 -


expansion. The expanded program is designed to develop the capacity of GIRA to oversee these funds, and include benchmarks to bring this program on-budget over 18 months.

Stabilization and COIN USAID has been engaged in intensive review and analysis of its engagement in support of stabilization. While the body of the report highlights this, the summary and recommendation fails to acknowledge that we have been reviewing the impact of our stabilization programs and altering the manner in which we work in challenging areas to ensure that we maximize sustainable impact. The report notes that 80 percent of our resources are supporting COIN in the south, south-west, and east. According to our figures, and in close consultation with our military partners, roughly 65-70 percent of all of our resources are being spent in those areas. Some of these funds are being used for short-term traditional "stabilization" activities with short and long term impacts, while other funds are for longer-term activities that may be considered "developmental", but which we consider to have a strong stabilizing effect as well. As the report acknowledges, we are working hard to identify appropriate programs for specific contexts and not dictate that a certain area receive a certain type of stabilization programming.

As we strive to improve our engagement in Afghanistan, it is important to acknowledge the enormous progress the Afghan people have made in rebuilding their government, economy, and society since 2001 with our support. At the time of the fall of the Taliban regime, there was no functioning government or civil service, no provision of basic services, no education for girls or public role for women in society, no proper financial system, and no rule of law. The development effort undertaken by the Afghan people in partnership with the international community, foremost the United States, has accomplished some astonishing things in terms of health, education, a functioning currency, a growing economy, and the foundations for an accountable, responsive government and society. Numerous challenges remain, as would be expected in a country amongst the poorest in the world, and still at war after decades of conflict.

I appreciate you offering us the chance to comment on this report.

Sincerely,



Rajiv Shah

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Majority Staff's draft "Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan" report. We look forward to further discussion of the report's conclusions and we appreciate the report's recognition that, despite the many operational challenges that we face, we are seeing progress in achieving our civilian goals in Afghanistan. Enclosed is a letter from Dr. Rajiv Shah, which includes a comprehensive response to the assistance-related elements of the report.

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As the report points out, sustainability is an important consideration as we begin the transition process. We are currently working with the Afghan government to streamline and enhance national-level programs, following some of the successful models mentioned in the report, such as the nation-wide Basic Package of Health Services. In cooperation with other donors, we are building Afghan institutional capacity and sustainability of our programming by

The Honorable
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One of the recommendations in your report is to develop a multi-year civilian assistance strategy for Afghanistan that compliments the now underway security transition process. This issue is playing an important role in our Strategic Partnership Declaration negotiations with the Afghan government, which will cement our cooperation in a number of critical areas such as security, governance, and development. Parallel to this, the U.S. government is also implementing a number of initiatives to foster private sector development, which will also contribute to the sustainability of our efforts. As we move toward the 2014 transition deadline and beyond, the private sector will be increasingly important as military and international spending gradually decrease.

Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Tom Nides', written over a horizontal line.

Thomas R. Nides

Enclosure:

As stated.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

The Administrator

June 1, 2011

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review your Majority Staff report Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. Though we do not endorse all the conclusions in this report, we appreciate the report's recognition that USAID has performed admirably in a very complex and insecure environment. We also acknowledge that we can always do more to more effectively spend our aid money. We hope to move forward in a spirit of partnership with your Committee and look forward to continued cooperation in the future.

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Corruption and A Corruption is of course a real concern for both on budget and off budget assistance I launched the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A³) initiative in the fall of 2010 to help ensure that the Agency is taking the necessary steps to limit the likelihood of assistance directly or inadvertently supporting malign groups or being diverted from their development purpose by extortion or corruption As a result, USAID is implementing safeguards in four areas, two of which strengthen our pre-award processes and two that strengthen our post-award implementation

A number of changes have been made that significantly improve contractor oversight. First, USAID/Afghanistan now includes a subcontractor clause in new awards that permits USAID to restrict the number of subcontract tiers, requires the prime contractor to perform a certain percentage of the work and prohibits subcontract "brokering" or "flipping", which is when a subcontractor passes the work to someone else and increases the risk for corruption.

Second, we are increasing our financial controls through a joint program with the USAID Inspector General to audit all locally incurred costs of program-funded implementing partners Audits will be performed by internationally-accredited regionally based audit firms and checked by the Inspector General Third, USAID/Afghanistan is also increasing its Project Oversight through the establishment of On-Site Monitors (OSMs) in USAID field offices for project monitoring Each USAID project will be assigned an OSM that will provide real time data to contract staff in Kabul on project performance and accountability

Kabul Bank USAID takes oversight of its awards seriously - at all levels With regard to the well-documented crisis at Kabul Bank, USAID has terminated this part of the Deloitte contract in Afghanistan to ensure that our technical assistance is as effective as possible in light of changed and difficult conditions. Nevertheless, we do not believe that Deloitte, or USAID could have stopped the massive fraud that occurred at Kabul Bank. Deloitte, with USAID funds supported the Afghan Central Bank by providing trainers and experts to build the capacity of its Bank Supervision Unit. Oversight of the Afghan financial sector is conducted by Afghan

authorities, and actual bank supervision is a sovereign function of the Afghan government. The fraud committed by Kabul Bank officers was a criminal act, deliberately concealed by major shareholders and senior bank management. While there was private speculation about possible financial difficulties at Kabul Bank based in part on the crash of the Dubai real estate market, all donors were essentially caught by surprise at the Kabul Bank collapse. Kabul Bank's shareholder/officers alleged frauds and self-dealing caused these massive losses and hid them from Central Bank examiners through fake documentation and obfuscating accounting techniques to hide this from the Central Bank and other authorities. The initial outline of this fraud and revelation of the unprecedented level of loss did not occur until the Chairman of the Board of Kabul Bank began talking with Central Bank Authorities in the summer of 2010.

Transition and Development planning: USAID and State Department are very engaged in anticipating both the impact of the U.S. troop withdrawal on the Afghan economy, and on U.S. civilian resources. We are working on a longer term economic strategy, which looks to transition at the end of 2014 and beyond. We are aligning resources against critical "foundational investments" in economic growth, infrastructure, and human capital that will enable transition and make it durable. These "foundational investments" require significant up-front financial and policy engagement in the start phase, with financial costs and policy engagement tapering off once systems or infrastructure are in place or private sector takes over. These investments, for example, in extractive industries or in promotion of mobile phone money transfers, will best leverage the higher levels of financial resources that we currently have to ensure sustainability of our other investments as well as the security transition in the future. The report also notes that State has undertaken a massive uplift in civilians. USAID has been an important part of that civilian uplift and we are working hard both to ensure we have adequate staff on the ground now, and to plan for the future decrease in numbers as the security transition occurs.

Performance-Based Governors Fund. The Performance-Based Governors Fund is a relatively young, but important new program that is explicitly designed to move toward sustainability. USAID explored options of bringing PBGF fully "on budget" this year, but was informed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) that the capacities to effectively implement this program do not yet exist at either the central or provincial levels. Building GIROA capacities to be able to take on these functions are an explicit element of PBGF.


expansion. The expanded program is designed to develop the capacity of GIRA to oversee these funds, and include benchmarks to bring this program on-budget over 18 months.

Stabilization and COIN: USAID has been engaged in intensive review and analysis of its engagement in support of stabilization. While the body of the report highlights this, the summary and recommendation fails to acknowledge that we have been reviewing the impact of our stabilization programs and altering the manner in which we work in challenging areas to ensure that we maximize sustainable impact. The report notes that 80 percent of our resources are supporting COIN in the south, south-west, and east. According to our figures, and in close consultation with our military partners, roughly 65-70 percent of all of our resources are being spent in those areas. Some of these funds are being used for short-term traditional "stabilization" activities with short and long term impacts, while other funds are for longer-term activities that may be considered "developmental", but which we consider to have a strong stabilizing effect as well. As the report acknowledges, we are working hard to identify appropriate programs for specific contexts and not dictate that a certain area receive a certain type of stabilization programming.

As we strive to improve our engagement in Afghanistan, it is important to acknowledge the enormous progress the Afghan people have made in rebuilding their government, economy, and society since 2001 with our support. At the time of the fall of the Taliban regime, there was no functioning government or civil service, no provision of basic services, no education for girls or public role for women in society, no proper financial system, and no rule of law. The development effort undertaken by the Afghan people in partnership with the international community, foremost the United States, has accomplished some astonishing things in terms of health, education, a functioning currency, a growing economy, and the foundations for an accountable, responsive government and society. Numerous challenges remain, as would be expected in a country amongst the poorest in the world, and still at war after decades of conflict.

I appreciate you offering us the chance to comment on this report.

Sincerely,



Rajiv Shah



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

June 17, 2011

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: S/SRAP – Dan Feldman, Acting

SUBJECT: Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan

*REPLACED
BY OFFICIAL
GROSSMAN
VERSION ON
6/21/11*

The past decade of foreign assistance to Afghanistan has produced significant results. Increases in agricultural production and employment have helped transform many insurgent strongholds into productive communities. Access to education and healthcare has increased by several thousand percent, saving and improving millions of lives. Investment in infrastructure and governance has spurred dramatic economic growth and revenue increases. In the most volatile regions of Afghanistan, USAID and State work side-by-side with the military to stabilize districts, build responsive local governance, improve the lives of ordinary Afghans, and ultimately help pave the way for U.S. troops to return home.

Afghanistan is a high-risk environment and our efforts face considerable challenges. Insurgent attacks and assassination campaigns kill our partners and significantly increase security-related costs. Massive fraud, like the Kabul Bank scandal, shakes confidence in the government and the financial system. A recently released Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) report titled "Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan" outlines additional challenges, including the need to balance resources devoted to counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts vis-à-vis traditional development, the difficulty of balancing political deadlines against assistance objectives, and the difficulty of adequately overseeing assistance in such a complex security environment. We are also committed to working with the Afghan government to improve the transparency and accountability of its ministries, both at the national and sub-national levels. Although we are encouraged by the steps that President Karzai and his government have taken to implement anti-corruption commitments, we also recognize that other key steps, such as the need to pass a firm anti-corruption law to support the Major Crimes Task Force, are slow to develop.

Transition presents both a unique challenge and an opportunity for our assistance efforts going forward. Since 2009, U.S. civilian assistance has been "lashed up" with ongoing COIN operations. For example, USAID estimates that

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approximately 65-70 percent of its resources go to the south, southwest, and east alone, including Kabul. As coalition troops begin to withdraw, U.S. civilian assistance agencies will be called upon to shift their focus away from COIN and back toward sustainable investments in areas that will promote long-term economic growth and stable governance. We are therefore taking steps to align resources with critical "foundational investments" in economic growth, infrastructure, and human capital that will enable a sustainable transition.

To this end, I co-hosted an internal U.S. government conference on Afghanistan's economic future in the region with Michele Flournoy and Bob Blake on June 7-8 in Washington. The conference will not be an isolated event but rather the starting point of an inter-agency initiative, spearheaded by Tom Nides, to establish a high-level task force that will guide efforts to generate international and private sector support for these "foundational investments." This effort will also be a major thrust of the Bonn Conference, where we hope to evoke political and security assurances for Afghanistan from its neighbors and the international community

During your upcoming testimony on Afghanistan and Pakistan, I recommend that you emphasize that our foreign assistance in Afghanistan plays an important and complementary role both to the reconciliation effort and to the ultimate success of the transition process. The United States must continue to support Afghanistan as a strategic partner and build the Afghan government's capacity to manage its internal security as it increasingly assumes responsibility for ongoing assistance.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 – Q&As on Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan
- Tab 2 – Detailed Appropriations Table
- Tab 3 – Estimated FY 2009-FY 2010 Disbursements by Civilian Regional Platform

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Tab 1: Questions & Answers on Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan**Q. How much civilian assistance has been given to Afghanistan since 2002?**

- Total non-humanitarian assistance funds appropriated for Afghanistan from FY 2002-FY 2011 totaled \$19.1 billion. The amount expended is approximately \$11.8 billion, \$3.3 billion is available to the mission, and approximately \$3.8 billion will become available upon signing of the certification package. The certification package is currently complete and Deputy Secretary Nides intends to sign it and send to Congress after your testimony.

Q. Which sectors have received the greatest amount of assistance? What progress has been achieved in these areas?

- From FY 2006-FY2010, U.S. civilian assistance to Afghanistan has focused on three key areas: peace and security, governance, and economic growth (Tab 2). Approximately 85 percent of funds have been appropriated to these sectors.
- ***Economic Growth:*** Since 2006, the “Economic Growth” program objective has received 29.4 percent of U.S. civilian assistance. Activities under this umbrella support high-growth potential sectors that can generate jobs, exports, and government revenues – as well as infrastructure and regional and private sector linkages needed to underpin a market economy. Achievements include:
 - **GDP/Revenues:** Since 2002 Afghanistan has averaged ten percent per year economic growth, legal GDP is now estimated by the IMF as \$15.6 billion, there is a single, stable currency, and revenues have grown to \$1.65 billion, with a 400 percent increase in customs revenues since 2006 alone and a steady increase of total revenues year-on-year of 20%.
 - **Electricity:** In 2002 only six percent of Afghans had access to reliable electricity. Today, 14 percent have access, and we have added 172 additional MW to the national power grid. We are vigorously continuing joint civ-mil efforts to expand electricity including the Kandahar power initiative.
 - **Roads:** In 2002, there were only 50 km of intact roads. Much of the country was littered with mines. Since then, USAID rehabilitated over 1,800 km of roads. USG assistance has greatly contributed to 80% of

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Afghans now living within 50 kilometers of the Ring Road, improving access to markets, health and education facilities.

- ***Peace & Security:*** Since 2006, the U.S. has dedicated 27.4 percent of its civilian assistance to the program objective "Peace and Security." This includes activities funded by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the areas of drug abuse prevention and treatment; regional policy and law enforcement cooperation; research, monitoring, and verification; prison system reform; and capacity building for law enforcement agencies. Achievements include:
 - ***Poppy Reduction:*** While the drug trade remains a significant challenge, twenty provinces were declared poppy-free in 2010, compared to only 13 as recently as 2007, with 98% percent of illicit cultivation occurring in the nine most insecure provinces in southern and western Afghanistan.
 - ***Agriculture:*** We are helping to improve agricultural yields in the Arghandab Valley to provide real alternatives to poppy production. As a result, farmers shipped the first agricultural exports out of Kandahar in 40 years. The USG also supported Afghan traders in exporting agricultural produce to new markets with improved shipping methods. In FY 2010, for the first time in Afghan history, fresh grapes were transported overland to Delhi using refrigerated containers. Pomegranates are now exported to Dubai directly from Kandahar airfield. In addition, 40 tons of raisins were exported to the European market under the "exceptional fair trade" status, and pomegranates again using refrigerated containers were for sale in Tajikistan, India, Canada, Holland and Germany. Over \$14 million in export sales were made in FY 2010, a direct result of USG agricultural assistance.
- ***Governance:*** The program objective "Governing Justly and Democratically" has received 28.4 percent of U.S. civilian assistance since 2006. Activities in this area focus on three priorities: strengthening national- and sub-national governance, pursuing targeted and Afghan-led rule of law programs, and supporting democratic practices and institutions. Achievements include:
 - ***Elections:*** The U.S. has supported multiple elections and provided support to key electoral institutions, including the International Election Commission (IEC). A U.S.-sponsored voter registry update has enfranchised 7.5 million newly eligible voters through 4,500 registration centers.

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- Civil Service Training: The U.S. has trained more than 100,000 Afghan civil servants. In addition, U.S. programs have trained over half of Afghanistan's judges (562) in Afghan legal practices and standards.
- ***Investing in People***: Since 2006, the "Investing in People" program objective has received 11.2 percent of U.S. civilian assistance. Our assistance in this area further supports our transition goals by facilitating the provision of priority services to underserved populations and key districts, thus strengthening the legitimacy and accountability of the Afghan government. Achievements include:
 - Health: In 2002, Afghanistan had one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world. Our efforts have contributed to a 22% drop in infant deaths
 - Education: Under the Taliban, only 900,000 boys and almost no girls were enrolled in schools. U.S. assistance has also printed over 97 million grade school textbooks, refurbished over 680 schools, and trained over 51,290 teachers (30 percent female) through formal education programs. As a result, today more than seven million children are enrolled in schools, 35% of whom are girls.

Q. How is U.S. civilian assistance distributed geographically across Afghanistan?

- For FY10, estimated regional disbursements totaled \$1.07 billion. RC-East received approximately 40 percent of the funds, RC-South 15 percent and, RC-SW 14 percent (Tab 3).

Q. What percentage of U.S. assistance goes through local Afghan contractors, compared to international contractors?

- 62 percent of all U.S. civilian assistance to Afghanistan is channeled through off-budget mechanisms, including contracts and grants. Of this, the vast majority of U.S. contracts are channeled through international contractors or non-profit entities. This is in part due to the lack of human and technical capacity at local Afghan organizations to abide by the USG stringent guidelines on monitoring and evaluation of programs and funds. To the greatest extent possible, the U.S. follows the "Afghan First" policy, which encourages local procurement of Afghan products made by Afghans to benefit and improve the well-being of the Afghan people. In addition, the U.S. is working to develop the capacity of the Afghan private sector to

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directly bid on and win international development contracts. At present, the vast majority of U.S. funds continues to flow through international contractors.

Q. What percentage of assistance is provided directly to the Afghan government? Which ministries receive this assistance? How do we ensure that these funds are adequately monitored and accounted for?

- Currently, the U.S. is delivering 38 percent of its assistance on-budget; the remaining 62 percent is delivered off-budget, through a variety of implementing partners, including both private contractors as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We continue to work to meet our commitment at the January 2010 London Conference to deliver at least 50 percent of its civilian assistance through on-budget mechanisms to the Afghan government.
- Currently, the U.S. provides on-budget assistance through the Ministry of Finance to four ministries:
 - Ministry of Public Health - With USG on-budget support, the MoPH has been successful in procuring, managing and monitoring 18 contracts with 10 NGOs to deliver basic health services in over 530 facilities in thirteen provinces. In FY 2010, with USG assistance the MoPH increase basic health services coverage to 10 million people in 13 provinces, serving over 800,000 patients each month. On-budget assistance channeled through the national core budget to the MoPH eliminates third party implementers and their overhead costs, resulting in a significant savings in indirect cost rates when comparing on-budget to off-budget programs. USAID's contract with MoPH has no overhead fee while the off-budget program for the same activity charged at least 44%.
 - Ministry of Information and Communication - This is a three year, \$1m program which focus on e-government to provide increased information on GIROA Ministries to the public.
 - Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Education - This \$150 million agricultural credit project consists of two complementary activities. The first activity is a \$100 million grant from USAID to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) that

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established the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF). ADF provides loans throughout the agricultural value chain through a broad range of partner intermediaries, including not only banks, but also non-bank channels such as farm stores, leasing companies, food processors, etc. The second activity is the Agricultural Credit Enhancement (ACE) project, which is a \$50 million technical assistance project that manages all ADF lending activities in close collaboration with MAIL. ACE provides technical support to: a) assess credit applications, b) encourage the development of new lending products suited to the agricultural sector, c) strengthen value chains so they can better absorb ADF funds, and d) facilitate collaboration among agricultural lending organizations to better serve the needs of the agricultural sector.

- Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development - The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is a billion dollar community development program established in 2003 and managed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). The program is implemented in 34 provinces and more than 24,000 communities with the support of 28 national and international partners, and has financed over 50,000 development projects. Through March 2011, USAID has disbursed \$440 million in support of the NSP, in addition to \$50 million in CERP funding.

Q. How does the U.S. measure its progress in civilian assistance?

- The U.S. regularly measures our progress against civilian assistance objectives through a variety of ways. Working closely with Congress, we helped develop a set of metrics collected quarterly by the National Security Council (NSC), which measure progress on a range of issues, including civilian assistance.
- USAID has developed the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (A³) to ensure that proper procedures are in place to help protect assistance dollars from waste and fraud, or otherwise being diverted from their development purpose. This includes investigating unsubstantiated reports that a portion of USAID's development funds in Afghanistan is being extorted by the Taliban. As a result, USAID is enhancing its safeguards for development assistance in the following five categories:

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- Award Mechanisms Utilize assistance awards that provide the most visibility on projects costs, such as cost-reimbursable contracts, and limited layers of subcontracts..
 - Partner Vetting – Conduct background investigations on non-U.S. companies and key personnel working on USAID projects.
 - Financial Controls – Enhance controls on project funds, such as electronic funds transfers and audits of locally incurred costs.
 - Project Oversight – Perform additional project oversight in high-risk areas, utilizing multiple monitoring techniques and delegating more oversight authority to USAID field staff.
- We have also taken steps to ensure that our assistance program advances our policy objectives in Afghanistan. Embassy Kabul measures progress through the Performance Management Plan (PMP), a document outlining eight over-arching assistance objectives with relevant indicators.

Q. How has the U.S. changed its approach to delivering civilian assistance in Afghanistan since 2009? What key reforms have been enacted during this period? What have been the results of these reforms?

- ***Civilian Uplift:*** Since 2009, the U.S. has increased its staffing footprint to 641 civilians under Chief of Mission (COM) Authority serving in Kabul and 378 COM employees in the field. This increased staffing presence helps improve U.S. oversight and accountability through an increase presence on the ground. Over the last 18 months, USAID has increased our staffing footprint throughout Afghanistan to approximately 305 Americans and 170 Afghans as of December 2010. Of that number, approximately 60 percent of our American staff are located outside of Kabul, as are many of our Foreign Service National personnel, who represent increased Afghan capacity and the continuity of USAID's mission.
- ***Shifting to Smaller, Flexible Mechanisms:*** Since 2009, we have been working to decrease our reliance on large, multi-year agreements and are instead shifting to implement an increased number of smaller and more flexible agreements that are often shorter in duration.

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- ***Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A³):*** In fall 2010, USAID developed the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (A³) to help prevent assistance directly or inadvertently supporting malign groups or being diverted from their development purpose by extortion or corruption. As a result, USAID is implementing safeguards in four areas, two of which strengthen our pre-award processes (e.g. subcontractor clause in new awards that permits USAID to restrict the number of subcontract tiers) and two that strengthen our post-award implementation (e.g. new joint program with the USAID Inspector General to audit all locally incurred costs of program-funded implementing partners).
- ***Increased Alignment with Afghan Priorities:*** The U.S. goal to increase on-budget assistance through Afghan government mechanisms to at least 50 percent by July 2012 reflects a commitment to increasingly align our efforts with Afghan priorities.

Tab 3: Estimated Annual Disbursements by Civilian Regional Platform*

	Est. FY 2009		Est. FY 2010	
Total	458,441,656	%	1,068,785,470	%
RC-East	212,722,052	46%	424,819,228	40%
RC-South	56,289,588	12%	163,930,014	15%
RC-Southwest	35,527,942	8%	154,517,129	14%
RC-North	110,748,707	24%	234,375,583	22%
RC-West	43,153,367	9%	91,143,516	9%

*These figures represent USAID funding that was managed from the regional platforms as opposed to centrally from Kabul so do not represent the totality of disbursements for either of these fiscal years. Note that from FY 2009 to FY 2010, the level of funding implemented from the regional platforms more than doubled though distribution across Regional Commands remained relatively stable.

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CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS
Congressional Hearings
June 8, 2011

**Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Diplomat Ryan C. Crocker to be U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan**

KERRY:

The hearing will come to order. Thank you all very much. I apologize for slightly tardy here. We welcome our friend and our colleague Senator John McCain. We're delighted to have him here for the purposes of making an introduction.

Obviously, we're here today to consider President Obama's nominee for ambassador to Afghanistan. And I think we are very fortunate the president has chosen one of America's most experienced and able diplomats to serve in Kabul, and we're very fortunate that Ambassador Ryan Crocker has agreed to serve.

We're happy to welcome him again before the Foreign Relations Committee. As everybody knows, in his distinguished career he has served as ambassador to five countries, including such challenging pose as Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon. And immediately after the Taliban's ouster, he became charge d'affaires in Afghanistan, reopening our embassy for the first time since 1989. So this is a man with experience in the region and experience in these complicated and difficult tasks.

I think he thought he had retired to a quiet life in academia, but the president had another idea.

KERRY:

And I want to say on behalf of all of us how grateful we are, Ambassador Crocker, that you and your wife Christine were willing to agree to return to public service.

Obviously you will arrive in this post at a pivotal moment in the conflict. We have a critical planning window in front of us right now.

This is a critical moment. It's a moment where we have the ability to recalibrate, if that's what's needed, to redefine and to do the things necessary in the wake of the

successes that we have had against Al Qaida, which was the principal reason for being in Afghanistan in the first place.

So, in order to ensure a transition, I think there are a number of things that need to be thought through.

Last month we held five hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan to examine all the assumptions guiding our strategy in the region and to help chart a path forward.

In about two weeks, Secretary of State Clinton will testify here on the administration's thinking and address congressional concerns as the president decides how many troops to draw down starting in July. Needless to say, I think it would be very helpful if this committee and the Senate can move very rapidly on this nomination in order to put you in place to be part of those deliberations.

I'll just say very quickly -- I know Senator McCain is here and so I'll truncate this, but just say very quickly that I think we ought to be guided by certain truths here.

First, that while the United States has genuine national security interests in Afghanistan, our current commitment in troops and in dollars, is neither proportional to our interest nor sustainable, in my judgment.

Second, our military has made significant gains, clearing and holding in the south. But, as the president has said, they are fragile and reversible absent continued U.S. robust presence there. We've not yet made sufficient gains in the east, where the threat from insurgent groups based in Pakistan continues.

And I will continue to beat this drum that the principle equation with respect to our capacity to resolve concerns in Afghanistan still lies in Pakistan and will lie in our ability to adjust that relationship and indeed to create a regional framework with respect to this conflict.

I want to emphasize that: regional framework.

Third, only a political settlement will resolve this. Every military leader has said that. There is no military solution. Reconciliation is not a silver bullet, so we're going to need to support the government of Afghanistan as it tries to engage those willing to make some kind of acceptable agreement.

And finally, we need to reexamine the current plan with regard to the Afghan national security forces because there are serious questions about size, capability, sustainability and I think we need to examine those very carefully.

Also, today the majority on the committee is releasing a report regarding assistance. This is a report meant to be constructive. It's not a -- it's a report with critical observations, but observations that are made in the best spirit of joint cooperative effort. And we appreciate (inaudible) assistance and we appreciate the administration's cooperation with us in efforts to address the concerns that we have.

The report argues that U.S. assistance needs to make -- meet three basic conditions before that money is dispensed: the projects have got to be necessary, achievable and sustainable. So over the next few months there's a lot on the table for the Congress and for the president, and Ambassador Crocker is going to have an essential role, a critical role to play in making sure that we get it right.

Senator Lugar?

LUGAR:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming our very distinguished nominee.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker returns from well-earned retirement to again apply his unsurpassed experience at managing civil-military collaboration in a dynamic conflict environment. I thank him for his commitment and I know that he will be bringing insight and informed judgment to the job in Kabul.

As you pointed out, this is the sixth hearing the Foreign Relations Committee has held related to Afghanistan during the last two months. We've explored not just what is happening in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, but whether our vast expenditures in Afghanistan represent a rational allocation of our military and financial assets.

Our geostrategic efforts are threatened not just by terrorism, but by debt, economic competition, energy and food prices and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and numerous other forces. Solving these problems will be much more difficult if we devote too many resources to one country that historically has frustrated nation-building experiments.

The question the president must answer is whether we can achieve the most important national security goals in Afghanistan, especially preventing the Taliban from taking over the government and preventing Afghan territory from being used as a terrorist safe haven, at far less expense.

Ambassador Crocker would be assuming his post incident with the Obama administration's review of Afghanistan policy that is anticipated to result in some level of troop reduction. This opportunity should be used to do more than just withdrawal an arbitrary number of troops based on political expediency.

Rather, the president should put forward a new plan that includes a definition of success in Afghanistan, based on the United States vital interests and a sober analysis of what is possible to achieve. Such a plan should include an explanation of what metrics must be satisfied before the country is considered secure.

It should also designate and eliminate those activities that are not intrinsic to our core objectives. The administration's ambiguity on our goals must be eliminated in order to move effectively and more effectively address our national security interests and to convey to Afghans the continuing relationship we will maintain as allies in the region.

Despite 10 years of investment and attempts to better understand the culture and the region's actors, we remain in a cycle that produces relative progress, but fails to deliver a secure political or military resolution. In Afghanistan measuring success according to relative progress, has very little meaning.

Undoubtedly, we will make some progress when we are spending more than \$100 billion per year in that country. The more important question is, whether we have an efficient strategy for protecting our vital interests that does not involve massive, open-ended expenditures and does not require us to have more faith than is justified in Afghan institutions.

I will appreciate hearing the nominee's impressions of the Obama Administration's strategic review and of how we can improve Afghanistan's capacity to defend and govern itself while reducing our own commitment and resources.

I applaud Ambassador Crocker's willingness, once again, to take on an extremely difficult mission. And I look forward to his testimony. I thank you Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

As I said previously, it is a privilege for the committee to welcome Senator McCain as the ranking member and chair and so forth, back and forth on the Armed Services Committee, there's nobody with more experience in these matters or who pays more attention to them in the Senate and I appreciate him taking the time to be here to introduce Ambassador Crocker.

Senator McCain?

MCCAIN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your kind words and thank you for indulging me as to introduce this great American. Senator Lugar and members of the committee, it's an honor to introduce the president's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker.

A man whose stellar record of service proceeds him and speaks for itself. Obviously I join the committee in recognizing two members of Ambassador Crocker's family who are joining him today, his niece Cameron and of course, the dedicated woman who has been by his side ever since they were young foreign service officers working together in Baghdad in 1979, Ryan's wife, Christine.

I understand the challenges of being a foreign service couple and I know that Ryan could never have enjoyed as many successes without the support of Christine. Those successes make the task of introducing Ambassador Crocker quite easy.

The U.S. Senate has had the wisdom to confirm him to the post of Ambassador as the chairman pointed out, five times already; Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Pakistan and Iraq and this is only a fraction of Ambassador Crocker's story. When the U.S. embassy in Beirut was bombed, Ryan Crocker was a young officer who helped pull wounded colleagues from the rubble.

When the United States needed to reopen our embassy in Afghanistan, after the Taliban were driven from power in 2001, the Secretary of State sent Ryan Crocker. A few years later, facing the same challenge in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, once again Ryan Crocker was the only man for the job.

It's nearly impossible to find other American diplomats who can match his record. I had met Ambassador Crocker in his earlier posts, but where I really came to know him and respect him most was during his amazing tour in Baghdad. It's

difficult to remember just what Ambassador Crocker was getting himself into when he raised his hand to serve in 2007.

The violence in Iraq was spiraling out of control. Dozens of civilians were being killed every day. The ethnic and sectarian battle lines were drawn. Iraq faced the very real prospect of tearing apart and America faced the horrifying possibility of being driven from the country in defeat.

Fortunately, President Bush adopted a new policy and of all the consequential decisions that he made in January of 2007, the change of strategy, the surge of forces, the nomination of General David Petraeus, one of the most important and least appreciated, was the nomination of Ryan Crocker as his Ambassador to Iraq.

MCCAIN:

I am sure that if you ask Ambassador Crocker, he will say he was just doing his part to serve his country where and when he was needed most. Heroes always say that. The truth is, what Ambassador Crocker accomplished in Iraq was nothing short of a miracle.

General Petraeus has obviously received huge praise for the role he played in Iraq and he deserves every bit of it. But as General Petraeus would be the first to affirm, our military strategy in Iraq would never have worked without Ryan Crocker's constant dogged and tireless leadership of our political strategy.

Ambassador Crocker put the U.S. embassy in Baghdad on a counterinsurgency footing. He established a seamless partnership with General Petraeus and his military leaders which set the standard for civil-military partnerships at every level of our effort across Iraq.

He also established a relationship of trust with Prime Minister Malaki and his government, and then used that relationship to push, prod, encourage, and support the Iraqis in saving their country. Throughout this struggle, as rockets smashed into his office in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker performed his duties with courage, poise under pressure, a unique ability to marry strategic vision with tactical effectiveness, and a relentless work effort that literally almost killed him.

I commend the president for recognizing that there is no better man for the job of ambassador to Afghanistan than Ryan Crocker. I also commend Ambassador Crocker for again answering his country's call to service. In Afghanistan today, a new generation of Americans, both military personnel and civilians, is writing the

inspiring next chapter to the history of our great nation. The challenge for all of us in our time of service is to strive to be equal to these heroic fellow Americans.

In nominating Ryan Crocker as ambassador to Afghanistan, the president has chosen a man who is worthy of the service and sacrifice of those he must lead. I hope all of you will reach a similar judgment and vote him out of committee as quickly, so that the full Senate can confirm Ambassador Crocker as rapidly as possible.

And I'd like to finally add I think that the Chairman and Ranking Member and others would agree with me, we've had the great privilege of having so many outstanding Americans serve in our diplomatic service, in our State Department, and Americans probably are not appreciative of the enormous sacrifices they make. There is no greater example of that kind of service and sacrifice than the man who's nomination is before you today.

I thank the Chairman, and I apologize for the length of my opening statement.

KERRY:

Well, Senator McCain, no apology needed at all. I think it's a very important statement. I appreciate in fact both the length and the thought that went into it. I think it's very helpful to the committee. It's important for the record, and I think it really states in a very articulate clear way the assets that Ambassador Crocker brings to this task.

And I think it's important that you've those things, and I've said those things, so that the message goes clear to President Karzai, to President Zardari, to others in the region that this is a serious person that we all have confidence in, and brings a great deal of experience. So I think your introduction was frankly superb, and really welcome.

Thank you.

MCCAIN:

Thank you.

KERRY:

Ambassador Crocker, you're flying alone now, but you've done that a lot. So we are delighted to welcome your testimony and you to the committee. You know how it works. If you want to put your full statement in the record as if read in full, it will be placed there. And if you want to summarize, we can then have a good dialogue and look forward to the questions.

Thank you.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to become U.S. ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

And I'm very grateful to Senator McCain for his most generous introduction, and for his recognition of the Foreign Service. My colleagues that over the years have labored hard on behalf of America's vital interests and sometimes paid the ultimate price. I am also grateful to the president and to Secretary Clinton for placing their trust in me.

If confirmed, I look forward to cooperating with you to advance America's interests in Afghanistan. I had the privilege of opening the embassy in Kabul in January 2002, as you noted. I worked closely with President Karzai in those early days and developed respect for his commitment to a stable, unified Afghanistan. If confirmed, I look forward to renewing our relationship and working together toward that vision.

I also had the honor of serving as the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan from 2004 to 2007, which developed my understanding of the region and which, if confirmed, I hope will be a useful asset as we work with our regional and international partners.

As you know, our core goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to deny it safe haven in those countries. Osama bin Laden's death is an important step, but much work remains to be done to ensure that al Qaeda can never again threaten us from Afghanistan with the Taliban providing safe haven.

Our efforts to pursue this goal are focused on three mutually reinforcing surges. Military, civilian, and diplomatic, all aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan so it will not become a safe haven for terrorists again. The military and civilian surges that

President Obama announced in 2009 have stolen momentum from the Taliban-led insurgency.

Today, more than 1,100 U.S. civilian experts are serving alongside our troops to help establish the conditions for a sustainable and irreversible transition to secure the responsibility to the Afghan government. If confirmed, it will be an enormous privilege to serve with these courageous and committed Americans.

Working together with the government of Afghanistan and our coalition partners, we have made significant progress, but as you noted, as the president has noted, this progress is still fragile and reversible. Enormous challenges remain. Governance, rule of law, including corruption, which undermines the credibility of the Afghan state, narcotics, sustainable economic development including employment, increased revenues along with the capacity of the government to provide basic services such as education and health care.

Failure in some of these areas can mean failure of the state and the creation of an environment in which our strategic enemies can regroup. Making progress on these issues has been hard and it will go on being hard, but hard does not mean impossible. As Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, we walked away from Afghanistan once in 1989 with disastrous consequences. We cannot afford to do so again.

Ultimately, all of this will be an Afghan responsibility realized through a responsible transition. A key U.S. priority in Afghanistan is supporting the Afghan-led transition process that was agreed upon by the Afghans and NATO-ISAF partners at the November 2010 NATO summit at Lisbon. This process will enable Afghans to systematically assume full responsibility for their security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The transition process will begin this July with the transfer of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces in seven provinces and municipalities, which I understand contain roughly one quarter of the Afghan population. If confirmed, I will work hand- in-hand with our military partners, as I did as the U.S. ambassador in Iraq, to continue this responsible, conditions-based transition to an Afghan security lead.

Alongside this transition process, the Afghan government has launched a peace effort to reconcile insurgents. President Karzai has formed a high peace council that includes representatives from across Afghanistan. The United States supports this Afghan effort.

Over the last two years we both have laid out our ambiguous red lines for reconciliation with the insurgents: renounce violence; abandon their alliance with al Qaida; and abide by the constitution of Afghan and its protections for all Afghans, including women. Those are necessary outcomes of any negotiation. If former militants are willing to meet these red lines, they would then be able to participate in the political life of the country.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will work closely with Ambassador Grossman, our Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ambassador Munter in Pakistan, among others, to continue our efforts to build support for an Afghan-led reconciliation process. I will maintain our efforts to support Afghanistan's long term reconstruction, sustainable economic development, and the strengthening of key Afghan institutions critical to ensuring that the present transition is sustainable and irreversible.

We do look forward to a long term relationship with Afghanistan, and have initiated negotiations on a long term strategic partnership declaration with the Afghan government in March of this year. This political framework document will help normalize our relationship and provide a roadmap for our political, economic, and security cooperation.

We respect Afghanistan's proud history of independence and we do not seek any permanent military bases in their country, or a presence that would be a threat to any of Afghanistan's neighbors.

In closing, I want to thank this committee for the support it has provided and continues to provide for the vital work of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. As you know, Mr. Chairman, you have held a number of hearings over the past several months to examine our policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and if confirmed, I will listen to your guidance and continue a dialogue with Congress on our progress on the ground.

And in that context, I would note that I've just received a copy of the report you cite, so if confirmed, I think I know where that dialogue is going to begin. I will also ensure that the precious U.S. taxpayer resources being used in Afghanistan are applied effectively, transparently, and with an eye toward the long term sustainability of these efforts by the Afghans themselves.

As the Secretary said in her February 18 speech at the Asia Society, the United States is not walking away from the region. We will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Our commitment is real and it is enduring. As we approach the 10th

anniversary of the horrible attacks of September 11, it is a time to remember those who died that day, and to honor the sacrifices that so many Americans have made, military and civilian, to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists from which they can attack America.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. I look forward to your questions.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker.

I want to come to that last sentence. It sort of hit me and I want to come back to it in a minute.

But let me say, first of all, that I support and agree with the transition process that will begin this July with the lead responsibility going to Afghan security forces in seven provinces, representing the somewhat roughly 25 percent of Afghan population.

Clearly, the Taliban are trying to disrupt that with their increased violence in the last days, targeting some of the governors and high-level officials. I also am particularly supportive of the Afghan-initiated peace process, the reconciliation President Karzai has initiated with his broad-based jirga last year and the things coming out of it that you have mentioned in your testimony.

My concern is a little bit in sort of pinning down our own definitions here at the breadth of some of our -- of -- of what you said, and particularly this sort of notion, ensure that Afghanistan never becomes a safe haven for terrorists from which they can attack America.

I think we have to really kind of bear in on this question of what that really entails. What is the -- what is a safe haven and -- and how much guarantee is there?

To the degree there is a safe haven, if that's what we're worried about, and we want to spend dollars most efficiently, the safe haven is in the western part of Pakistan. We're spending \$120 billion in a country where there is no safe haven and about \$2.8 billion where there is a safe haven -- today there's a safe haven.

The Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed -- these folks are the problem. And they're the ones responsible for most of the

violence that's taking place in Afghanistan. So I think the question is how do we get this right?

I mean, what I saw in R.C.-East, when I was there a few weeks ago, convinced me that if all we do is the current paradigm, where attacks are launched out of the western part of Pakistan, we're not going to find a very successful road here. I'd like you to comment on that.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are very important points. I have said in testimony before this committee during that brief but happy interlude when I was out of the service, you cannot really succeed in Afghanistan without a fair measure of success in Pakistan. That's why I think your legislation, the Kerry Lugar Berman legislation, a multi-year commitment, was so important.

These are hard problems to solve. I wrestled with them as ambassador to Pakistan. I had numerous meetings, as you have had, with the Pakistani leadership to press on the Quetta Shura, on the Haqqani Network, and clearly with the most limited of results.

So again, I think that is why the administration has been right in talking about the two nations together and having Ambassador Grossman now succeeding Ambassador Holbrooke so that you do have an approach that crosses the borders, because certainly that's what the militants are doing.

You know, how to -- how to crack that conundrum, sir, I know you have made huge efforts, as has Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Grossman in recent weeks. We'll have to see whether the Pakistanis do take these actions. And as I noted in my statement, I look forward to working with Ambassador Muntz as well as Ambassador Grossman, because we face a common problem.

The last thing I'd say, Mr. Chairman, is, quite frankly, the reason that most of the problem is in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan at this time is because we are in Afghanistan.

And as we go through a responsible transition, it -- it, I think, has to be, as the president and others have said, conditions-based to ensure that as we draw down our forces, and I'm keenly aware from my consultations of the -- of the mood both here on the Hill and publicly, there has to be transition, but at the end of the day we

have to be sure that the safe haven doesn't then relocate from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

KERRY:

I understand that. The question is does it take 150,000 troops to guarantee that doesn't happen?

CROCKER:

Mr. Chairman, that's again a question that the president will be seized of. I'm not part of those deliberations or consultations. And indeed, the -- the...

KERRY:

No, I realize that. That's an unfair question. It's a question that's on the table. I want to put the question to you, but I understand you're not part of those deliberations now, so I don't expect you to answer it today.

But let me ask you this. In your testimonies enormous challenges remain -- governance, rule of law, including corruption, which undermines economic growth, credibility of the Afghan state, narcotics, sustainable economic development, including adequate employment opportunities, increased revenues, along with the capacity for the government to provide basic services, education, health care. Failure in some of these areas can mean failure of the state and the creation of an environment in which our strategic enemies can regroup.

Can you narrow that down for us? Which of those areas means failure of the state and are essential to the accomplishment of our goal?

CROCKER:

I think, clearly, the -- the issues of -- of governance, rule of law and corruption have to improve, if Afghanistan is to go forward as a stable state charting its own destiny.

KERRY:

Are you saying, then, that corruption is essential to our capacity to achieve our goal of preventing strategic enemies from regrouping?

CROCKER:

I think corruption, Mr. Chairman, and I draw on my Iraq experience here, corruption totally unchecked becomes, as prominent Iraqis put it, a second insurgency. It undermines confidence on the part of the people in their government, and it makes groups like the Taliban look attractive.

You know, Mr. Chairman, we're not out to clearly create a shining city on a hill. That's not going to happen. That would apply to all of these sectors I've mentioned. But there needs to be progress.

We went through the same thing in Iraq. We chipped away at it. Over time we got them to take some measurable, if partial, steps on the issue of corruption so that you have a situation Iraq today that, you know, is not, again, as city on a hill, but where they have a -- a good chance of carrying forward without U.S. forces on the ground.

It's the same kind of dynamic that I think we have to go through in Afghanistan, not -- not solve these problems...

KERRY:

Do you think -- do you think that billions of dollars coming from America that are spent through contractors, which don't have adequate oversight, contributes to corruption?

CROCKER:

That's certainly something I'm going to take a careful look at, Mr. Chairman. I have met with the State Department's inspector generals. They, as you know, did a recent report. We have your staff report. I have spoken to colleagues in government.

It's clear that there is a need for more contracting officer representatives. State and AID recognize this. There have been initiatives that you're aware of and, as the staff report notes, USAID Forward, the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative, the military's Operation Transparency.

So I think there clearly have been problems. I think, equally clearly, there is a recognition that we have to be a part of the solution, not a part of the problem. And I'm encouraged by what I've heard of the steps that have been taken.

KERRY:

Senator Lugar?

LUGAR:

Ambassador Crocker, we've discussed, and you have in your opening statement, the possibility for passing over control for the military, for the police functions, presumably, to seven provinces, or about 25 percent of Afghanistan, with the thought that this is the first of such large transitions in the next few years, hopefully occurring before 2014, I think, in the current plan.

I want to ask, however, about the whole conduct of the Afghan state and really how the budget of Afghanistan is put together, how this is paid for. Now, in the case of the military and the police, the training has been paid for largely, if not completely, by the United States and its allies. And that sustenance of all of that will be expensive.

But beyond that, enlighten us a little bit more about the commerce in Afghanistan. That is, how do ordinary people make a living? What kind of industries are there? What sort of investment has been coming into the country or has been generated by any profits or success in the country?

And the reason I ask this question is that many stories about Afghanistan's economy indicate that the income coming into that government is pretty low, given the ambitions of Afghans and the United States and its allies so that on the military side, expense has been calculated.

LUGAR:

But with regard to civil society and an economy moving forward, the thoughts have come even from President Karzai himself in personal visits with members of Congress that Afghan has remarkable natural resources that might be found, might be, as a matter of fact, exploited and -- and sold to others in due course, but that will require a considerable amount of investment -- and the safety to investors, or whoever is coming into the country to deal with this.

And, of course, many of the investors may or may not be friends of ours or may have very different foreign policy views.

Now I don't mean to make the question impossibly complex, but as you -- as you survey the scene, how is Afghanistan going to raise revenue?

And secondly, if Afghanistan is not able to raise revenue, are you, in your preparation for this ambassadorship, working with our State Department or our officials on some estimates as to what obligations the United States may have for many years to come, not something the military idea of 2014 or thereabouts, but some with whom we've raised this question in previous hearings have said is a matter of common sense, our obligations will last for a long time, for a decade (ph) or decades, as the case may be.

This really has to be an important part of our calculations, as members of Congress working with the administration now on 5- or 10- year budget plans for the United States. This could be a major factor.

And if we do not get it right, it could have very great consequences on Afghanistan, where there are expectations that the American support might be forthcoming.

Can you discuss this general area?

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator. It is a very important and, as you note in your question, a very complex set of issues.

And again, at this point, I have, shall we say, an imperfect understanding of exactly how Afghanistan works, having not yet been confirmed and not having gotten out there.

But I did note employment and economic development, because I think these are critical factors.

How does the economy work now? Services are an important part. Agricultural is an important part.

I am told that the agricultural sector accounts for 80 percent of employment in Afghanistan, which is why, I think, we have to continue to support its development in a reasonable way that leads to, again, ultimately an Afghan capacity to carry forward.

LUGAR:

Why? What part of that is drugs and (inaudible) more legitimate crops?

CROCKER:

Yes, the -- I'm talking about the part that isn't drugs, primarily wheat.

We would certainly like to see them move into, as they want to do, higher-yield products, such as fruit and pomegranates, which Afghanistan used to be famous for, and which provide a better return to the farmer, actually, I'm told, than poppies.

But I -- based on what I know, I think the administration is right in dealing with the narcotics issue, not to emphasize, as we tried at one point, eradication, but, you know, alternatives, economic alternatives that cause Afghans themselves to turn away from these kinds of things.

I'd make a couple of other brief points on the Afghan economy. As you know, there are substantial mineral resources.

Over the longer term, these can be of significant benefit to the state, but this will take time for them to develop. And as you point out, it's going to require security conditions.

The development of a robust private sector is going to be important, and I am pleased to learn that OPEC is significantly engaged in Afghanistan, working on upwards of 50 projects.

I would like to see U.S. private investment come into Afghanistan. I worked hard on that in Iraq with some success. Customs revenues have to pick up.

And I know there is a major effort underway where our trainers, mainly from the Department of Homeland Security, are working side-by-side with the Afghan border police.

Corruption gets into this, too, but they've got to increase their revenues.

The final point I'd make is Afghanistan, as a country, centrally located in an important region, I think the Afghan-Pakistan trade and transit agreement was a very important step.

I understand that President Karzai will be visiting Islamabad in just a few days' time, I think the day after tomorrow, which is good, in and of itself, obviously, as the leaders of the two countries talk through their issues.

But I understand one of the objectives is to lay out the actual implementation of this agreement, because Afghanistan, as a trade and transit center, through Pakistan into India, up into the former Soviet Republics to the north, with Iran, I think all of that can provide a major difference for Afghans' economic future.

LUGAR:

Well, my time has expired, but I just want to underline, I think it's the remarkable fact you present 80 percent of the employment of Afghanistan as agricultural. That is huge.

And the success, obviously, of that is paramount. But I get back to the fact that you're pointing out the development resources.

Most of the estimates that are made -- and perhaps eventually the Congress or the public will have a better idea of the budget of Afghanistan -- but it would appear that the revenues are a very, very small percentage of the obligations, both from a security standpoint as well as a commercial standpoint that we're talking about.

And as I get back to my problem, and that is how long a stream of income from the United States, going to Afghanistan, is going to be required -- or the morale of people collapse, as the economy collapses, as security collapses, as we are sort of back to square one again, with or without the conflict, which you are undergoing now to provide that security?

But I thank you again for, at least, that discussion. And as we get out there, you will have more to say.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.

I will recognize Senator Casey, and I'm also going to pass the gavel to Senator Casey, because I need to go to another committee.

And, Ambassador Crocker, I hope you'll forgive me for that, but I appreciate your testimony this morning.

As I said earlier, we're going to try and move your nomination as rapidly as we can, hopefully have a business meeting in short order and get this full Senate to move on it.

We look forward to getting you there, and I thank you again for coming and your willingness to do this.

Senator Casey?

CASEY:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thanks for this hearing.

And Ambassador Crocker, it's great to see you again. And we're so grateful for your public service and your willingness to commit yourself to yet another very difficult assignment.

But I know that you're not only prepared, but I have confidence, total confidence, that you'll be confirmed, and you should be confirmed, because we need you there. We need you on the ground.

I wanted to raise a couple of questions with you. And, again, I'd also commend the commitment that your family makes when you take on a tough assignment like this.

But I wanted to bring you back to a meeting that you and I had -- I've spoken about this a number of times -- but I think I keep coming back to it, because I think it has a lot of relevance to not just our policy in Afghanistan, but where we are now, this year, this summer, making some difficult decisions, the Congress, the administration and the American people.

And I start with the setting. It was in -- it was in Iraq and it was a small group of people, and you were there.

It was August of 2007. And I was complaining at the time, very bluntly, about the language that was used to describe progress in Iraq, victory and defeat, win or lose, all language which I thought was not only inappropriate but, frankly, sometimes misleading, (inaudible) deliberately so at the time in Washington.

I won't cast blame on who used the language, but a lot of folks did. And it was wrong. It was wrong then. I think it's wrong now.

And I asked you, at the time, what language do you think is appropriate to the mission.

And you said at the time -- and you gave a very cogent answer -- but what I remember most about it was that you said two words: sustainable stability, which has stayed with me ever since.

So I guess I'd ask you, in light of this mission, which is -- I -- frankly, in my judgment, more complicated, as difficult as Iraq was, more complicated, a different set of -- different set of priorities and, frankly, different set of challenges in Afghanistan.

But I ask it in light of the -- some of the real numbers that folks in Pennsylvania live with, and I know comparable numbers around the country.

We have -- we're at about 70 right now, killed in action, 69 was the last number I saw, but it could actually be -- now be 70, which is about a third of where we were with regard to Iraq.

We fell very -- just short of 200 there, 197, 198, depending on what counts you read. So we're about a third of the killed in action as we were in Iraq and Afghanistan now.

The wounded numbers, my numbers in Pennsylvania are 455 in Afghanistan, 1,233 in Iraq. So, again, about the -- a third of the number in Iraq as it relates to the wounded.

And I guess what people want to know, taxpayers want to know, certainly the families that are -- they have loved and lost are families that are contributing, at a minimum, their -- the time and the sacrifice of their loved ones, is what is the mission and what is the -- and, therefore, what is the goal?

And I'd ask you to comment on that in light of the -- in light of the discussion we had in '07.

(UNKNOWN)

(Inaudible) that closely.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do clearly recall that conversation. That was shortly before the September 2007 hearings that General Petraeus and I took part in.

And again, as you may recall from that conversation, I was not among those who have ever used the word winning or victory. Not then, not now. Not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan. Sustainable stability were words or a concept that I would stand -- that I stood by then and would stand by now in the case of Iraq.

Another way to put it is -- is good enough governance. Governance that is good enough to ensure that the country doesn't degenerate back into a safe haven -- safe haven or Al Qaeda. And that's what I was attempting to get at in my conversation with Chairman Kerry I think before you arrived. That there is no intention that I see in any of my consultations here.

I certainly don't come with such an intention to produce the perfect society. We can't. But I think by judicious use of resources and conditions-based redeployments and transfers of responsible, as will begin this July, we can get to that sustainable stability. I would be -- I have always been and always will be frank and open with this committee. It's my responsible as a -- an official, if you so choose to make me one again, but even as a citizen.

As I look at Afghanistan's past, the 50 years of relative tranquility from say 1928 to 1978, Afghanistan did require outside assistance. And we provided some -- some very important contributions to their economic development that are still favorably remembered through the Point Four Program, which later became USAID.

So in my -- well, and I'm not well informed enough to lay this out as a thoroughly considered view, but I would anticipate, and this gets a bit into what Senator Lugar was touching on, that beyond 2014 there will be a requirement for outside assistance from the international community.

And I think part of our obligation is being sure that the international community continues to understand that they have a great deal at stake here. This is not an American problem only, or an American obligation. But that in short is how I would view it.

Getting -- and it's going to be incremental. It's going to be kind of issue by issue, case by case, as to what sustainable stability and good enough governance is -- is going to look like. But that certainly is what I see as my responsibility.

CASEY (?):

Thank you. And I'm over on my time, but I'll ask you in a second round about how we measure that. And I think that's also something a lot of -- a lot of the American people are concerned about.

Senator Menendez? I'm sorry. Senator Cardin?

CARDIN:

I thought I'd moved up one in seniority.

CASEY (?):

Senator Ben Cardin, state of Maryland, class of 2006.

CARDIN:

Ambassador Crocker, first of all, thank you very much for your service. You have served our nation with great distinction. And I thank you for that, and I thank you for your willingness to come back into public service. And I can think of no one who's more qualified for the position than -- than you, and in a very tough situation.

As everyone is suggesting, Afghanistan needs to change. It's (ph) U.S. role in Afghanistan needs to change. And we could talk about the military aspects and the fact that we are looking towards a redeployment of our combat troops starting in the next month or two. And that we expect that we might be able to accelerate that considering the status of terrorist organizations operating in the region.

Now having said that, I want to concentrate on the other part of our role. We've had our military presence, but we also have had an effort to provide economic development assistance to the people of Afghanistan. Now I know you just recently got the report that was commissioned by this committee, but let me just share with you some observations that should not be a surprise.

There is a -- it's rather critical of the efficiency of the deliverance of our aid to accomplish any long-term economic stability for the people of Afghanistan. It also questions as to whether we really are operating with a leadership in Afghanistan that can deliver the type of economic promise for the people.

And probably worse than that, that we're creating an arbitrary economic activity in the country based upon a war economy that will not be sustainable, and that we are in effect (ph) creating an inflationary situation within Afghanistan that will cause a serious problem as we transition to a country that can take care of itself, admittedly with international assistance. And I don't deny the long-term need for humanitarian and economic assistance to the people of Afghanistan.

My question is one of how you see your role as the ambassador to assist us in being able to evaluate how we can transition the U.S. role and be as helpful as we can so the Afghans can take care of their own people and that we have at least a strategic ally in our war against terror.

How do you see using the information that you have learned or will learn or know from the region to assist in helping us, the United States Senate, in transitioning to the next phase in Afghanistan?

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator. It's clearly an important question. I see my responsibilities at a number of levels.

First, it is ensuring that we are properly organized as a civilian mission, as an embassy, to ensure that -- that our assistance is accountable and it is effective. And effective for me means it's got to be about transition, building Afghan capacity, helping the Afghans again carry forward without assistance at this scale in the future.

So I know that Administrator Shaw and Deputy Secretary Nides have provided some responses already to this report. I -- I have not had the chance to go through it in depth. But I know it will be useful to me if I'm confirmed out at post looking at how we're structured and deployed, looking at our programs and being sure they're effective. Again, to this end of sustainable stability with the Afghans increasingly taking the lead. So, you know, obligation begins at home within the embassy.

The second thing that I clearly would be focusing on is developing a partnership with the Afghan government. This, you know, our programs have to support their vision and have to be sustainable by them.

And I know that we already have in place several mechanisms that -- formal mechanisms that focus on transition. This is a major concern of President Karzai.

He has chosen Ashraf Ghani, who I also came to know in my early days in Afghanistan, to head this up from his side precisely so that we don't create that unsustainable wartime economy.

I understand that USAID and other donors have already taken steps, for example, to ensure that they are not inflating salaries. I think that would be very important. We -- you know, for example, the worst thing we could do I think is be competing with the Afghan government for -- for talent. It -- it needs all it can get, and a lot more, to function as a government.

So that would be another key part of it. It's their country. And how it moves forward is ultimately their responsibility. And I want to establish myself as a reliable partner, but keeping the emphasis on sustainable development and -- and transition. You know, which is what they themselves seek.

And thirdly, I would say, again, this (inaudible) consultation with Ambassador Grossman and others, we have a lot of international partners engaged in Afghanistan. NATO and non-NATO. The United Nations plays an important role. The special representative, the secretary general, Estefan (ph) (inaudible) preformed that role in Iraq and I cooperated closely with him there. I look forward to doing the same in Afghanistan.

As I said earlier in a slightly different context, Afghanistan is not a uniquely American problem. It is a threat to international peace and security, and requires an ongoing international commitment. So, you know, what role I play in that is still something to be sorted out. But clearly I believe I -- I will have a role to play.

I -- I hope that gives you some sense of...

CARDIN:

I -- I thank you for your answer on (ph). I think it's going to be a real challenge. We're not necessarily paying salaries or competing with the Afghan government. We're paying the salaries that look like we're giving just cash bonuses well above reasonable salaries to make friends with Afghans, which ends up supporting a corrupt system. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

CASEY (?):

Senator Corker?

CORKER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Ambassador, I'm here out of respect for you as a person and the role you've played in -- in much of our foreign policy. I know we had -- an extensive conversation in our office.

General Petraeus has asked that we support efforts in Afghanistan through this fighting season. And I think people generally speaking -- speaking have been willing to do that. But I think you sense certainly in our conversation but probably among numbers of people here, we're expecting pretty dramatic changes at the end of this fighting season and expect and know that you will help guide those changes into a different place.

All of us know the model that we have and Afghanistan is not sustainable for multiple reasons that we talked about again in detail in private. And I'm just here to thank you today for your willingness to do this.

I don't know why you'd come back and do this, other than you're a - you're a - you're a great American and, and we thank you for that. And again without belaboring, I know there's numbers of questions that we can ask you that you cannot answer yet.

But I think you all know there's a, a great degree of -- it's not impatience, it's a great degree of us knowing that what we're doing there is not sustainable, that it's greatly changing the character of the country, that, that your knowledge there hopefully will help us too in the partnership that doesn't exist in the way it should in Pakistan also.

But again, we thank you for that. I look forward to talking to you on the ground in Afghanistan and I thank you for your willingness to do this.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Sir.

KERRY:

Senator Webb?

WEBB:

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ambassador let me pile on with everybody else. You're a, clearly a national treasure here and we're, we're happy to see you going over into, into that part of the world. I think what my major concern is and you and I had the opportunity to discuss this when you visited with me, is how we really define our strategic objectives in Afghanistan and how that matches up with what we are able to actually accomplish in a cost/benefit way, quite frankly.

I think that's one thing you're hearing from a lot of people right now, that -- how much do we actually need to achieve in Afghanistan with respect to our national interests? How much do people want to achieve that may be above what we need to? And we're getting into, into his area of nation building. How much can we achieve?

And how much of that actually benefits our, our strategic objectives? I mean that's what I've been struggling with for more than a year now. I don't know if you saw a -- the column that Peggy Noonan wrote recently for the Wall Street Journal. It's been a few weeks.

I don't have it in front of me, but she clearly is not a radical. She's one of the bright lights of the Reagan administration, which I was very proud to serve. And one of the, the strong comments that was, was making was that, if there's any nation in the world that really needs nation building right now, it's the United States of America.

And when we're putting hundreds of billions of dollars into infrastructure in another country, it should only be done if we can articulate a vital national interest because we, we quite frankly need to be doing, doing a lot more of that here. Can you -- time is short, obviously, but could you please articulate for us, your view of the strategic interests of the United States in Afghanistan?

And how the current military policy can help bring us to, to an end point in that strategic objective?

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator. That is, of course, the essential question. As I said in my statement and as the president and others have said, our ultimate strategic objective is to disrupt, dismantle, defeat al Qaeda and in the Afghan context, to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes what it was before 9/11.

An area in which al Qaeda can reconstitute itself, under protection of like-minded elements.

WEBB:

But you could, you could pretty well -- I mean I, I watched your opening statement from my office and I don't disagree with, with the objective, but you can pretty well fight international terrorism without remaking an entire societal structure. Wouldn't you, wouldn't you agree? And I know you're -- I watched your comment about how they're not in Afghanistan now because they're in Pakistan because we're in Afghanistan etcetera, but you, you can end up in that region playing whack-a-mole.

So the, the real question is, what is the ultimate objective with all of these ground forces and all of these infrastructure programs in terms of the long term advantage?

CROCKER:

Again, an important and multifaceted issue. What we've seen with the, the additional forces and the effort to carry the fight into enemy strongholds is, I think tangible progress in security on the ground in the south and the west.

This has to transition and again, we're seeing a transition of seven provinces and districts to Afghan control, to sustainable Afghan control. So I think you can, you can already see what we're trying to do. And province by province, district by district, establish the conditions where the Afghan government can take over and hold ground.

And you're absolutely right, you don't have to, you know, build a whole nation I think to achieve that.

WEBB:

International terrorism and global warfare in general is intrinsically mobile. I fought a guerrilla war in Vietnam and written about this for a long time, as you know. So securing one particular area doesn't necessarily -- I, I don't say this critically, I just say this out of concern for where this policy is going.

It doesn't necessarily guarantee that you've reduced the capability of, of those kinds of forces. They are mobile. They move. The reason that they're international in scope is they don't align themselves with any, with any particular governmental structure.

I just, I want to lay that out as, as an area of continuing concern and I want to ask you one more question in the time that we have. I, I mentioned to you when you visited my office and that is, we tend to speak of the conciliators in this, in this region simply along the Pakistan, Afghanistan, India axis when I believe there is a role here that China could play if they would step up to the mat and be a little more overt in their, their willingness to participate in, in these types of solutions.

They're clearly going to benefit if there's more stability in the region. What are your thoughts on that?

CROCKER:

It, it's a great point, Senator. That's, you know, as we talk about the three elements of our strategy, that the third one is very much involved in regional engagement. And I, I would join you in, in including China in that, in that discussion.

The Chinese, as you are aware, have the copper concession in Afghanistan. OK. That's great. You can only really make that pay off for you if the conditions on the ground permit it's extraction and it's transport.

WEBB:

They also have a long relationship with Pakistan. I know there are some people who say that's overstated, but clearly they do and, and in fact when Chairman Kerry returned here from Pakistan, that same day we were sitting here in a hearing where the Prime Minister of Pakistan immediately made a state visit to China and was welcomed, you know, stated that China was the, was Pakistan's greatest friend.

I wish you the best. I am grateful that you are undertaking this and I look forward to, to visiting you and perhaps continuing our discussion.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Sir.

KERRY:

Senator Shaheen?

SHAHEEN:

Thank you. Ambassador Crocker, I join my colleagues in thanking you for your willingness to continue to serve the country and I think, I certainly stand ready and I'm sure all of us do, to be helpful to you as you take on this new assignment.

I know that you haven't had a chance to review the report that was released this morning from the committee. But I think it does provide a renewed perspective on how difficult the challenges are in Afghanistan, particularly the, the civilian challenges and much of that has been discussed by others here.

But the report certainly underscores the need for our reconstruction projects in Afghanistan to be necessary, achievable and sustainable. And I know there have been some concerns about the projects undertaken under the CERP Program, I certainly share concerns about how those dollars are distributed.

And I have, like others, have called for a number of steps to try and address more accountability in Afghanistan. I'm very pleased to see the overhaul of the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, something that I thought also was long overdue.

The appointment of the senior civilian representative to serve as a counterpart to the military commander there. And I wonder, and I know you haven't gotten on the ground there, but I wonder if you can assess at this stage what difference that might be making in Afghanistan? And what you would expect your relationship as Ambassador to be with those two civilian counterparts there?

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator.

I -- I join you in a concern for accountability. I was ambassador in Iraq, as you know, and I think we all learned a lot of hard lessons. I would hope to see those lessons being applied now in Afghanistan and I think they are through some of the initiatives you note and others that I mentioned earlier: the USAID Forward Initiative, the operation transparency that the military runs, the joint military/USAID vetting mechanism for contractors, the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan Initiative and so forth.

One of my first consultations was with the state inspector general. I had a very close working relationship with the head of SIGIR Iraq, Stuart Bowen, who I have a lot of regard for.

So again, I'm pleased that SIGAR seems to be moving forward with real capability. And I -- if confirmed, I look forward to welcoming the GAO, which, I understand, plans to set up a permanent staff in the fall. I think all of these institutions -- the State IG, the USAID regional inspector general, SIGAR, the GAO -- all have an important responsibility in ensuring oversight and accountability.

And you know the phrase, "We're here to help." Well, you know, sometimes help can be painful, but in my experience in Iraq, I found that kind of oversight to be absolutely essential going forward, and I will certainly, if confirmed, employ the same approach in -- in Afghanistan.

SHAHEEN:

And are there experiences from your time in Iraq that you think can be helpful in terms of coordinating all these efforts? Because as -- for those of us looking at what's going on on the ground, as you point out, there are a lot of people there trying to address oversight and accountability, but how is all of that getting coordinated?

You know, we know we have General Petraeus on the military side, but is there a similar command structure on the civilian side? And who's responsible?

CROCKER:

Thank you for that question, because it is an important one, Senator. Basically, there are two and only two U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, as there were in Iraq, one military and one civilian. The civilian commander is the U.S. ambassador.

And I -- I would like to say that as I have consulted and read in, I think Ambassador Eikenberry has done an amazing job in this lift ramp-up of the civilian presence in ensuring that it is -- has been done in an orderly and organized manner. Obviously, if confirmed, I -- I will need to make my own assessments, but my sense is that he -- he has handled a huge challenge with -- with great care, thoughtfulness and ability.

There are -- there are micro-coordination issues, and this may be what you're referring to. I have an obligation to see that the entire U.S. mission is effectively

carrying out its various roles. I also want to be -- ensure that the accountability element of this, the -- the different inspection agencies, are themselves coordinated.

We had to wrestle with this a bit in Iraq so that we did not have different inspectors inspecting the same thing and not working in coordination. There's also, of course, a whole military inspection apparatus that also has to be woven into this. So as I did in Iraq, I -- again, I have responsibility of seeing that the whole mission is operating effectively.

And again, I give huge credit to Ambassador Eikenberry that, if confirmed, I have the sense I'm going to be inheriting a going concern, but also on this specific issue that our accountability and oversight mechanisms are working as a team, and not in isolation or competition with each other.

SHAHEEN:

Thank you.

KERRY:

Senator Coons?

COONS:

Thank you, Senator Casey.

And I'll join the other members of this committee and thanking Ambassador Crocker and your family for your willingness to come out of retirement and take on yet again another vital mission for the United States at this time in Kabul. And I'm very encouraged by your successful previous service in Iraq and the very difficult circumstances that you negotiated there.

I was concerned on my one visit to Afghanistan as a relatively new Senator to hear repeatedly about our generational commitment to the stability and security of the nation of Afghanistan. And in your opening testimony, you -- you cited Secretary Gates' comment that we walked away from Afghanistan in '89 with disastrous consequences, and we cannot afford to do so again.

And I think in the previous questions by Senator Lugar and others, a number of us are trying to get at the question if we're not going to walk away, how long are we going to stay and at what level?

And there's a lot of focus on the immediate decision about a drawdown, but I'm really equally, if not more, interested in the post- 2014 structure and what it looks like and was very surprised to hear in-country assertions that we were committed to sustaining a more than 300,000-member Afghan national security force, which meant paying for it, and to a sustained U.S. military presence for the foreseeable future a decade or more.

You also made a comment that we are not seeking permanent military bases in Afghanistan, and I wondered, just as my first question, if you'd comment on the importance of achieving a U.S.- Afghan strategic -- excuse me, a U.S. -- in --in Iraqi you achieved a strategic agreement that allowed for long-term stabilization.

What importance is there in Afghanistan to our having a long-term U.S. coalition military presence? Where do you think we are headed in terms of retaining strategic regional abilities? And how sustainable do you really think past 2014 assistance required to support a 300,000 NASF really is?

A few questions, right? Nothing difficult at all, sir. These are shared questions that I think many of us are -- are confronting, so.

CROCKER:

Well, they -- they certainly are the negative questions, and -- and they are important ones. They are ones, if confirmed, I'll be very much focused on, since I would expect to be out there for a couple of years.

And I am -- I'm not ducking by saying that, you know, I just don't know the answer now. You know, I -- I do think that we have an interest, again, in ensuring that the country doesn't backslide, that, you know, it just does not again become a Al Qaida safe haven. I think we all would share that.

The trick is how do you do it and how much does it cost and how long does it take? And these are questions that my colleagues and I will have to work on. And we're accountable to you as -- as you ask them.

I -- I do think, as we saw in Iraq, that, you know, by going in big, you can then come out small. You know, Iraq has oil, and it always helps to have oil (inaudible)

size of corruption issue there. They can pay for a lot of things that the Afghans can't.

I do think the strategic partnership declaration process is important, as this strategic framework agreement was in Iraq. It lets both countries kind of know where they want to move in the future. And, obviously, the SPD is -- is going to look different than the strategic framework agreement in Iraq, but I think, broadly speaking, it's intended to serve the same -- the same purpose.

In terms of the ultimate end state for Afghan national security forces, the target is too, as you know, is to have them to police and army combined at the 300,000 level by this October. To me that is not a number that's engraved in stone and would never change.

I think, again -- and I'm speculating here; I mean, we just have to see how circumstances develop over time -- as this first transition of seven districts and provinces takes place, how they do. And it -- you know, farther down the road, 2014, 2015, the Afghans may decide that, you know, they really don't need a security force of this size.

COONS:

Another key factor to the sustainable progress in Iraq was the not just reconciliation, but the reintegration of more than 100,000 through the Sons of Iraq program. So far, reintegration of the Taliban is going quite slowly. It isn't proceeding at anything like the pace you and others were able to accomplish in Iraq.

Do you think reintegration is going to be critical? Because, frankly, the size of the Afghan national security force required is partly directly correlated to the size of the ongoing insurgency or Taliban or other extremist activity.

CROCKER:

It's a great question, Senator, because you're right. And we haven't talked that much about this so far. The Afghans are focused on two elements to bring this insurgency to an end. One is reconciliation, kind of big "R," and the other reintegration, which I guess would be little "r."

Both, I think, are premised on a concept we would all share, which is that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency. There has to be, ultimately, a political solution.

I think reintegration is part of it. I am told that there are some 2,500 former insurgents that are either process or in process. It's an Afghan process, of course, and I think Afghan capacity is again an issue here about how fast they can move.

There's another element that I think is significant, and that is the Afghan local police initiative, not quite like the Sons of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq, as you remember, was a pretty varied group. Some of them were former insurgents; some were not.

CROCKER:

The Afghan local police initiative focuses on individuals who want to stand up for their community and who were not part of the insurgency. I think their numbers are 6,000 and been advised that we expect to be able to continue to expand that possibly to 10,000 by September.

You know, again, in the lessons learned category, the Sons of Iraq were never tied to the Iraqi government until quite late in the process, when the prime minister made some undertakings to incorporate some into the security services and provide civilian employment for others.

The Afghan local police have started out linked to the Ministry of Interior. So you've got all three of those in play, all three Afghan-supported and Afghan-led, which, I believe, is important.

Clearly, we'd like to see the reintegration process move more quickly.

And, if confirmed, that is something that will have my focus, because it can be a very -- as it was in Iraq, you know, it can be a very important component of a broader process.

But unlike Iraq, I think the ultimate solution will come through a successful reconciliation process.

And we'll see what effect the death of Osama bin Laden might have on Taliban leadership attitudes, to what extent the linkage is personal rather than institutional.

I don't think we know the answer to that yet. But it is going to be a very important question.

COONS:

Thank you for your answers, Ambassador.

Thank you.

CASEY:

Thank you, Senator Coons.

I'd ask our distinguished ranking member, Senator Lugar, do you have a second round?

I wanted to ask one question. I know Senator Shaheen might also have a follow-up and -- as well as -- if Senator Coons does, just one quick question.

We can amplify this, or I should say you could amplify this, Ambassador Crocker, with written responses.

But I wanted to ask you about the -- a related question about the set of questions I asked you about how the American people view the mission and the goals and the -
- how we define it.

One way to analyze that for -- not just for members of Congress, but for the American people, is to have metrics, measurements, reporting that we know we've had in place.

There's probably a good debate about whether they're adequate enough. We learned a lot in the conflict in Iraq about how difficult that can be to measure and to report.

But I think we've got a -- we've got to have metrics like that in place.

I want to get your assessment of kind of where we are with that and how you view that -- and similar to what Senator Shaheen talked about with regard to accountability and having some reporting, so that as people analyze the policy and debate it, they have some way to measure progress.

CROCKER:

It's an important point, Mr. Chairman. And, again, I think it's part of that accountability process that Senator Shaheen was alluding to.

How do you -- how do you measure progress? And as you point out, it -- that can be hard in certain areas. In other areas, I think it's easier.

In education, for example, we know how many Afghan kids are in school, over 7 million, two and a half million of whom are girls.

And, again, as we consider our costs and our options, I just would like to take a minute, with your permission, to comment on girls and women in Afghanistan.

One of the first things USAID did, when we reopened the embassy in January 2002, was to start educational programs for girls, who were completely shut out of the educational system, as you know, under the Taliban.

And the middle of January '02, on a freezing day, I took then Senator Biden to visit a girls' school that we had just established.

We visited a first grade class that had girls whose ages ranged from six to 12, because the 12-year olds had to become of school age when the Taliban took over.

And I remember asking a 12-year old whether it bothered her at all to be kind of in there with the little kids, and she said, "I am just so happy to have the chance for an education."

You know, this is -- I was touched at the time and I still am.

As we consider, again, hard options, it certain is my intention to see that there would be nothing in my recommendations and nothing in policy decisions over which I might have input or control, that would put at risk the -- half the population of Afghanistan, the girls and women, who still face some significant challenges, but who are in school, in business and in government.

So I'm sorry for a slight digression, but, again, it touch at metrics. I think we -- these are things we can measure. And I take the point.

I mean, I'm not far along into this to be able to give you large quantities of statistics. And not everything is measurable that way.

But I take the point that that which can be measured and metricized should be, so the American people and the Congress have a sense of what is actually happening out there.

CASEY:

Senator Shaheen?

SHAHEEN:

Thank you.

And thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker, for that commitment, because that's exactly what I was going to ask, as we talked about, the potential for reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban, how do we ensure that women's rights aren't traded away in any negotiations.

And I think for all of us who have watched what's happened in Afghanistan, one of the biggest concerns, as I think about what happens after the United States leaves, is what happens to half of the population, who is women.

So I very much appreciate your commitment to ensure that those rights are protected.

CASEY:

Senator Coons?

COONS:

Thank you, Senator Casey, if I might, just one last question, to take us back to, I think, the very first point Chairman Kerry raised about the Pakistan and the disproportionate or significantly different investment we're making in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan and then trying to sustain this uneven partnership, relationship, whatever it is, with the people of Pakistan.

As a former ambassador to Pakistan, I just -- I just wanted to ask your advice or input on how you see the prospects of our ever being successful in persuading the Pakistanis to change their relentless focus on India as the primary source of threat to their nation, and instead, throw in their lot more decisively with us in the war on extremism, particularly in the -- against the Quetta Shura and in North Waziristan and against LET, and what initiatives you think we can or should be taking to engage New Delhi in this, and in helping sort of realign the strategic calculus of the Pakistanis.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator. I would imagine that my colleagues from Legislative Affairs would say you're not the nominee for Pakistan, so be careful.

But I was the ambassador to Pakistan. And it is an important question.

The Pakistanis, of course, have been engaged against militants on their soil, and they've lost a very large number of forces fighting them. So it's not like they're not doing anything.

But the problems of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani network, the Quetta Shura, as you note, persist.

As just in recent weeks, since the death of bin Laden, of course, we've had a number of senior visitors who have engaged the Pakistanis, including the chairman, as well as Secretary Clinton, Admiral Mullen and Marc Grossman. And they have made some statements.

It's clearly going to be important for them to follow through on them.

With respect to India, I'm pleased to see, from my possible future perspective in Afghanistan, that the dialogue between the foreign secretaries of the two nations has resumed.

I think that's an important step. I hope they sustain it and they broaden it, because, clearly, the degree to which India and Pakistan start to see some capacity to work together, it's to the benefit of the region, and it's to the benefit of us.

But, again, that's -- that falls to the purview of others, particularly as it relates to India.

COONS:

Thank you. Thank you for your input. And thank you for your willingness to take on this vital mission.

CASEY:

Thank you, Senator Coons.

Ambassador Crocker, I'm going to be leaving. I'm going to be turning the gavel over to Senator Menendez. He will be the next questioner.

But we're grateful for your service and thank you for the testimony today, and with that, I'll turn to Senator Menendez.

MENENDEZ:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your service, both past and your willingness to serve in the future.

We had a good discussion when you came to office. I want to still pursue some of the things we talked about at that time.

I know you don't determine war strategy. But I do wonder what your role will be as the ambassador in terms of information to the Congress about where we're at.

I am one of those who believe that we would be more successful in Afghanistan by reducing our troop presence in the south, and continuing support for institution building in the north.

Seems to me that a counterterrorism strategy versus a counterinsurgency strategy, which is where we are, fighting insurgents to give the government the time to have the wherewithal to stand up for itself, defend itself, govern itself, is -- would maybe be a considerate policy if, in fact, we had a partner which, in my view, we do not have a solid partner in this regard.

And so that present policy has had an enormous toll on American lives, on American treasure, and I don't think we've won the hearts and minds.

So give me a sense. Do you believe that we're making sustainable progress in the South? I know that we're clearing and holding.

But after that, that's not sustainable for us to be able to stay. What happens in the follow-on?

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator. And thank you also for the time you gave me in your office. That was very valuable to me in trying to get my mind around the big issues. We, as you point, are successfully clearing and holding in the south and west. We're also going to be transitioning seven provinces and districts in the month of July to Afghan security control. And I don't have the list right in front of me, but some of those are in these areas, as I understand it. It'll be an important step, because that ultimately is our goal and their goal for the entire nation.

They are assured that they can do this. What I understand from my briefings is that we are confident that they have the capabilities in these seven districts to do it. And if successful, that will be a not bad start to the transition that we and they are committed to, to cover the whole country.

MENENDEZ:

What role will you play in helping to win over Pashtuns and others in the south?

CROCKER:

Again, I at this stage in the process, I cannot answer that with exact certainty, because it will be part of a process of consultation with others who are involved in this matter. In particular, Ambassador Grossman, who is both a friend and colleague. That said, I - as the Afghans move toward a concentrated reconciliation effort, I would certainly see a role for the embassy in working closely, as we already do, with Pashtuns in the south.

My position in Iraq was basically that we would talk to anybody who would talk to us. And not ask a lot of questions as we entered those conversations, at least initially. Now, whether I can get away with this in Afghanistan, I don't know. But I do think it's important that we know what southern Pashtuns are thinking, as it is important we know what northern Tajiks and Hazaras and so forth are all looking at, especially as a tricky reconciliation process moves forward.

MENENDEZ:

Well, let me turn to a field that I do think you do have a lot to say about. And that is, what is the continuing of U.S. taxpayer dollars for an assistance mission? My understanding is that the president's goal is to reportedly shift from the military mission to an assistance mission in Afghanistan. And that, that mission is to help rebuild lives and institutions to create a functioning government. We've done this before, but we've done this with more committed partners, from my perspective.

From 2002 to 2010, we have spent \$19 billion in assistance, \$19 billion in assistance. And much of which is not sustainable is subject to endemic corruption. And I know that there is a report about to be released suggesting that we have only limited success. That this huge attempt at nation-building may not survive an American withdrawal, and is a real concern to me. Is this a good use of United States taxpayer dollars?

CROCKER:

I think we have had some (inaudible)...

MENENDEZ:

Could you use your microphone?

CROCKER:

Sorry. I think we have some significant successes with our assistance, and I understand the report touches on some of those. That would certainly include education - we were talking about before you came in - and the provision of basic health services. What I can tell you, Senator, is that now I am committed to ensuring that the assistance we provide, A), makes an important positive difference, B), can be implemented, And C), can be sustained.

You know, I would agree with, personally, with the three basic conditions that I saw in the report, which I haven't had the chance to fully study, that our assistance projects, should be necessary, achievable, and sustainable. I know that Administrator Shaw and Deputy Secretary Nides have responded on behalf of their respective offices. They are the ones to speak authoritatively on the matter. But I can tell you that if I am confirmed, I mean, going forward our assistance has to make a difference and it has to be sustainable to build capacity.

MENENDEZ:

Let me ask you. You said we had some successes. Quantify for me in the context of \$19 billion what is success?

CROCKER:

I think clearly in education, which was an early priority for us, the success of getting seven million kids into school, two and-a-half of those being girls, that would be a metric of success.

MENENDEZ:

And if we put a dollar figure on that, what would that be? Do we have any sense of it?

CROCKER:

I can certainly get that for you, sir.

MENENDEZ:

If you could get it to us, I'd appreciate it, because I consider that a success. But I don't think that's \$19 billion.

And this is - we've admonished the audience that we appreciate your attendance, but we're not subject to comments.

My point here is, Ambassador, is that you're going on - I'm going to support your nomination, that's not the issue. My point is that you're going to be in a role that is, yes, diplomacy, yes, foreign policy, and yes, I hope that you look at it as a fiduciary to the American taxpayer. Because right now I do not believe that as a fiduciary from this side of the legislative process, that we are being good fiduciary's to the American taxpayer at this point.

And part of that is, moving forward is, you know, do you believe that the Karzai government is doing what it needs to do to be an effective partner with us, to be an honest partner, to be a transparent partner?

CROCKER:

There are several elements, again, to a very important question. I'll start with the last. I noted in my statement that I got to Kabul in the beginning of January 2002, just about 10 days after President Karzai had been named by the Bonn Conference as Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority. And I worked very closely with him during those early days. I believe he is committed to a unified, stable, Afghanistan. And I look forward to renewing that relationship.

I'm certainly going to make every effort as the ambassador to have a productive working relationship with the head of state to which I'm accredited. Have we had differences? Are there things that we wish he would or would not have done? Are there things that he wishes we would or would not have done? Of course there are. One key issue is corruption.

For the sake of the state of Afghanistan, the Afghan government is going to have to do more. We wrestled with the same thing in Iraq. And you don't get positive change overnight. But Prime Minister Malaki in Iraq expressed an awareness of the problem, and incrementally, some steps were taken. We have seen President Karzai make the same commitments. Words do count. Deeds count for more. But I would start, if confirmed, from the assumption that we do have partners in the Afghan government.

That is certainly what I hear in my consultations, some effective gubernatorial appointments in the provinces, some increasingly effective members of the Karzai cabinet. That's a critical part of capacity building in transition. I would see that again as a key responsibility to help them develop that capacity.

MENENDEZ:

Well, I'll just say that when I see the reports, both public and private, about where our money has gone here, where the corruption is at, and when I see Karzai talk about the United States as an occupying force, I have real problems having American lives shed and having American treasure continuing to be shed. I mean, my understanding is that for FY '02 to '10, we spent \$672 million on education. That's far from \$19 billion of success.

One last question and I'll turn to Senator Risch.

What is the United States position, your position, on the efforts to alter the U.N.'s 1,267 list of persons associated with the Taliban and al-Qaida? Under the proposed plans, I understand that two separate lists would be created, one for each militant organization. And this separation would likely provide the Afghan government with a much greater say over which Taliban would be on the new list, and possibly allow them to remove more than 100 people from the 450-person list that presently list, providing them with freedom to travel, access to the banking system.

Do you support that effort, which will ultimately decide who stays on the list and who gets off? And are you concerned that potentially dangerous individuals can be removed from the list?

CROCKER:

Senator, this is one of many issues frankly that I am not fully briefed or fully up to speed on. I'm aware of it. Again, the policy of the administration has been that for reconciliation to take place, insurgents, the Taliban have to renounce violence, break with al Qaeda and agree to respect the Afghan Constitution.

I can't speak for the administration on this matter, because I don't know if they have a position. I would be concerned about individuals who have a record of, of extremist violence against us and against the Afghans having the freedom of movement and an ability to -- and do whatever they want.

But, again I cannot be authoritative on that matter.

MENENDEZ:

I look forward to pursuing that with you because I'm concerned about where we're headed with these lists.

Senator Risch? Thank you for your answers.

RISCH:

Thank you Senator Menendez. Mr. Crocker, first of all thank you for what you do for America. Certainly your qualifications are impeccable here for this job. I can tell you this, I don't envy what you are about to take on.

I have been following this hearing electronically because I've had other things going, but let me just say that I share some of the skepticism that, that -- in fact that's probably an understatement. I share a lot of the skepticism that's been expressed here this morning

And this, this is a messy situation that isn't getting any better and since I've been elected to the U.S. Senate, it -- people back home keep asking me, what's going to happen? How is this going to end? What, what kind of progress is being made there?

Certainly militarily, we've done well, I believe. But beyond that, this is very, very difficult and to articulate what our objectives are and what our goals are and, and how this is going to end with us achieving those is very, very difficult to grasp, let alone to convey to the American people.

So I wish you well. the problems here are, are very, very significant and I'm glad you're the one that's going there because I think that you are the right person to do this job, but again I'm very skeptical about how, how we're going to be able to end this, so.

Thank you.

CROCKER:

Thank you, Senator. I'm under no illusions of the difficulty of the challenge. If Iraq was hard, and it was hard, Afghanistan in many respects is harder. All I can promise to you and the other members is that if confirmed, I will give you an honest assessment of what the conditions and situations are.

What are achievable ways forward and what may not be achievable. You know, that much I, I certainly undertake to do.

RISCH:

And I appreciate that and I, I think your observation regarding Iraq and Afghanistan is appropriate. Too often people try to compare the two and it's a, it's a comparison of apples and oranges. It, it -- what we're trying to give to the Afghan people and have worked at for 10 years, and, and given them in blood, sweat and tears, you really, really wonder whether they want what we're trying to give them.

And if they don't want what we're trying to give them, its not going to work. So that's kind of where I am on it. And thank you very much again for your service. I wish you well. Take care of yourself over there. Thank you very much.

CASEY (?):

With that, so you know other members, the record will remain open for 48 hours. I would ask the Ambassador to respond to any questions as expeditiously as possible so we can move the nomination.

And with that, this hearing is closed.

CQ Transcriptions, June 8, 2011

List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS:

SEN. JOHN KERRY, D-MASS. CHAIRMAN

SEN. BARBARA BOXER, D-CALIF.

SEN. ROBERT MENENDEZ, D-N.J.

SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, D-MD.

SEN. BOB CASEY, D-PA.

SEN. JIM WEBB, D-VA.

SEN. JEANNE SHAHEEN, D-N.H.

SEN. CHRIS COONS, D-DEL.

SEN. RICHARD J. DURBIN, D-ILL.

SEN. TOM UDALL, D-N.M.

SEN. RICHARD G. LUGAR, R-IND. RANKING MEMBER

SEN. BOB CORKER, R-TENN.

SEN. JIM DEMINT, R-S.C.

SEN. JOHNNY ISAKSON, R-GA.

SEN. JOHN BARRASSO, R-WYO.

SEN. JIM RISCH, R-IDAHO

SEN. JAMES M. INHOFE, R-OKLA.

SEN. MARCO RUBIO, R-FLA.

SEN. MIKE LEE, R-UTAH

WITNESSES:

SEN. JOHN MCCAIN, R-ARIZ.

**AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR
TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN**

Source: CQ Transcriptions

Floor Statement by Senator Menendez on Afghanistan

PASSED TO
ON 6/22
PER [redacted]
[redacted] b6 per FBI
[redacted] b7C per FBI
REQUEST

AFGHANISTAN -- (Senate - June 20, 2011)

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I have come to the floor to speak about something that I very passionately believe in, and that is my view in support of a significant and sustained reduction of American combat forces in Afghanistan beginning this July.

In short, I believe the time has come to move from a strategy of counter-insurgency to one of counter-terrorism--a strategy that would rely on our specialized military forces to continue to engage those who present a real and continued threat to the national security of the United States and one that would allow us to bring home a majority of troops serving in Afghanistan.

After September 11, almost a decade ago, we were clearly justified in intervening in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida and bring bin Laden to justice for the atrocities they committed against Americans on our own soil. I supported President Bush at that time in that effort. I have a standard that if I am willing to send my son and daughter to fight for America on behalf of the Nation's national security interests, I will vote to send anyone else's sons and daughters. Not so in Iraq where I did not believe it was in the national security interests of the United States; and if I won't send my son and daughter, I won't vote to send anyone else's sons or daughters. But in Afghanistan nearly a decade ago, that is where the perpetrators of September 11 were, and it was the right engagement. Our original goals have largely been met in that respect.

Today, even according to the Director of the CIA, fewer than 100 members of al-Qaida remain in Afghanistan. Since September 11, we are painfully aware that the world is a different place, and we will always have to be vigilant. But the current threat simply does not justify the presence of 100,000 American troops on the ground. Bin Laden is dead, having hidden for years in Pakistan in plain view of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence force, and the Pakistani military.

Clearly, the issue at hand is about terrorism not insurgency. Terrorism is a borderless issue represented by the unimpeded movement of the Taliban into Pakistan and a safe haven in Abbottabad for al-Qaida's leader. In finding bin Laden and bringing him to justice, we have struck a serious blow to al-Qaida's network that permits us to now reconsider our mission and the wisdom of pursuing a broad

and open-ended strategy of nation building in Afghanistan because, make no mistake about it, what we are doing in Afghanistan is nation building.

This is interesting. I have heard speeches on the Senate floor and in my previous service in the House by many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle about how we should not be nation building, as though that is not a vital national interest. Well, that is exactly what we are doing. The costs of our current strategy are too high in lives lost, in futures unraveled by injury, and in taxpayer dollars spent.

Mr. President, 1,500 brave men and women have lost their lives in Afghanistan. Almost 12,000 have been wounded in action, at a cost--a continuing cost--of \$10 billion a month--a month. Nonmilitary contributions to Afghan reconstruction and development from 2002 to 2010 have reached \$19 billion--a number which is expected to surge as we transition to a civilian mission. But at the same time, reports from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on which I sit, and from the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan place our billions of dollars in investment at risk of falling into disrepair because of inadequate planning to pay for the ongoing operations and maintenance; not to mention that from my own perspective, \$19 billion later, I don't know what we have achieved in Afghanistan.

In my mind not only are the costs and lives and treasure far too high, but there is a growing consensus that absent a very long and sustained commitment involving many troops on the ground, we can't win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people or, for that matter, even President Karzai who, in my view, has not proven to be a good partner. Karzai most recently suggested that the U.S. and NATO forces risk becoming an occupying force that would be, in his words, ousted from the country--all of these lives later of American troops lost. To do what? To have a counter-insurgency effort. Which is what? Fighting insurgents to give the Afghan Government the opportunity to sustain itself, to defend itself, to govern itself, and we are an occupying force? We are an occupying force?

We have to ask, even if we are willing to make the enormous economic commitment required to build a democracy and to fund the necessary security elements at the cost of tens of billions of dollars per year, what is the likelihood of our success?

The Afghan Government is corrupt. Our working relationship with President Karzai continues to be challenged. Today I believe he made some other comments--either today or yesterday--again, that malign the very Nation that is there

defending them with the sons and daughters of America, with the National Treasury of America--in a country that, by the way, has \$1 trillion of precious deposits of various minerals that, if properly pursued, would be able to fund the Afghan Nation for years to come.

When they gave out their first contract, who did they give it to? Not the Nation that has defended them but the Chinese who have done nothing to stand up for the Afghan people.

So I look at a government that is corrupt, our working relationship with Karzai crumbling, our focus on building security forces challenged because its membership largely excludes Pashtuns in the south, which is the base for the Taliban. I am not certain there is any amount of money or a plan that can work under those circumstances. It seems to me for every Taliban fighter we kill, buy off, or convert another one will take his place, and more and more will stand up to fight an enemy that is perceived as infidels. I am not certain a counter insurgency strategy is anything but counterproductive.

It is clear to me the present course is unsustainable, creates dependency, breeds corruption, and ignores the fact that at some point Afghanistan will have to stand on its own--on its trillions of dollars in mineral deposits--and build its own future. We are spending \$10 billion a month on a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan that does not have a clear path to a definable victory. I am not certain a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan does anything but feed and grow the insurgency.

In short, I am not certain a counter-insurgency strategy is a winnable strategy. Therefore, it is my belief we need a tailored counter-terrorism strategy to achieve and protect our national security interests and meet our broader fiduciary responsibilities. Since 2001 we have invested over \$50 billion to help stand up a central government in Kabul and fund reconstruction projects across Afghanistan. So \$26 billion has gone to standing up the Afghan security forces, including an additional \$11 billion this year. To date, the Afghan National Army now stands at 164,000 men, and the Afghan National Police Force at 126,000. So combined, the Afghan National Security Forces now stand at 290,000 men strong.

We can't forever be the overprotective parent. The time has come to allow Afghans to secure their own future, to draw on the 290,000 men who have committed to securing their country's future, and to allow them the opportunity to defend their Nation and their people.

The fact is, Afghanistan is a rugged, multifaceted country with a long history of complex tribal relationships. It faces almost unprecedented challenges in building a vibrant, independent, and, hopefully, democratic nation from the rubble of more than a quarter century of war. We can guide a process to provide necessary, achievable, and sustainable assistance to bolster their efforts--and we should--but it is up to the Afghan people to stand up a government and a security force and to develop their own counter-insurgency effort.

Our primary goal--the goal that was crystal clear on September 12, 2001--was to address the imminent terrorist threat to America and America's interests. The phrase was "to drain the swamp and address the new threats we face."

The Taliban is a threat, but they are not the threat we rallied to address. Any counter-terrorism strategy we employ now can necessarily deal with any Taliban issues that would be a threat to American security. But the primary threat to America and to American interests is posed by al-Qaida. It is a threat that is stateless, borderless. The notion that if we deploy enough forces in Afghanistan we will somehow lessen that threat, in my view, is farcical and falls on the conventional Washington wisdom that more is better.

In my view, better is better--a mission better focused on the threats, with specialized troops better trained to better locate and better destroy terrorist hideouts; a mission with resources better spent on projects that are necessary, achievable, and sustainable. In short, we need a better, not a bigger, mission.

In my view, we must accelerate the transfer of nation building and nation protecting to the Afghan people and their government. We must remain ever vigilant and ever prepared to protect our national security interests and eliminate any new terrorist threats that emerge. We should continue to identify areas where our advice and assistance can strengthen the Afghan Government and the institutions of democracy. But our mission should be one of counter-terrorism, not counter-insurgency.

We need to concentrate our resources on the real threats in the region--threats to U.S. citizens and U.S. interests and threats that could destabilize Pakistan and place nuclear materials at risk, which would be a very real and present threat to national security and the security of the region--a threat we cannot abide.

We entered Afghanistan to address a threat vital to the national security of our country. By reforming our mission, targeting our unique military resources, and

refining our assistance mission to focus on sustainable and achievable outcomes, we can achieve that goal with fewer troops and less money.

For those reasons, last week I joined with my distinguished colleague Senator *Merkley* of Oregon and many other Members in urging the President to begin a sizable and sustained reduction in U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan this summer. It is time to bring our men and women home. It is my belief this is the best and most responsible policy for America--a policy that seeks to protect our national security while meeting our fiduciary responsibilities, and serving the interests of the service men and women and their families who have sacrificed so much on behalf of a grateful Nation. It is time. It is time.

With that, I yield the floor.

June 15, 2011

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write to express our strong support for a shift in strategy and the beginning of a sizable and sustained reduction of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, beginning in July 2011.

In 2001 the United States rightfully and successfully intervened in Afghanistan with the goals of destroying al Qaeda's safe haven, removing the Taliban government that sheltered al Qaeda, and pursuing those who planned the September 11 attacks on the United States. Those original goals have been largely met and today, as CIA Director Leon Panetta noted last June, "I think at most, we're looking at maybe 50 to 100, maybe less" al Qaeda members remaining in Afghanistan.

In addition, over the past few years, U.S. forces have killed or captured dozens of significant al Qaeda leaders. Then, on May 2, 2011, American Special Forces acting under your direction located and killed Osama bin Laden. The death of the founder of al Qaeda is a major blow that further weakens the terrorist organization.

From the initial authorization of military force through your most recent State of the Union speech, combating al Qaeda has always been the rationale for our military presence in Afghanistan. Given our successes, it is the right moment to initiate a sizable and sustained reduction in forces, with the goal of steadily redeploying all regular combat troops.

There are those who argue that rather than reduce our forces, we should maintain a significant number of troops in order to support a lengthy counter-insurgency and nation building effort. This is misguided. We will never be able to secure and police every town and village in Afghanistan. Nor will we be able to build Afghanistan from the ground up into a Western-style democracy.

Endemic corruption in Afghanistan diverts resources intended to build roads, schools, and clinics, and some of these funds end up in the hands of the insurgents. Appointments of provincial and local officials on the basis of personal alliances and graft leads to deep mistrust by the Afghan population. While it is a laudable objective to attempt to build new civic institutions in Afghanistan, this goal does not justify the loss of American lives or the investment of hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars.

Instead of continuing to be embroiled in ancient local and regional conflicts in Afghanistan, we must accelerate the transfer of responsibility for Afghanistan's development to the Afghan people and their government. We should maintain our capacity to eliminate any new terrorist threats,

continue to train the Afghan National Security Forces, and maintain our diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. However, these objectives do not require the presence of over 100,000 American troops engaged in intensive combat operations.

Mr President, according to our own intelligence officials, al Qaeda no longer has a large presence in Afghanistan, and, as the strike against bin Laden demonstrated, we have the capacity to confront our terrorist enemies with a dramatically smaller footprint. The costs of prolonging the war far outweigh the benefits. It is time for the United States to shift course in Afghanistan. We urge you to follow through on the pledge you made to the American people to begin the redeployment of U.S. forces from Afghanistan this summer, and to do so in a manner that is sizable and sustained, and includes combat troops as well as logistical and support forces.

We look forward to working with you to pursue a strategy in Afghanistan that makes our nation stronger and more secure.

Sincerely,

Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR)
Sen. Mike Lee (R UT)
Sen. Tom Udall (D-NM)
Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT)
Sen. Michael Bennet (D-CO)
Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)
Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA)
Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH)
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA)
Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD)
Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND)
Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL)
Sen. Al Franken (D-MN)
Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)

Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA)
Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-LA)
Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ)
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ)
Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA)
Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY)
Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-NY)
Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR)

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Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Blake, Robert O
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 6:26 AM
To: Sherman, Wendy R, Burns, William J
Cc: Pyatt, Geoffrey R
Subject: Fw: Former Secretary of State George Shultz would be honored to join you in co-authoring an appropriate bi-partisan Op-ed piece

Wendy/Bill: FYI on this exchange. Bob

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 03:07 AM
To: Blake, Robert O; hdr22@clintonemail.com <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
Cc: Verveer, Melanne S; Pyatt, Geoffrey R
Subject: Re: Former Secretary of State George Shultz would be honored to join you in co-authoring an appropriate bi-partisan Op-ed piece

[REDACTED] b5 per DOS

From: Blake, Robert O
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 08:39 PM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Verveer, Melanne S; Pyatt, Geoffrey R
Subject: Re: Former Secretary of State George Shultz would be honored to join you in co-authoring an appropriate bi-partisan Op-ed piece calling for the continued independence of the Grameen Bank, and suggested inviting the current and immediate past president of

b5 per DOS

Madame Secretary: I am getting on a plane to Alma ty now so will be out of range for a bit. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bob

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 08:17 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Verveer, Melanne S; Blake, Robert O
Subject: Re: Former Secretary of State George Shultz would be honored to join you in co-authoring an appropriate bi-partisan Op-ed piece calling for the continued independence of the Grameen Bank, and suggested inviting the current and immediate past president of

[REDACTED] b5 per DOS

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 05:40 PM
To: H
Subject: FW: Former Secretary of State George Shultz would be honored to join you in co-authoring an appropriate bi-partisan Op-ed piece calling for the continued independence of the Grameen Bank, and suggested inviting the current and immediate past president of

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS
on 11/30/2015 -- Cass
CONFIDENTIAL -- Reason
1.4(D) Declassify on: 8/12/2027

HRC-7252

From: Vidar Jorgensen [mailto:] b6 per DOS

Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 9:46 AM

To: Mills, Cheryl D

Cc: Toiv, Nora F; Verveer, Melanne S

Subject: Former Secretary of State George Shultz would be honored to join you in co-authoring an appropriate bi-partisan Op-ed piece calling for the continued independence of the Grameen Bank, and suggested inviting the current and immediate past president of the

THE HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

C/o Cheryl Mills

US Department of State

T: 202 647 5548


millscd@state.gov

Nora F Toiv, ToivNF@state.gov

Dear Secretary Clinton,

b1 per DOS

b6 per DOS

First we thank you again for all the support from the US for Professor Yunus and the independence of the Grameen Bank 

X
U!

Thank you again for your exceptional support in this area.

Sincerely,

Vidar

Vidar Jorgensen

President and Founder, Grameen America and Grameen Research

Advisor, Grameen Trust and Grameen Health Trust

Cell:

b6 per DOS

Lakhdir, Kamala S

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 11:11 AM
To: 'H', Carson, Johnnie
Cc: Mills, Cheryl D, Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: Unbelievable

b5 per DOS

Am hoping that this meeting with [REDACTED] Travel safely and well

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 10:19 AM
To: Sherman, Wendy R; Carson, Johnnie
Cc: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Unbelievable

Wendy--

Thanks for the feedback and for all the work you did on these issues and countries.

Just landed in Nigeria where no dancing is expected.

All best, H

From: Sherman, Wendy R [mailto:ShermanWR@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 09:53 AM
To: H; Carson, Johnnie <CarsonJ@state.gov>
Cc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>; Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Subject: Unbelievable

Dear Madam Secretary, Johnnie,

Just wanted you both to know how extraordinary the coverage is of your trip to Africa is and how consequential the trip has been. Although, unbelievably, as of this writing you still have three countries to go before Turkey, at each and every stop the agenda has moved forward. Whether Sudan and South Sudan making progress, challenging South Africa to move ahead by remembering what has come before, reinforcing Joyce Banda and more, everyone here is truly taken by all of your moves—including Madam Secretary, your dance moves (consensus is that Bob needs a couple more moves!). Most of us only wish we had been with you on the trip. Off on Sunday to Beijing (spoke with VFM yesterday to thank him on Sudan/South Sudan), Moscow and London next week but will catch up from the road.

Best,
Wendy

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Friday, July 27, 2012 5:10 PM
To: Campbell, Kurt M, Hdr22@clintonemail.com, Sullivan, Jacob J, Yun, Joseph Y, Burns William J
Cc: Patel, Nirav S, Moy, Kin W, Barte, Peter R, Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Subject: Re: South China Sea

Kurt,
Please let me know how I can help when in Beijing and Bangkok in August, or anywhere else that might be helpful.
Best,
Wendy

From: Campbell, Kurt M
Sent: Friday, July 27, 2012 05:02 PM
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; Sullivan, Jacob J; Sherman, Wendy R; Yun, Joseph Y; Burns, William J
Cc: Patel, Nirav S; Moy, Kin W
Subject: South China Sea

b1 per DOS

Madame Secretary,

Please don't hesitate to contact me to discuss any part of this overall effort.

Classified by DAS A GIS DoS on
2/26/2016 -- Class CONFIDENTIAL
-- Reason 1.4(D) -- Declassify on
7/26/2037

HRC-7257

Best,
Kurt

Dr. Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian & Pacific Affairs
Department of State

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Sunday, July 15, 2012 8 10 AM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Yay!

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Sunday, July 15, 2012 07:55 AM
To: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

In the car in Tel Aviv on way to Jerusalem.

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 08:57 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

I am glad it worked out.
Travel safely

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 08:35 PM
To: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

On the plane. All is well. Thanks for all of your support today-- and always.

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:13 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Great. See you Tuesday

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:03 PM
To: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Thanks. At airport, through security. Marg, great decision to drive. Thank you.

From: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:42 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Cc: Morris, Margo T

Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

From: Valmoro, Lona J

Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM

To: Valmoro, Lona J; S, S-FinalSchedule; Kidwell, Michael R; Degory, John A

Cc: 'tkrinvic'; 'Justin'; 'Jor'; 'doug'; 'hannah'; 'laura'; 'jschlichter'; 'msteenburd'; 'izimmerehner'; 'oscar'; 'caansslev'; 'dcheng'; 'blurie'; 'Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S'; 'Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdir, Kamala S;

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8 35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
En route Ministry of Defense
[drive time 35 minutes]

9 10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters: Major General Nabil Mohandas,
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense
Major General Mohamed El Assar,
Assistant to the Minister of Defense
Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief, American Relations
Branch

9.15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**

10:15 am Field Marshall's Office

CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note: Consecutive interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
VADM Harris
Mr Simon
Mr Spence
Mr Sullivan
Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Field Marshall Tantawi
Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
En route Flat6Labs
[drive time 35 minutes]

10 55 am **ARRIVE Flat6Labs**

Greeters: Mr Ramez Mohamed, CEO, Flat6Labs
Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawar Ventures Managing Partner

11 00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**
11 45 am Flat6Labs
OPEN PRESS

Note Consecutive interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Mr Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawar Ventures
Mr Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr. Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11 50 am **DEPART Flat6Labs**
En route US Embassy
[drive time 15 minutes]

12 05 pm **ARRIVE US Embassy**

12 10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**
1 10 pm Meeting Room
CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note No interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AAS Jones
AS Posner
Rev. Mounir Anis
Bishop Nicola Antonios
Mr Ihab Azziz
Rev. Safwat El Barady
Ms. Mona Makram Ebeid
Father Rafiq Greish
Mr. Ramy Lakah
Bishop Morcos
Mr Michael Mounir
Ms Georgette Kalini
Mr Yousef Sidhom
Ms Laila Takla

- Ambassador Patterson introduces HRC to the participants
- HRC takes her seat
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks

- HRC welcomes guests and invites discussion, which will be moderated by Ambassador Patterson

1 30 pm

TEA w/EGYPTIAN LEADERS

2 30 pm

Ambassador's Residence

CAMERA SPRAY (at the top)

Note No interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AAS Jones
A/S Posner
Ms Amany Asfour
Ms Maha Abol-Ezz
Ms Tayseer Fahmy
Ms Mozn Hassan
Ms Angie Helmi
Ms Laila Iskandar
Ms Gameela Ismail
Ms Nehad Aboul Komsan
Ms Afaf Maraie
Ms Heba Morayef
Ms Nevine Al Tahry
Amb Mervat Tallawy
Ms Ghada Waly
Ms Dalia Ziada

- Ambassador Patterson introduces SECRETARY CLINTON to the participants and they take their seats
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks and introduces HRC
- HRC welcomes guests and opens the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Patterson

2.50 pm

MEET AND GREET w/EMBASSY CAIRO

3 10 pm

Courtyard (outdoor venue)

OPEN PRESS (traveling press only)

Note No interpretation Approximately 450 employees and family members attending

3 15 pm

DEPART Embassy

En route Cairo International Airport

[drive time 45 minutes]

4.00 pm

ARRIVE Cairo International Airport

Note. Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
Ambassador Sami Shoukrey,
Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr El Hussein Abdelwahab, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs

4 10 pm

DEPART Cairo, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003

En route Alexandria, Egypt

[flight time 45 minutes]

Manifest HRC
Joanna Biddle, AFP
Margaret Brennan, CBS

[REDACTED]
John Degory, S/ES-S
[REDACTED]

Katherine Gaouette, Bloomberg
Thomas Giusto, ABC
Monica Hanley
Harry Harris Jr, JCS
Eric Kerchner, ABC
Michael Kidwell, S/ES-S
Brad Klapper, AP
[REDACTED]

Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post
Nick Merrill
Arshad Mohammed, Reuters
Tuli Mushingi
Victoria Nuland
Kurt Olsson
Shilpa Pesaru, S/CPR
Pam Quanrud
Philippe Reines
Megan Rooney
Dan Schwerin
Brendan Smialowski, AFP
Scott Stearns, VOA
Jake Sullivan
[REDACTED]

Virginia Vicario, ABC
Ashley Yehl
Dr. Monte Makous
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Business Week
Huma Abedin
[REDACTED]

Kim Ghattas, BBC
Anne Elizabeth Jones, NEA
Reem Khoshnevisan, A/LS
Elise Labott, CNN
Anne Patterson, NEA
Steven Simon, NSC
[REDACTED]

4:55 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Greeters: Consul General Candace Putnam
General Khalid Mohy ed-Din, Head of Agami District
General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

5:05pm **DEPART** Borg al Arab Airport
En route Consulate General Alexandria
[drive time: 30 minutes]

5:35 pm **ARRIVE** Consulate General Alexandria

Greeters: Ms. Bridgette Walker, Deputy Consul General
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

5:40 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL FLAG-RAISING CEREMONY**
6:10 pm US Consulate
OPEN PRESS

Note. Simultaneous interpretation

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 Consul General Putnam
 Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

- HRC takes her seat onstage with Ambassador Patterson and other VIPs
- CG Putnam opens the event and welcomes guests
- National anthems of Egypt and the United States are played
- CG Putnam introduces HRC.
- HRC proceeds to the podium and delivers remarks
- Marines lower the flag, symbolically closing the American Center, and then raise a different flag, re-opening the Consulate General
- Governor Osama Al Fouly delivers remarks
- VIPs on stage proceed to the left side of the stage and unveil the plaque
- HRC, accompanied by CG Putnam, greets VIP guests

6 15 pm
6 35 pm

CONSULATE GENERAL ALEXANDRIA MEET AND GREET
Consulate General Building
PRESS TBD

Participants. HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 CG Putnam
 Approximately 30 employees and family members

- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC delivers remarks and greets consulate staff
- HRC proceeds to the grand staircase for a group photo with consulate staff, Ambassador Patterson, and AA/S Jones

6 40 pm

DEPART US Consulate
En route Borg al Arab Airport
[drive time 30 minutes]

7 10 pm

ARRIVE Borg al Arab Airport

Note. Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
 Consul General Putnam
 General Haní Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

7 20 pm

DEPART Alexandria, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Tel Aviv, Israel
[flight time 1 hour, 5 minutes, 2 hours, 5 minutes]

Note Same manifest as previous leg

9 25 pm **ARRIVE** Ben Gurion International Airport

Note. Open press arrival, no interpretation.

Greeters Ambassador Dan Shapiro
 Ms Julie Fisher, Ambassador Shapiro's spouse
 Lt Gen Mike Moeller, U S Security Coordinator
 Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the U S
 Tayla Lador-Fresher, Chief of State Protocol

9 35 pm **DEPART** Ben Gurion International Airport
 En route David Citadel Hotel, Jerusalem
 [drive time 45 minutes]

10 20 am **ARRIVE** David Citadel Hotel

HRC RON Jerusalem, Israel

b6 per DOS

Weather

Cairo, Egypt: Mostly sunny, 100/77

Alexandria, Egypt: Mostly sunny, 93/77

Jerusalem, Israel: Sunny, 90/72

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Sunday, July 15 2012 7:56 AM
To: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

In the car in Tel Aviv on way to Jerusalem.

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 08:57 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

I am glad it worked out.
Travel safely

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 08:35 PM
To: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

On the plane. All is well. Thanks for all of your support today and always.

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:13 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Great See you Tuesday.

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:03 PM
To: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Thanks At airport, through security Marg, great decision to drive. Thank you.

From: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:42 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

From: Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM
To: Valmoro, Lona J; S_S-FinalSchedule; Kidwell, Michael R; Degory, John A
Cc: 'tkrinvid' [redacted] 'justin' [redacted]

b6 per DOS

[redacted] 'Jon [redacted] b6 per DOS
 'doug [redacted] 'laura b7C per DOS
 [redacted] 'hannah [redacted]
 'jschlichter [redacted] 'msteenburd
 [redacted] 'zimmerebner [redacted]
 'oscar [redacted] 'cgansslev
 [redacted]
 'dcheng [redacted] 'blurie
 [redacted] Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S; [redacted]
 [redacted] 'Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdhir,
 Kamala S; [redacted]
Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8 35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
 En route Ministry of Defense
 [drive time 35 minutes]

9.10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters: Major General Nabil Mohandas,
 Secretary General Ministry of Defense
 Major General Mohamed El Assar,
 Assistant to the Minister of Defense
 Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief, American Relations
 Branch

9 15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**

10 15 am Field Marshall's Office
CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note Consecutive interpretation

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 VADM Harris
 Mr Simon
 Mr Spence
 Mr Sullivan
 Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
 Field Marshall Tantawi
 Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
 En route Flat6Labs
 [drive time 35 minutes]

10 55 am **ARRIVE** Flat6Labs

Greeters Mr. Ramez Mohamed, CEO, Flat6Labs
 Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawari Ventures Managing Partner

11 00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**

11 45 am Flat6Labs

OPEN PRESS

Note Consecutive interpretation.

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Mr Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawan Ventures
Mr Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr. Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11 50 am **DEPART** Flat6Labs
En route US Embassy
[drive time: 15 minutes]

12.05 pm **ARRIVE** US Embassy

12.10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**
1 10 pm Meeting Room
CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note: No interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
A/S Posner
Rev Mounir Anis
Bishop Nicola Antonios
Mr Ihab Azziz
Rev Safwat El Barady
Ms Mona Makram Ebeid
Father Rafiq Greish
Mr Ramy Lakah
Bishop Morcos
Mr Michael Mounir
Ms Georgette Kalini
Mr Yousef Sidhom
Ms Laila Takla

- Ambassador Patterson introduces HRC to the participants
- HRC takes her seat
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks
- HRC welcomes guests and invites discussion which will be moderated by Ambassador Patterson

1 30 pm **TEA w/EGYPTIAN LEADERS**
2.30 pm Ambassador's Residence
CAMERA SPRAY (at the top)

Note No interpretation

Participants HRC

Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 A/S Posner
 Ms Amany Asfour
 Ms Maha Abol-Ezz
 Ms Tayseer Fahmy
 Ms Mozn Hassan
 Ms Angie Helmi
 Ms Laila Iskandar
 Ms Gameela Ismail
 Ms Nehad Aboul Komsan
 Ms Afaf Maraie
 Ms Heba Morayef
 Ms Nevine Al Tahry
 Amb Mervat Tallawy
 Ms Ghada Waly
 Ms Dalia Ziada

- Ambassador Patterson introduces SECRETARY CLINTON to the participants and they take their seats
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks and introduces HRC.
- HRC welcomes guests and opens the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Patterson

2 50 pm
 3 10 pm

MEET AND GREET w/EMBASSY CAIRO
 Courtyard (outdoor venue)
OPEN PRESS (traveling press only)

Note. No interpretation. Approximately 450 employees and family members attending

3 15 pm

DEPART Embassy
 En route Cairo International Airport
 [drive time 45 minutes]

4 00 pm

ARRIVE Cairo International Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell. Ambassador Patterson
 Ambassador Sami Shoukrey,
 Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
 Mr El Hussein Abdelwahab, Assistant Minister of Foreign
 Affairs

4 10 pm

DEPART Cairo, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
 En route Alexandria, Egypt
 [flight time 45 minutes]

Manifest

HRC
 Joanna Biddle, AFP
 Margaret Brennan, CBS
 [Redacted]
 John Deary, S/ES-S
 [Redacted]
 Katherine Gaouette, Bloomberg
 Thomas Giusto, ABC
 Monica Hanley
 Harry Harris Jr, JCS
 Eric Kerchner, ABC
 Michael Kidwell, S/ES-S

b6 per DOS
 b7C per DOS

Brad Klapper, AP

[REDACTED]
Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post

Nick Merrill

Arshad Mohammed, Reuters

Tuli Mushingi

Victoria Nuland

Kurt Olsson

Shilpa Pesaru, S/CPR

Pam Quanrud

Philippe Reines

Megan Rooney

Dan Schwerin

Brendan Smialowski, AFP

Scott Stearns, VOA

Jake Sullivan

b6 per DOS

b7C per DOS

[REDACTED]
Virginia Vicario, ABC

Ashley Yehl

Dr. Monte Makous

Elizabeth Dwoskin, Business Week

Huma Abedin

[REDACTED]
Kim Ghattas, BBC

Anne Elizabeth Jones, NEA

Reem Khoshnevisan, A/LS

Elise Labott, CNN

Anne Patterson, NEA

Steven Simon, NSC

4:55 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Greeters: Consul General Candace Putnam
General Khalid Mohy ed-Din, Head of Agami District
General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

5:05pm **DEPART** Borg al Arab Airport
En route Consulate General Alexandria
[drive time 30 minutes]

5:35 pm **ARRIVE** Consulate General Alexandria

Greeters: Ms. Bridgette Walker, Deputy Consul General
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

5:40 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL FLAG-RAISING CEREMONY**

6:10 pm US Consulate
OPEN PRESS

Note: Simultaneous interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
Consul General Putnam
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

- HRC takes her seat onstage with Ambassador Patterson and other VIPs

- CG Putnam opens the event and welcomes guests
- National anthems of Egypt and the United States are played
- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC proceeds to the podium and delivers remarks
- Marines lower the flag, symbolically closing the American Center, and then raise a different flag re-opening the Consulate General
- Governor Osama Al Fouly delivers remarks
- VIPs on stage proceed to the left side of the stage and unveil the plaque
- HRC, accompanied by CG Putnam, greets VIP guests

6 15 pm
6 35 pm

CONSULATE GENERAL ALEXANDRIA MEET AND GREET
Consulate General Building
PRESS TBD

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 CG Putnam
 Approximately 30 employees and family members

- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC delivers remarks and greets consulate staff
- HRC proceeds to the grand staircase for a group photo with consulate staff, Ambassador Patterson, and AA/S Jones

6 40 pm

DEPART US Consulate
En route Borg al Arab Airport
[drive time 30 minutes]

7 10 pm

ARRIVE Borg al Arab Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
 Consul General Putnam
 General Hanı Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

7 20 pm

DEPART Alexandria Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Tel Aviv, Israel
[flight time 1 hour, 5 minutes, 2 hours, 5 minutes]

Note Same manifest as previous leg.

9 25 pm

ARRIVE Ben Gurion International Airport

Note Open press arrival, no interpretation

Greeters Ambassador Dan Shapiro
 Ms Julie Fisher, Ambassador Shapiro's spouse
 Lt Gen Mike Moeller, U S Security Coordinator

Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S
Tayla Lador-Fresher Chief of State Protocol

9 35 pm **DEPART** Ben Gurion International Airport
En route David Citadel Hotel Jerusalem
[drive time 45 minutes]

10 20 am **ARRIVE** David Citadel Hotel

HRC RON Jerusalem, Israel

Weather:

Cairo, Egypt Mostly sunny, 100/77.

Alexandria, Egypt: Mostly sunny, 93/77.

Jerusalem, Israel: Sunny, 90/72.

b6 per DOS

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 8 57 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

I am glad it worked out
Travel safely

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 08:35 PM
To: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

On the plane All is well Thanks for all of your support today-- and always

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:13 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Great See you Tuesday.

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:03 PM
To: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Thanks. At airport, through security. Marg, great decision to drive. Thank you.

From: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:42 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

From: Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM
To: Valmoro, Lona J; S_S-FinalSchedule; Kidwell, Michael R; Degory, John A
Cc: 'tkrinvid'; 'justin'

'Jori'
'doug'; 'laura'
'hannah'
'ischlichter'; 'msteenburd'
'jzimmerebner'; 'osca'; 'cgansslev'
'dcheng'; 'blurie'

b6 per DOS

[redacted] Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S; [redacted]

[redacted] Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdhir, [redacted]

Kamala S; [redacted]

Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8 35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
En route Ministry of Defense
[drive time 35 minutes]

9 10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters Major General Nabil Mohandas,
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense
Major General Mohamed El Assar,
Assistant to the Minister of Defense
Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief, American Relations
Branch

9 15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**

10 15 am Field Marshall's Office

CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note Consecutive interpretation

Participants. HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
VADM Harris
Mr. Simon
Mr. Spence
Mr. Sullivan
Ms. Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Field Marshall Tantawi
Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
En route Flat6Labs
[drive time 35 minutes]

10.55 am **ARRIVE** Flat6Labs

Greeters Mr. Ramez Mohamed, CEO, Flat6Labs
Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawari Ventures Managing Partner

11.00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**

11:45 am Flat6Labs

OPEN PRESS

Note Consecutive interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
Ms. Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Mr. Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawari Ventures
Mr. Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11:50 am **DEPART** Flat6Labs
En route US Embassy
[drive time: 15 minutes]

12:05 pm **ARRIVE** US Embassy

12:10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**
1:10 pm Meeting Room
CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note: No interpretation.

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
A/S Posner
Rev. Mounir Anis
Bishop Nicola Antonios
Mr Ihab Azziz
Rev. Safwat El Baiady
Ms Mona Makram Ebeid
Father Rafiq Greish
Mr. Ramy Lakah
Bishop Morcos
Mr Michael Mounir
Ms. Georgette Kallini
Mr. Yousef Sidhom
Ms. Laila Takia

- Ambassador Patterson introduces HRC to the participants.
- HRC takes her seat.
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks.
- HRC welcomes guests and invites discussion, which will be moderated by Ambassador Patterson.

1:30 pm **TEA w/EGYPTIAN LEADERS**
2:30 pm Ambassador's Residence
CAMERA SPRAY (at the top)

Note: No interpretation.

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
A/S Posner
Ms Amany Asfour
Ms Maha Abol-Ezz
Ms Tayseer Fahmy
Ms Mozn Hassan
Ms Angie Helmi
Ms Laila Iskandar

Ms Gameela Ismail
Ms Nehad Aboul Komsan
Ms Afaf Maraie
Ms Heba Morayef
Ms Nevine Al Tahry
Amb Mervat Tallawy
Ms Ghada Waly
Ms Dalia Ziada

- Ambassador Patterson introduces SECRETARY CLINTON to the participants and they take their seats
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks and introduces HRC
- HRC welcomes guests and opens the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Patterson.

2 50 pm

MEET AND GREET w/EMBASSY CAIRO

3 10 pm

Courtyard (outdoor venue)

OPEN PRESS (traveling press only)

Note: No interpretation Approximately 450 employees and family members attending.

3 15 pm

DEPART Embassy

En route Cairo International Airport
[drive time 45 minutes]

4 00 pm

ARRIVE Cairo international Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell:

Ambassador Patterson
Ambassador Samr Shoukrey,
Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr El Hussein Abdelwahab, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs

4 10 pm

DEPART Cairo, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003

En route Alexandria, Egypt
[flight time 45 minutes]

Manifest

HRC

Joanna Biddle, AFP

Margaret Brennan, CBS

John Degory, S/ES-S

Katherine Gaouette, Bloomberg

Thomas Giusto, ABC

Monica Hanley

Harry Harris Jr, JCS

Eric Kerchner, ABC

Michael Kidwell, S/ES-S

Brad Klapper, AP

Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post

Nick Merrill

Arshad Mohammed, Reuters

Tuli Mushingi

Victoria Nuland

Kurt Olsson

b6 per DOS

b7C per DOS

Shilpa Pesaru, S/CPR
Pam Quanrud
Philippe Reines
Megan Rooney
Dan Schwer.n
Brendan Smialowski, AFP
Scott Stearns, VOA
Jake Sullivan

[REDACTED]
Virginia Vicario, ABC
Ashley Yehl
Dr. Monte Makous
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Business Week
Huma Abedin

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

[REDACTED]
Kim Ghattas, BBC
Anne Elizabeth Jones, NEA
Reem Khoshnevisan, A/LS
Elise Labott, CNN
Anne Patterson, NEA
Steven Simon, NSC
[REDACTED]

4 55 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Greeters Consul General Candace Putnam
General Khalid Mohy ed-Din, Head of Agami District
General Hanî Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

5 05pm **DEPART** Borg al Arab Airport
En route Consulate General Alexandria
[drive time 30 minutes]

5 35 pm **ARRIVE** Consulate General Alexandria

Greeters Ms. Bridgette Walker, Deputy Consul General
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

5 40 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL FLAG-RAISING CEREMONY**
6 10 pm US Consulate
OPEN PRESS

Note Simultaneous interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
Consul General Putnam
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

- HRC takes her seat onstage with Ambassador Patterson and other VIPs
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6 15 pm
6 35 pm

CONSULATE GENERAL ALEXANDRIA MEET AND GREET
Consulate General Building
PRESS TBD

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 CG Putnam
 Approximately 30 employees and family members

- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC delivers remarks and greets consulate staff
- HRC proceeds to the grand staircase for a group photo with consulate staff Ambassador Patterson and AA/S Jones

6 40 pm

DEPART US Consulate
En route Borg al Arab Airport
[drive time 30 minutes]

7 10 pm

ARRIVE Borg al Arab Airport

Note: Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
 Consul General Putnam
 General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

7 20 pm

DEPART Alexandria, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Tel Aviv, Israel
[flight time 1 hour, 5 minutes 2 hours, 5 minutes]

Note: Same manifest as previous leg

9 25 pm

ARRIVE Ben Gurion International Airport

Note: Open press arrival, no interpretation

Greeters Ambassador Dan Shapiro
 Ms Julie Fisher, Ambassador Shapiro's spouse
 Lt. Gen. Mike Moeller, U.S. Security Coordinator
 Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
 Tayla Lador-Fresher, Chief of State Protocol

9 35 pm

DEPART Ben Gurion International Airport
En route David Citadel Hotel, Jerusalem
[drive time 45 minutes]

10 20 am

ARRIVE David Citadel Hotel

HRC RON Jerusalem, Israel

b6 per DOS

Weather

Cairo, Egypt Mostly sunny, 100/77

Alexandria Egypt Mostly sunny, 93/77

Jerusalem, Israel Sunny, 90/72

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Sherman, Wendy R
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Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:13 PM
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Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

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From: Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM
To: Valmoro, Lona J; S_S-FinalSchedule; Kidwell, Michael R; Degory, John A
Cc: 'tkrinvic'; 'Justin'; 'Jon'; 'doug'; 'laura'; 'hannah'; 'jschlichter'; 'msteenburd'; 'zimmerebner'; 'oscar'; 'cganssley'; 'dcheng'; 'blurie'; Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S; Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdhir, Kamala S;
Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8.35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
En route Ministry of Defense
[drive time 35 minutes]

9 10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters: Major General Nabil Mohandas,
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense
Major General Mohamed El Assar,
Assistant to the Minister of Defense
Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief, American Relations
Branch

9 15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**
10 15 am Field Marshall's Office
CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note. Consecutive interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
VADM Harris
Mr. Simon
Mr. Spence
Mr. Sullivan
Ms. Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Field Marshall Tantawi
Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
En route Flat6Labs
[drive time 35 minutes]

10 55 am **ARRIVE** Flat6Labs

Greeters: Mr. Ramez Mohamed, CEO, Flat6Labs
Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawari Ventures Managing Partner

11.00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**
11:45 am Flat6Labs
OPEN PRESS

Note. Consecutive interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
Ms. Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Mr. Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawari Ventures
Mr. Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr. Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr. Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11 50 am **DEPART** Flat6Labs
En route US Embassy

[drive time 15 minutes]

12 05 pm **ARRIVE US Embassy**

12 10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**

1 10 pm Meeting Room

CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note No interpretation

Participants:

- HRC
- Ambassador Patterson
- AA/S Jones
- A/S Posner
- Rev Mounir Anis
- Bishop Nicola Antonios
- Mr Ihab Azziz
- Rev Safwat El Barady
- Ms Mona Makram Ebeid
- Father Rafiq Greish
- Mr Ramy Lakah
- Bishop Morcos
- Mr Michael Mounir
- Ms Georgette Kalini
- Mr Yousef Sidhom
- Ms Laila Takla

- Ambassador Patterson introduces HRC to the participants
- HRC takes her seat
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks
- HRC welcomes guests and invites discussion, which will be moderated by Ambassador Patterson

1.30 pm **TEA w/EGYPTIAN LEADERS**

2 30 pm Ambassador's Residence

CAMERA SPRAY (at the top)

Note No interpretation

Participants

- HRC
- Ambassador Patterson
- AA/S Jones
- A/S Posner
- Ms Amany Asfour
- Ms Maha Abol-Ezz
- Ms Tayseer Fahmy
- Ms Mozn Hassan
- Ms Angie Helmi
- Ms Laila Iskandar
- Ms Gameela Ismail
- Ms Nehad Aboul Komsan
- Ms Afaf Maraie
- Ms Heba Morayef
- Ms Nevine Al Tahry
- Amb Mervat Tailawy
- Ms Ghada Waly
- Ms Dalia Ziada

- Ambassador Patterson introduces SECRETARY CLINTON to the participants and they take their seats
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks and introduces HRC
- HRC welcomes guests and opens the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Patterson

2:50 pm

MEET AND GREET w/EMBASSY CAIRO

3:10 pm

Courtyard (outdoor venue)

OPEN PRESS (traveling press only)

Note: No interpretation. Approximately 450 employees and family members attending

3:15 pm

DEPART Embassy

En route Cairo International Airport

[drive time: 45 minutes]

4:00 pm

ARRIVE Cairo International Airport

Note: Open press departure.

Farewell

Ambassador Patterson
Ambassador Sami Shoukrey,
Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr. El Hussein Abdelwahab, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs

4:10 pm

DEPART Cairo, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003

En route Alexandria, Egypt

[flight time: 45 minutes]

Manifest:

HRC
Joanna Biddle, AFP
Margaret Brennan, CBS
[redacted]
John Degory, S/ES-S
[redacted]
Katherine Gaouette, Bloomberg
Thomas Giusto, ABC
Monica Hanley
Harry Harris Jr, JCS
Eric Kerchner, ABC
Michael Kidwell, S/ES-S
Brad Klapper, AP
[redacted]
Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post
Nick Merrill
Arshad Mohammed, Reuters
Tuli Mushingi
Victoria Nuland
Kurt Olsson
Shilpa Pesaru, S/CPR
Pam Quanrud
Philippe Reines
Megan Rooney
Dan Schwerin
Brendan Smialowski, AFP
Scott Stearns, VOA
Jake Sullivan
[redacted]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

[redacted]
Virginia Vicario, ABC
Ashley Yehl
Dr. Monte Makous
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Business Week
Huma Abedin
[redacted]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Kim Ghattas, BBC
Anne Elizabeth Jones, NEA
Reem Khoshnevisan, A/LS
Elise Labott, CNN
Anne Patterson, NEA
Steven Simon, NSC
[redacted]

4 55 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Greeters Consul General Candace Putnam
General Khalid Mohy ed-Din, Head of Agami District
General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

5 05pm **DEPART** Borg al Arab Airport
En route Consulate General Alexandria
[drive time: 30 minutes]

5 35 pm **ARRIVE** Consulate General Alexandria

Greeters Ms. Bridgette Walker, Deputy Consul General
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

5 40 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL FLAG-RAISING CEREMONY**
6 10 pm US Consulate
OPEN PRESS

Note: Simultaneous interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/LS Jones
Consul General Putnam
Dr. Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

- HRC takes her seat onstage with Ambassador Patterson and other VIPs.
- CG Putnam opens the event and welcomes guests
- National anthems of Egypt and the United States are played
- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC proceeds to the podium and delivers remarks
- Marines lower the flag, symbolically closing the American Center, and then raise a different flag, re-opening the Consulate General
- Governor Osama Al Fouly delivers remarks
- VIPs on stage proceed to the left side of the stage and unveil the plaque
- HRC, accompanied by CG Putnam, greets VIP guests

6 15 pm
6.35 pm

CONSULATE GENERAL ALEXANDRIA MEET AND GREET
Consulate General Building
PRESS TBD

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 CG Putnam
 Approximately 30 employees and family members

- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC delivers remarks and greets consulate staff
- HRC proceeds to the grand staircase for a group photo with consulate staff, Ambassador Patterson, and AA/S Jones

6:40 pm

DEPART US Consulate
En route Borg al Arab Airport
[drive time 30 minutes]

7 10 pm

ARRIVE Borg al Arab Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
 Consul General Putnam
 General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

7 20 pm

DEPART Alexandria, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Tel Aviv, Israel
[flight time 1 hour, 5 minutes; 2 hours 5 minutes]

Note Same manifest as previous leg

9 25 pm

ARRIVE Ben Gurion International Airport

Note Open press arrival, no interpretation

Greeters: Ambassador Dan Shapiro
 Ms Julie Fisher, Ambassador Shapiro's spouse
 Lt Gen Mike Moeller, U S Security Coordinator
 Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the U S
 Tayla Lador-Fresher, Chief of State Protocol

9 35 pm

DEPART Ben Gurion International Airport
En route David Citadel Hotel, Jerusalem
[drive time, 45 minutes]

10 20 am

ARRIVE David Citadel Hotel

HRC RON Jerusalem, Israel

b6 per DOS

Weather:
Cairo, Egypt Mostly sunny, 100/77.
Alexandria, Egypt Mostly sunny, 93/77
Jerusalem, Israel Sunny, 90/72

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Morris, Margo T
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 7 14 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Great. See you Tuesday.

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 07:03 PM
To: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Thanks At airport, through security. Marg, great decision to drive. Thank you.

From: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:42 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

From: Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM
To: Valmoro, Lona J; S S-FinalSchedule: Kidwell, Michael R; Degory, John A
Cc: 'tkrivid'; 'Jon'; 'doug'; 'laura'; 'hannah'; 'jschlichte'; 'msteenburg'; 'izimmerebnel'; 'oscar'; 'ccansslev'; 'dcheng'; 'blurie'; Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S; 'Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdhir, Kamala S;
Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8 35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
En route Ministry of Defense
[drive time: 35 minutes]

9 10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters Major General Nabil Mohandas,
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense

Major General Mohamed El Assar,
Assistant to the Minister of Defense
Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief American Relations
Branch

9 15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**
10 15 am Field Marshall's Office
CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note Consecutive interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
VADM Harris
Mr Simon
Mr Spence
Mr. Sullivan
Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Field Marshall Tantawi
Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
En route Flat6Labs
[drive time 35 minutes]

10.55 am **ARRIVE** Flat6Labs

Greeters Mr Ramez Mohamed, CEO Flat6Labs
Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawari Ventures Managing Partner

11 00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**
11 45 am Flat6Labs
OPEN PRESS

Note Consecutive interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
Ms Reem Nuseibeh Interpreter
Mr Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawari Ventures
Mr Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11 50 am **DEPART** Flat6Labs
En route US Embassy
[drive time 15 minutes]

12 05 pm **ARRIVE** US Embassy

12 10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**
1 10 pm Meeting Room
CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note No interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
A/S Posner
Rev Mounir Anis
Bishop Nicola Antonios
Mr Ihab Azziz
Rev Safwat El Barady
Ms Mona Makram Ebeid
Father Rafiq Greish
Mr Ramy Lakah
Bishop Morcos
Mr Michael Mounir
Ms Georgette Kalini
Mr Yousef Sidhom
Ms. Laila Takla

- Ambassador Patterson introduces HRC to the participants
- HRC takes her seat
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks
- HRC welcomes guests and invites discussion, which will be moderated by Ambassador Patterson

1 30 pm
2 30 pm

TEA w/EGYPTIAN LEADERS

Ambassador's Residence

CAMERA SPRAY (at the top)

Note No interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
A/S Posner
Ms Amany Asfour
Ms Maha Abol-Ezz
Ms Tayseer Fahmy
Ms Mozn Hassan
Ms Angie Helmi
Ms Laila Iskandar
Ms Gameela Ismail
Ms Nehad Aboul Komsan
Ms Afaf Maraie
Ms. Heba Morayef
Ms Nevine Al Tahry
Amb Mervat Tallawy
Ms Ghada Waly
Ms Dalia Ziada

- Ambassador Patterson introduces SECRETARY CLINTON to the participants and they take their seats
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks and introduces HRC
- HRC welcomes guests and opens the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Patterson

2 50 pm
3 10 pm

MEET AND GREET w/EMBASSY CAIRO

Courtyard (outdoor venue)

OPEN PRESS (traveling press only)

Note No interpretation Approximately 450 employees and family members attending

3 15 pm **DEPART** Embassy
En route Cairo International Airport
[drive time 45 minutes]

4 00 pm **ARRIVE** Cairo International Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
Ambassador Sami Shoukrey,
Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr El Hussein Abdelwahab Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs

4 10 pm **DEPART** Cairo, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Alexandria Egypt
[flight time 45 minutes]

Manifest HRC
Joanna Biddle, AFP
Margaret Brennan, CBS
[redacted]
John Degory, S/ES-S
[redacted]
Katherine Gouette, Bloomberg
Thomas Gusto, ABC
Monica Hanley
Harry Harris Jr, JCS
Eric Kerchner, ABC
Michael Kidwell, S/ES-S
Brad Klapper, AP

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

[redacted]
Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post
Nick Merrill
Arshad Mohammed, Reuters
Tuli Mushingi
Victoria Nuland
Kurt Olsson
Shilpa Pesaru, S/CPR
Pam Quanrud
Philippe Reines
Megan Rooney
Dan Schwerin
Brendan Smialowski, AFP
Scott Stearns VOA
Jake Sullivan

[redacted]
Virginia Vicario, ABC
Ashley Yehl
Dr Monte Makous
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Business Week
Huma Abedin

[redacted]
Kim Ghattas BBC
Anne Elizabeth Jones, NEA

Reem Khoshnevissan, A/LS
Elise Labott, CNN
Anne Patterson, NEA
Steven Simon, NSC

b6 per DOS

4 55 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Greeters Consul General Candace Putnam
General Khalid Mohy ed-Din, Head of Agami District
General Hanı Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

5 05pm **DEPART** Borg al Arab Airport
En route Consulate General Alexandria
[drive time: 30 minutes]

5 35 pm **ARRIVE** Consulate General Alexandria

Greeters Ms Bridgette Walker, Deputy Consul General
Dr Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

5 40 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL FLAG-RAISING CEREMONY**
6 10 pm US Consulate
OPEN PRESS

Note Simultaneous interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
Consul General Putnam
Dr Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

- HRC takes her seat onstage with Ambassador Patterson and other VIPs
- CG Putnam opens the event and welcomes guests
- National anthems of Egypt and the United States are played
- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC proceeds to the podium and delivers remarks
- Marines lower the flag, symbolically closing the American Center, and then raise a different flag, re-opening the Consulate General
- Governor Osama Al Fouly delivers remarks
- VIPs on stage proceed to the left side of the stage and unveil the plaque
- HRC, accompanied by CG Putnam, greets VIP guests

6 15 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL ALEXANDRIA MEET AND GREET**
6 35 pm Consulate General Building
PRESS TBD

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
CG Putnam
Approximately 30 employees and family members

- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC delivers remarks and greets consulate staff
- HRC proceeds to the grand staircase for a group photo with consulate staff, Ambassador Patterson, and AAS Jones

6 40 pm **DEPART** US Consulate
En route Borg al Arab Airport
[drive time 30 minutes]

7 10 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
Consul General Putnam
General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

7 20 pm **DEPART** Alexandria, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Tel Aviv, Israel
[flight time 1 hour, 5 minutes, 2 hours, 5 minutes]

Note Same manifest as previous leg

9 25 pm **ARRIVE** Ben Gurion International Airport

Note Open press arrival, no interpretation

Greeters Ambassador Dan Shapiro
Ms. Julie Fisher, Ambassador Shapiro's spouse
Lt Gen Mike Moeller, U S Security Coordinator
Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the U S
Tayla Lador-Fresher, Chief of State Protocol

9 35 pm **DEPART** Ben Gurion International Airport
En route David Citadel Hotel, Jerusalem
[drive time 45 minutes]

10 20 am **ARRIVE** David Citadel Hotel

HRC RON Jerusalem, Israel

b6 per DOS

Weather
Cairo, Egypt: Mostly sunny, 100/77
Alexandria, Egypt: Mostly sunny, 93/77
Jerusalem, Israel: Sunny, 90/72

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Sherman, Wendy R
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 7 03 PM
To: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

Thanks. At airport, through security Marg, great decision to drive. Thank you.

From: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:42 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

From: Valmore, Lona J
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM
To: Valmore, Lona J; S_S-FinalSchedule; Kidwell, Michael R; Degory, John A
Cc: 'tkrinvic'; 'Justin'; 'Jor'; 'doud'; 'Laura'; 'hannah'; 'schlichter'; 'msteenburg'; 'jzimmerebner'; 'oscar'; 'ccanssiev'; 'dcheng'; 'blurie'; Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S; 'Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdhir, Kamala S;
Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8 35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
En route Min stry of Defense
[drive time 35 minutes]

9 10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters Major General Nabil Mohandas,
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense
Major General Mohamed El Assar,
Assistant to the Minister of Defense
Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief, American Relations
Branch

9 15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**
10 15 am Field Marshall's Office
CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note. Consecutive interpretation

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AAS Jones
 VADM Harris
 Mr. Simon
 Mr. Spence
 Mr. Sullivan
 Ms. Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
 Field Marshall Tantawi
 Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
 En route Flat6Labs
 [drive time 35 minutes]

10 55 am **ARRIVE** Flat6Labs

Greeters: Mr. Ramez Mohamed, CEO, Flat6Labs
 Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawari Ventures Managing Partner

11 00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**
11 45 am Flat6Labs
 OPEN PRESS

Note. Consecutive interpretation.

Participants. HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 Ms. Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
 Mr. Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawari Ventures
 Mr. Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr. Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr. Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11 50 am **DEPART** Flat6Labs
 En route US Embassy
 [drive time 15 minutes]

12 05 pm **ARRIVE** US Embassy

12 10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**
1.10 pm Meeting Room
 CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note. No interpretation

Participants. HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AAS Jones
 A/S Posner
 Rev. Mounir Anis
 Bishop Nicola Antonios

Mr Ihab Azziz
 Rev Safwat El Baiady
 Ms Mona Makram Ebeid
 Father Rafiq Greish
 Mr Ramy Lakah
 Bishop Morcos
 Mr Michael Mounir
 Ms Georgette Kalini
 Mr Yousef Sidhom
 Ms Laila Takla

- Ambassador Patterson introduces HRC to the participants.
- HRC takes her seat
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks
- HRC welcomes guests and invites discussion, which will be moderated by Ambassador Patterson

1 30 pm
 2 30 pm

TEA w/EGYPTIAN LEADERS

Ambassador's Residence

CAMERA SPRAY (at the top)

Note No interpretation

Participants HRC
 Ambassador Patterson
 AA/S Jones
 A/S Posner
 Ms Amany Asfour
 Ms Maha Abol-Ezz
 Ms Tayseer Fahmy
 Ms Mozn Hassan
 Ms Angie Helmi
 Ms Laila Iskandar
 Ms Gameela Ismail
 Ms Nehad Aboul Komsan
 Ms Afaf Maraie
 Ms. Heba Morayef
 Ms Nevine Al Tahry
 Amb Mervat Tallawy
 Ms Ghada Waly
 Ms Dalia Ziada

- Ambassador Patterson introduces SECRETARY CLINTON to the participants and they take their seats
- Ambassador Patterson delivers brief welcome remarks and introduces HRC
- HRC welcomes guests and opens the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Patterson

2 50 pm
 3 10 pm

MEET AND GREET w/EMBASSY CAIRO

Courtyard (outdoor venue)

OPEN PRESS (traveling press only)

Note No interpretation Approximately 450 employees and family members attending

3 15 pm

DEPART Embassy

En route Cairo International Airport
 [drive time 45 minutes]

4 00 pm ARRIVE Cairo International Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
Ambassador Sami Shoukrey,
Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
Mr. El Hussein Abdelwahab, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs

4.10 pm **DEPART** Cairo, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Alexandria, Egypt
[flight time: 45 minutes]

Manifest: HRC
Joanna Biddle, AFP
Margaret Brennan, CBS
[redacted]
John Degory, S/ES-S
[redacted]
Katherine Gouette, Bloomberg
Thomas Giusto, ABC
Monica Hanley
Harry Harris Jr, JCS
Eric Kerchner, ABC
Michael Kidwell, S/ES-S
Brad Klapper, AP
[redacted]
Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post
Nick Merrill
Arshad Mohammed, Reuters
Tuli Mushingi
Victoria Nuland
Kurt Olsson
Shilpa Pesaru, S/CPR
Pam Quanrud
Philippe Reines
Megan Rooney
Dan Schwerin
Brendan Smialowski, AFP
Scott Stearns, VOA
Jake Sullivan
[redacted]
Virginia Vicario, ABC
Ashley Yehl
Dr. Monte Makous
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Business Week
Huma Abedin
[redacted]
Kim Ghattas, BBC
Anne Elizabeth Jones, NEA
Reem Khoshnevisan, A/LS
Elise Labott, CNN
Anne Patterson, NEA
Steven Simon, NSC
[redacted]

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

4 55 pm ARRIVE Borg al Arab Airport

Greeters Consul General Candace Putnam
General Khalid Mohy ed-Din, Head of Agami District
General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

5 05pm **DEPART** Borg al Arab Airport
En route Consulate General Alexandria
[drive time 30 minutes]

5 35 pm **ARRIVE** Consulate General Alexandria

Greeters Ms Bridgette Walker, Deputy Consul General
Dr Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

5:40 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL FLAG-RAISING CEREMONY**
6 10 pm US Consulate
OPEN PRESS

Note Simultaneous interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
Consul General Putnam
Dr Osama Al Fouly, Governor of Alexandria

- HRC takes her seat onstage with Ambassador Patterson and other VIPs
- CG Putnam opens the event and welcomes guests
- National anthems of Egypt and the United States are played
- CG Putnam introduces HRC.
- HRC proceeds to the podium and delivers remarks
- Marines lower the flag, symbolically closing the American Center, and then raise a different flag, re-opening the Consulate General
- Governor Osama Al Fouly delivers remarks
- VIPs on stage proceed to the left side of the stage and unveil the plaque
- HRC, accompanied by CG Putnam, greets VIP guests

6 15 pm **CONSULATE GENERAL ALEXANDRIA MEET AND GREET**
6 35 pm Consulate General Building
PRESS TBD

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
CG Putnam
Approximately 30 employees and family members

- CG Putnam introduces HRC
- HRC delivers remarks and greets consulate staff
- HRC proceeds to the grand staircase for a group photo with consulate staff, Ambassador Patterson, and AA/S Jones

6 40 pm **DEPART** US Consulate
En route Borg al Arab Airport
[drive time 30 minutes]

7 10 pm **ARRIVE** Borg al Arab Airport

Note Open press departure

Farewell Ambassador Patterson
Consul General Putnam
General Hani Rashad, Director of Borg al Arab Airport

7 20 pm **DEPART** Alexandria, Egypt via Air Force Aircraft Tail #90003
En route Tel Aviv, Israel
[flight time 1 hour, 5 minutes, 2 hours, 5 minutes]

Note Same manifest as previous leg

9 25 pm **ARRIVE** Ben Gurion International Airport

Note Open press arrival, no interpretation

Greeters Ambassador Dan Shapiro
Ms Julie Fisher, Ambassador Shapiro's spouse
Lt Gen Mike Moeller, U.S Security Coordinator
Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the U S
Tayla Lador-Fresher, Chief of State Protocol

9 35 pm **DEPART** Ben Gurion International Airport
En route David Citadel Hotel, Jerusalem
[drive time 45 minutes]

10 20 am **ARRIVE** David Citadel Hotel

HRC RON Jerusalem, Israel

b6 per DOS

Weather
Cairo, Egypt Mostly sunny, 100/77
Alexandria, Egypt Mostly sunny, 93/77
Jerusalem, Israel Sunny, 90/72

Lakhdhir, Kamala S

From: Lakhdhir, Kamala S
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 6:43 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R
Cc: Morris, Margo T
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th
Attachments: July 15 12 final doc

From: Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Saturday, July 14, 2012 06:40 PM
To: Valmoro, Lona J; S, S-FinalSchedule; Kidwell, Michael R; Decary, John A
Cc: 'tkrinvid'; 'justin'; 'Jon'; 'doug'; 'laura'; 'hannah'; 'jschlichter'; 'msteenburc'; 'zimmerebner'; 'oscar'; 'cganssley'; 'dcheng'; 'blurie'; 'Pesaru, Shilpa; Zeya, Uzra S'; 'Huma@clintonemail.com' <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Meier, Edward F; Lakhdhir, Kamala S;
Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday July 15th

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

The information contained in this email is not to be shared, forwarded or duplicated.

PREV RON Cairo, Egypt

8:35 am **DEPART** Four Seasons Hotel
En route Ministry of Defense
[drive time: 35 minutes]

9:10 am **ARRIVE** Ministry of Defense

Greeters: Major General Nabil Mohandas,
Secretary General, Ministry of Defense
Major General Mohamed El Assar,
Assistant to the Minister of Defense
Major General Ahmed Moataz, Chief, American Relations
Branch

9:15 am **MEETING w/EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHALL TANTAWI**
10:15 am Field Marshall's Office
CLOSED PRESS (official photographers only)

Note: Consecutive interpretation

Participants: HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AAS Jones
VADM Harris
Mr. Simon

Mr Spence
Mr Sullivan
Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Field Marshall Tantawi
Others Tbd

10 20 am **DEPART** Ministry of Defense
En route Flat6Labs
[drive time 35 minutes]

10 55 am **ARRIVE** Flat6Labs

Greeters Mr Ramez Mohamed, CEO, Flat6Labs
Hany Al-Sonbaty, Sawari Ventures Managing Partner

11 00 am **FLAT6LABS SITE VISIT**
11 45 am Flat6Labs
OPEN PRESS

Note: Consecutive interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
Ms Reem Nuseibeh, Interpreter
Mr Hany Al-Sonbaty, Managing Partner, Sawari Ventures
Mr. Ramez Mohammed, Flat6Labs CEO

- Flat6Labs CEO Ramez Mohammed and key investor Hany Al-Sonbaty welcome HRC
- Mr Al Sonbaty gives HRC an overview of Flat6Labs
- Mr Mohammed introduces HRC to a number of project teams present at the lab and gives a brief tour of the lab's teaching spaces

11 50 am **DEPART** Flat6Labs
En route US Embassy
[drive time 15 minutes]

12 05 pm **ARRIVE** US Embassy

12.10 pm **ROUNDTABLE w/CHRISTIAN LEADERS**
1:10 pm Meeting Room
CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP

Note: No interpretation

Participants HRC
Ambassador Patterson
AA/S Jones
A/S Posner
Rev Mounir Anis
Bishop Nicola Antonios
Mr Ihab Azziz
Rev Safwat El Baiady
Ms Mona Makram Ebeid
Father Rafiq Greish
Mr Ramy Lakah
Bishop Morcos
Mr Michael Mounir
Ms. Georgette Kalini

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI, PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI, PA# 1353814 000

Total Deleted Page(s) 11
Page 8 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 9 ~ OTHER DOS Reading Room C06131/628&C06180628-F 2016-07895;
Page 21 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 22 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 23 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 24 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 25 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 26 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 27 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 28 ~ b5 - per DOS,
Page 29 ~ b5 - per DOS,

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
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CONFIDENTIAL

DECL: 08/21/2019

The Secretary's Call Sheet for
German Foreign Minister Frank Steinmeier
Time and Date TBD

Purpose of Call: Steinmeier has asked to speak with you about the deal to sell 55% of General Motors holdings in the troubled German car-maker, Opel.

- **Opel:** We understand the significance of this issue for German industry and German workers. Treasury is the lead agency on this issue, and has been in close contact with the Chancellery and the Ministry of the Economy. However, any decision will be made independently by GM based on commercial considerations. The United States Government does not play an active role nor do we have a position on any particular bid.

Background: An independent trust fund, made up of representatives of GM and the German government has been weighing bids from several interested parties on a controlling interest in GM's holdings in Opel. The German Government has come out strongly in favor of a bid by Canadian Auto Parts Manufacturer Magna (in association with Russian Sberbank – 60% government owned – and Gaz, a car maker and direct GM competitor in the Russian market) and has offered 4.5 billion Euro in financing contingent on acceptance of Magna's bid. The German government's support is likely based on its opinion that Magna, a car company, is committed to continuing to produce cars (and thus, preserve German jobs) rather than being merely a financial investment. GM is reportedly troubled with numerous conditions of the Magna bid, not least concerns regarding Russian access to its intellectual property. The rival bid is from the international investment firm RHJ(I) (a.k.a. Ripplewood). Steinmeier was an early supporter of Magna's bid and was very visible in the media, looking to carve out an electoral issue that would resonate with his party's union base. Chancellor Merkel, however, has recently co-opted the issue and has thrown the weight of the German Government behind the Magna bid. The Germans cancelled a call from Finance Minister Steinbrueck to Secretary Geithner scheduled earlier in the day ahead of the August 21 GM board of directors meeting. However, the GM board did not act on the Magna offer at that meeting. Steinmeier is likely doing the same; looking to remind voters that he did everything he could to preserve German jobs. Once a bid is endorsed by GM, the final decision about the fate of Opel will be made by the trust fund and reportedly will be by consensus. Early in the evolution of this issue (May) Steinmeier spoke to you by phone about possible US support for GM and the repercussions for Opel.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: A/S Philip H. Gordon
E.O. 12958, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

U:\Germany 2009\S-Steinmeier Call Sheet 8.21.09docx

Drafter: EUR/CE: Peter Schroeder, 7-2584

Approved: EUR/FO: Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon

Cleared: EUR/FO: Claire Pierangelo - ok
EEBOLA: WScholz - ok
Treasury: LKohler - ok
D/L: JButte-Dahl - info
P: TWaser - ok
S/P: DPittman - ok
D/S: AScanlon - ok


b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B5

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, June 20, 2010 8:47 AM
To: H
Subject: Hague

b5 per DOS

Purpose of Call



From: Mills, Cheryl D' <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: 10/4/2009 3:18:10 PM +00:00
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
CC: Sullivan, Jacob J' <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Subject: Draft Holbrooke Team
Attachments: Pak Paper 10-03dcjs.docx

HRC:

team
7960

Attached is the draft memo in its current state from the Holbrooke team (it does not yet include RCH's hand edits which he just sent in).

As you will see, the beginning of this memo lays out 4 strategic interests, 3 of which overlap with the goals we discussed in our conversation; the fourth goes to the international consequences of success or failure.

Assuming we go with the approach we discussed, a cover memo should work reasonably well with this document (excepting the discussion on the foreign aid piece). See if you agree.

To actually see the document in its current form with showing edits - you need to print the attached version.

Below is the version that accepts all the proposed edits and eliminates the comments so you can read on BB if you choose.

cdm

DRAFT 10-03

b5 per DOS

4/5/1649
Serial

b6
b7c

HRC-8258

[REDACTED] (WF) (FBI)

From: Herrington, Mark H CIV OSD OGC (US) [mark.h.herrington2.civ@mail.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2016 3:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [U//FOUO] HRC Emails (B)(1) CLEAN
Attachments: 5759595.pdf, 5763972.pdf, 5764002.pdf, 5764642.pdf, 5767928.pdf, 5778578.pdf

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

I'm sending you two emails with the documents that DoD components asserted b(1) exemptions above those originally asserted by State in response to the FOIA litigation. This email contains the documents as sent to DoD from State. I don't see any of these as situations where the classification would have changed from the date they were created until now, so either secret or confidential (5778578) for the information redacted, which you will see in the next email.

Mark

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[REDACTED] - OCA - 49

b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D),B6

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
 Sent: Wednesday, September 9, 2009 6:07 AM
 To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
 Subject: Fw: Iran insights from [redacted]

b1 per DOS

1.4(D)
B1

Have you met Jackie? Pls. call and ask her to come in and discuss her insights w us at a time that I can stop by.

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: newmyer [redacted]
 To: H
 Sent: Tue Sep 08 08:52:10 2009
 Subject: Re: Iran insights from [redacted]

b6 per DOS

b1 per DOS

1.4(D)
B1

Secretary Clinton,

I will be in Washington for a day-long meeting on Thursday this week [redacted] and my travel plans are flexible, so I could meet you any time on Wednesday afternoon, after 5 pm on Thursday, or any time on Friday morning. If those times do not work, I would be happy to come down at your convenience.

b1 per DOS

All best, Jackie

Classified by DAS, A/GIS
 DoS on 10/30/2015 -
 Class CONFIDENTIAL -
 Reason 1.4(D) -
 Declassify on 09/07/2024

On Mon, Sep 7, 2009 at 4:06 PM, H<HDR22@clintonemail.com> wrote:
 > Jackie—I would like to discuss and will call to set up a time to do so. Thx.

> ----- Original Message -----

> From: newmyer [redacted]
 > To: H
 > Sent: Wed Sep 02 11:01:17 2009
 > Subject: Iran insights from [redacted]

b6 per DOS

b1 per DOS

> Secretary Clinton,

b1 per DOS

> Last week I traveled to Israel [redacted] in an Iran-related seminar and simulation exercise with the IDF general who is likely to become Israel's next chief of military intelligence and his team and, separately [redacted] Yesterday [redacted] an workshop in Washington involving DoD and think tank experts. Despite the fact that the meetings were with senior [redacted] personnel, there was universal sentiment that a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, on the one hand, and that incremental measures would be perceived by Iran as an indication of weakness, on the other.

> The conclusions of the conversations therefore tended to emphasize diplomatic measures targeted at Iranian elites' psychology, and non-conventional military options derivative of this psychological approach. Specific operational recommendations include:

> From the IDF meetings:

> — The post-election situation in Iran has reduced popular fear of the regime. At the same time, the Iranian people are not suicidal and seek ways of confronting the regime that do not put their lives at risk. Accordingly, a general strike or a strike among oil field workers that would, as in the period before the deposition of the shah, demonstrate the

01170

HRC-8260

weakness of the regime domestically while also starving it of resources. As in the period of Solidarity in Poland, American or, even better, European non-governmental groups could work with Iranian popular leaders to provide training and money to help them organize such strikes. A call to Bernard Kouchner or another European with a similar background (grass-roots political activism tied to transnational organizations) might be productive in this regard.

>
 > From the conversation with [REDACTED] ~~S~~ U b1 per DOS
 >
 > — If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, no single American/allied countermeasure will be adequate. Something like the "flexible response" posture from the Cold War will be required, necessitating a range of actions from enhancing the US deterrent presence — nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles in the Arabian Sea — to bolstering regional actors' defenses.

>
 > — Israeli leaders should be able to contain the damage to the Israeli population's morale from an Iranian bomb, but this will require careful management of public statements. There is a tension between building up support for action against the Iranian nuclear program now and delivering the kind of reassurance that will be necessary once the capability has been acquired.

>
 > From the DC workshop:

>
 > — Based on patterns of Iranian behavior in the past, there is reason to think that some diplomatic communications may serve to increase Iranian fears about the consequences of its pursuit of a nuclear capability. These messages, which could be delivered in the course of speeches or less formal interactions, would play on existing Iranian paranoia.

>
 > I would be happy to chat in person if you might have 15 minutes to discuss such measures, or any of the other points above.

>
 > Yours sincerely, and best, Jackie

> —
 > Jacqueline Newmyer
 > President, Long Term Strategy Group
 > 12 Eliot St. Cambridge, MA 02138

[REDACTED]
 > www.ltstrategy.com <<http://www.ltstrategy.com/>>

b6 per DOS

—
 Jacqueline Newmyer
 President, Long Term Strategy Group
 12 Eliot St. Cambridge, MA 02138

[REDACTED]
www.ltstrategy.com

b6 per DOS

B6

b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B5

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 1, 2009 4:26 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Honduras

Classified by DAS A GIS, DoS on
10/30/2015 Class CONFIDENTIAL
Reason 1.4(A), 1.4(D) Declassify
on 08/31/2034

Fyi

From: Kelly, Craig A
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: Shannon, Thomas A
Sent: Mon Aug 31 21:50:26 2009
Subject: Re: Honduras

Cheryl:

Thanks for sharing this.

B5

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

I know you have other concerns about the determination, but I just wanted to address the Pentagon angle. We have made all these points to JCS, OSD and Southcom.

Thanks,

✕

From: Mills, Cheryl D
To: Kelly, Craig A; Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Mon Aug 31 21:24:29 2009
Subject: Fw: Honduras

Fyi

From: Steinberg, James B
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Shannon, Thomas A; Koh, Harold Hongju
Sent: Mon Aug 31 17:35:17 2009
Subject: Honduras

Cheryl,

C05763972

I spoke with Michele Flournoy at DOD earlier today who confirmed that they still remain deeply concerned about the impact of a formal finding of a military coup in Honduras.

Jim

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2009 1:26 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: 9/1 Senior Staff and Deputies Meetings

From: Smith, Daniel B
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Tue Sep 01 12:33:05 2009
Subject: 9/1 Senior Staff and Deputies Meetings

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Somalia

- Cheryl noted that she needed to hear further from the Secretary on the proposed changes to the OFAC letter with respect to humanitarian assistance to Somalia and the potential for diversion. She indicated she would let Eric Schwartz know where things stand.

Afghanistan

- No one has yet seen the McChrystal Report.

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- Jack stressed his continued concern over funding for the transfer of police training responsibilities from Defense to State, noting that it remains "highly ambiguous." (The estimated cost is an initial \$500 million, with an additional \$700 million a year in expenses.) Defense is insisting it does not have money to transfer to State for this purpose, and the idea of a Supplemental is problematic, not the least because the timing would not coincide with the transfer of responsibilities. Jack is concerned that we will look like we are holding up the transfer.

b5 per DOS

B5

- Jim reported that there had been another meeting on Chinese tire imports yesterday where there was interagency agreement on the "first best option," but disagreement over other options. The Chinese are in town for negotiations and there will be another meeting tomorrow after the first round.

Baghdad Management Issues

b5 per DOS

- Eric Boswell noted that the Department would extend

- Eric also noted that the roof of the USAID building in Baghdad had collapsed.

Congressional Issues

- Rich said that he met with Senator DeMint yesterday to discuss the holds on Valenzuela and Shannon. Rich thinks DeMint is prepared to let Valenzuela go forward, but would like to speak to Jim Steinberg regarding Honduras. He will insist on a debate and roll call vote for Tom Shannon. DeMint apparently warned, however, that any "substantive change" in our current policy vis-à-vis Honduras would jeopardize both nominations.
- Codel Levin will be heading to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, but will not overlap with Jack Lew's stay in those places.

Legal Issues

- Harold said that one fallout from the renewed focus on Libya is that some former claimants are coming back seeking new relief.

Hurricane Jimena

- I noted that Hurricane Jimena is expected to make landfall in Baja early tomorrow morning as a powerful Category 4 or 5 Hurricane. Embassy Mexico City and Consulate General Tijuana have issued warden messages and Consular Affairs has put out a travel alert advising citizens to avoid the areas likely to be hit. Many hotels in the path of the storm have been largely evacuated, but there are still many Americans who could be affected. The Ops Center is in close touch with our missions in Mexico to monitor conditions.

Public Affairs

- PJ anticipates questions about Iran's alleged willingness to restart talks and whether the Secretary will meet with Zelaya.

Deputies Meeting Highlights

Sri Lanka

- The War Crimes Office said that the report to the Hill on alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka is due by September 21. They have prepared a 60-page draft which is now circulating for clearance. The report covers the period up to May, but Jack encouraged the Office to consider including later material if it would be helpful.

Pakistani Internally Displaced Persons

- Eric Schwartz said that the Op-ed in today's post by Morton Abramowitz criticizing the U.S. and Pakistan for allegedly forcing the return of IDPs into Swat and other areas is simply not true. Eric said he would call Mort to discuss this.

Export Controls

- Andrew Shapiro noted that the Interagency process aimed at "reforming" export controls gets underway today. The goal is to have something to present to Deputies in six weeks.

Brazilian Oil Development

- David Goldwyn said that Brazil's proposed regulations for developing its vast offshore petroleum reserves were disappointing. Brazil seems to have opted for a nationalist model that will substantially delay bringing on line the most promising non-OPEC source of oil in years.

H1N1

- OES reported that the Administration will release its report on H1N1 in the Southern Hemisphere today. The analysis of the virus in several developed countries in the region suggests that it has not mutated and that the vaccine being developed should be effective. It is still not clear, however, whether one or two doses will be required.

RELEASE IN PART
B1, B5, 1.4(A), B6

From: Shah, Rajiv (AID/A) <rshah [REDACTED]>
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 10:07 PM b6 per DOS
To: H; 'cheryl.mill [REDACTED]' B6
Cc: Fuchs, Michael H; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: Is there still a bottleneck at the airport? I'm listening to a doctor (Bob Hoff w Salvation Army) on NPR saying he is upset because they are running out of supplies and he keeps being told they are in the air.

I apologize for the delay in responding. We were planning for tomorrow's commodity lift.

Current status is that planes are landing at the airport but the Govt of Haiti is prioritizing and managing throughput and that makes its capacity very low and congestion very high.

[REDACTED]

1.4(A)
B1
B5

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

Raj

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 8:38 PM b6 per DOS
To: Shah, Rajiv (AID/A); 'cheryl.mill [REDACTED]'
Cc: Fuchs, Michael H; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Is there still a bottleneck at the airport? I'm listening to a doctor (Bob Hoff w Salvation Army) on NPR saying he is upset because they are running out of supplies and he keeps being told they are in the air.

Classified by DAS, A/GIS,
DoS on 10/30/2015 - Class:
CONFIDENTIAL - Reason:
1.4(A) - Declassify on:
01/14/2025

RELEASE IN PART
1.4(B),B1,1.4(D),B6

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 10:45 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help
Importance: High

Classification extended to
3/13/2031

Fyi

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
0229/2016 - Class. CONFIDENTIAL-
Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) - Declassify on:
03/13/2026

From: Jones, Deborah K
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 09:34 AM
To: Williams, Stephanie T

Leslie M Tsou; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J;
 Steinberg, James B; Wells, Alice G; Schlicher, Ronald L; Sanderson, Janet A; Bondy, Steven C;
 Denis R. McDonough; Dennis B. Ross
 Hood, Ludovic L; Puneet Talwar
 Lisa D Kenna; Sacmanus,
 Joseph E; S. Special Assistants; Catalano, Elsa; Nides, Thomas R; Antony J. Blinken
 Herro, K. Mustafa

Cc: Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Posner, Michael H; Olson, Richard G; Greene, Douglas C; Zlodeh, Susan L; Smith, James B;
 Crowley, Philip J; Djerassi, Alexander M; NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL; Holtz, Greta C (NEA); Wittes, Tamara C; Mull, Stephen
 D; SES-O; Williams, Thomas E; Schmliker, Richard J; LeBaron, Joseph E; Hurtado, L Victor (Muscat); Nantongo, Mamba
 L; Scobey, Margaret; Gray, Gordon
Subject: RE: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

1.4(B)
1.4(D)

B6

b6 per DOS

b1 per DOS

dj

Deborah K. Jones
 US Ambassador to the State of Kuwait
 jonesdk2@state.gov
 Tel: +965.2259-1227

SBU

b6
b7C

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: Herrington, Mark H CIV OSD OGC (US) [mark.h.herrington2.civ@mail.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2016 3:32 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [U//FOUO] HRC Emails (B)(1) CLEAN
Attachments: 5759595.pdf, 5763972.pdf, 5764002.pdf, 5764642.pdf, 5767928.pdf, 5778578.pdf

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Here are the DoD b(1) redactions that were asserted.

Vr/

Mark

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D),B6

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
 Sent: Wednesday, September 9, 2009 6:07 AM
 To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
 Subject: Fw: Iran insights from [redacted]

b1 per DOS

1.4(D)
B1

Have you met Jackie? Pls. call and ask her to come in and discuss her insights w us at a time that I can stop by.

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: newmyer [redacted]
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 Sent: Tue Sep 08 08:52:10 2009
 Subject: Re: Iran insights from [redacted]

b6 per DOS

b1 per DOS

1.4(D)
B1

Secretary Clinton,

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b1 per DOS

[redacted] and my travel plans are flexible, so I could meet you any time on Wednesday afternoon, after 5 pm on Thursday, or any time on Friday morning. If those times do not work, I would be happy to come down at your convenience.

All best, Jackie

Classified by DAS, A/GIS,
 DoS on 10/30/2015 - Class.
 CONFIDENTIAL - Reason:
 1.4(D) - Declassify on:
 09/07/2024

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 > Jackie—I would like to discuss and will call to set up a time to do so. Thx.

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> From: newmyer [redacted]
 > To: H
 > Sent: Wed Sep 02 11:01:17 2009
 > Subject: Iran Insights from [redacted]

b6 per DOS

b1 per DOS

> Secretary Clinton,

b1 per DOS

> Last week I traveled to Israel [redacted] an Iran-related seminar and simulation exercise with the IDF general who is likely to become Israel's next chief of military intelligence and his team and, separately, [redacted]

[redacted] Yesterday [redacted] Iran workshop in Washington involving OOD and think tank experts. Despite the fact that the [redacted]

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) USSC

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) & (e) USSC

> From the (b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) &

> — The post-election situation in Iran has reduced popular fear of the regime. At the same time, the Iranian people are not suicidal and seek ways of confronting the regime that do not put their lives at risk. Accordingly, [redacted] or a strike among oil field workers that would, as in the period before the deposition of the shah, [redacted]

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) & (e) USSC [redacted] while also starving it of resources. As in the period of Solidarity in Poland, American or, even better, European non-governmental groups could work with Iranian popular leaders to provide training and money to help them organize such strikes. (b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) & (e) USSC [redacted]

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) & (e) USSC [redacted]

>
 > From the conversation with [redacted] ~~C~~ ~~X~~ U. b1 per DOS
 >
 > — If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, (b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) USSC [redacted] Something like the "flexible response" posture from the Cold War will be required, necessitating a range of actions from (b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(a) & (b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(a) & (d) USSC [redacted] to bolstering regional actors' defenses.

>
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> — (b)(1) Sec. 1.4.(d) USSC [redacted]

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 > Jacqueline Newmyer

> President, Long Term Strategy Group

> 12 Eliot St., Cambridge, MA 02138

b6 per DOS

> www.ltstrategy.com <<http://www.ltstrategy.com/>>

>

Jacqueline Newmyer
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b6 per DOS

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B6

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B5

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To: H
Subject: Fw: Honduras

Fyi

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To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
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Subject: Re: Honduras

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
10/30/2015 -- Class.
CONFIDENTIAL -- Reason:
1.4(A), 1.4(D) -- Declassify on
8/31/2034

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B5

b1 per DOS

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Fyi

From: Steinberg, James B
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Shannon, Thomas A; Koh, Harold Hongju
Sent: Mon Aug 31 17:35:17 2009
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C05763972

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To: H
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From: Smith, Daniel B
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Tue Sep 01 12:33:05 2009
Subject: 9/1 Senior Staff and Deputies Meetings

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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- [REDACTED]
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- [REDACTED]

b5 per DOS

Baghdad Management Issues

- Eric Boswell noted that the Department would extend [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

B5

- Eric also noted that the roof of the USAID building in Baghdad had collapsed.

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Deputies Meeting Highlights

Sri Lanka

- The War Crimes Office said that the report to the Hill on alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka is due by September 21. They have prepared a 60-page draft which is now circulating for clearance. The report covers the period up to May, but Jack encouraged the Office to consider including later material if it would be helpful.

Pakistani Internally Displaced Persons

- (b)(1),(b)(5)

Export Controls

- Andrew Shapiro noted that the interagency process aimed at "reforming" export controls gets underway today. The goal is to have something to present to Deputies in six weeks.

Brazilian Oil Development

- David Goldwyn said that Brazil's proposed regulations for developing its vast offshore petroleum reserves were disappointing. Brazil seems to have opted for a nationalist model that will substantially delay bringing on line the most promising non-OPEC source of oil in years.

H1N1

- OES reported that the Administration will release its report on H1N1 in the Southern Hemisphere today. The analysis of the virus in several developed countries in the region suggests that it has not mutated and that the vaccine being developed should be effective. It is still not clear, however, whether one or two doses will be required.

b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B6

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, September 20, 2009 12:46 PM
To: H
Subject: RE: Burma meeting

[redacted] but I will verify that.

b5 per DOS

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 20, 2009 12:44 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Burma meeting

Ok but pls explain when we meet what the problems were. Also, what's status of Sudan policy? [redacted]

b5 per DOS

----- Original Message -----

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H
Cc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Sep 20 12:31:08 2009
Subject: Burma meeting

Classified by DAS, A/G S, DoS on
10/30/2015 - Class CONFIDENTIAL -
Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) - Declassify
on: 09/20/2019

B5

b5 per DOS

[redacted] The proposed building blocks for your remarks are below.

b5 per DOS

If you agree, we will move forward. If you disagree, we will use Monday and Tuesday to get our ducks in a row.

Building Blocks for Secretary Clinton's Remarks

Group of Friends of Burma Ministerial

Hosted by the UN Secretary General Ban, Sept. 23, 2009

06538

15-LC-0010/State/89

HRC-8279

b5 per DOS

Legal Issues

- Harold reported on two matters: Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (on humane treatment), where DoD would like to make a positive senior level comment and Additional Protocol II which was submitted by the Reagan Administration for ratification and consent in 1987, but has sat in the Senate since. DoD thinks it is time to make this a higher priority. Jim cautioned that we need to coordinate closely with the W/H on this, especially with the legislative affairs folks who may think the timing is not ideal.

Assistant Secretaries MeetingGates/Barak Meeting

- PM reported that SecDef Gates meeting with Israeli DefMin Barak had gone well. (b)(1) 1.4 b,(b)(1) 1.4 d,(b)(5)
(b)(1) 1.4 b,(b)(1) 1.4 d,(b)(5)

Human Rights Council

- IO said that we hoped to have guidance out on responding to the Goldstone Report later today after the President meets with Netanyahu.

Afghan Strategy

-

b5 per DOS

Refugee Issues

- Eric Schwartz said that he will represent the USG at the UNRWA at 60 event on Wednesday. Also noted that PRM is keeping a close eye on Yemen, where the number of IDPs has reached an estimated 100,000 persons.

06539

RELEASE IN PART
B1, B5, 1.4(A), B6

b5 per DOS

From: Shah, Rajiv (AID/A) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 10:07 PM b6 per DOS
To: H; 'cheryl.mills' [REDACTED]
Cc: Fuchs, Michael H; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: Is there still a bottleneck at the airport? I'm listening to a doctor (Bob Hoff w Salvation Army) on NPR saying he is upset because they are running out of supplies and he keeps being told they are in the air.

B6

I apologize for the delay in responding. We were planning for tomorrow's commodity lift.

Current status is that planes are landing at the airport but the Govt of Haiti is prioritizing and managing throughput and that makes its capacity very low and congestion very high.

(b)(1) 1.4 a, (b)(5)

1.4(A)
B1
B5

Rmj

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 8:38 PM b6 per DOS
To: Shah, Rajiv (AID/A); 'cheryl.mills' [REDACTED]
Cc: Fuchs, Michael H; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Is there still a bottleneck at the airport? I'm listening to a doctor (Bob Hoff w Salvation Army) on NPR saying he is upset because they are running out of supplies and he keeps being told they are in the air.

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
10/30/2015 - Class CONFIDENTIAL -
Reason: 1.4(A) - Declassify on
01/14/2025

C05778578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART
1.4(B), 1.4(D), B6

b5 per DOS

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJ@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 10:45 AM
To: H
Subject: For: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

Importance: High

Classified by DAS, A/GIS DoS on
2/29/2016 -- Class CONFIDENTIAL --
Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D) -- Declassify on
3/13/2026

Pyl

From: Jones, Deborah K
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 09:34 AM
To: Williams, Stephanie T

Classification extended to 3/13 2031

[REDACTED] Elman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J;
Steinberg, James B; Wells, Alice G; Schlicher, Ronald L; Sanderson, Janet A; Bondy, Steven C;

B6

[REDACTED] Hood, Ludovic L; [REDACTED] Macmenul,
Joseph E. S. Special Assistants: Catalano, Elka; Niles, Thomas R; [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

cc: Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Posner, Michael H; Olson, Richard G; Greene, Douglas C; Zideh, Susan L; Smith, James B;
Crowley, Philip J; Djerassi, Alexander M; NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL; Holtz, Greta C (NEA); Wittes, Tamara C; Mull, Stephen
D; SES-O; Williams, Thomas E; Schriener, Richard J; LaBaron, Joseph E; Hurtado, L Victor (Muscat); Nantongo, Mganbe
L; Scobey, Margaret; Gray, Gordon

1.4(B)

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

dj

Deborah K. Jones

US Ambassador to the State of Kuwait
jonesdk2@state.gov
Tel: +965.2259-1227

CLASSIFIED BY: DASD (ISA/MID) A. EXUM
REASON: E.O. 13526, Section 1.4(d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02/24/2026

[Signature]

SBU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28393

HRC-8282

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Tsou, Leslie

Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:01 PM

To: 'feltmanjd@state.gov'; 'JonesDK2@state.gov'; 'SullivanJJ@state.gov'; 'BurnsWJ@state.gov'; 'SteinbergJB@state.gov'; 'WellsAG@state.gov'; 'SchlicherRL@state.gov'; 'SandersonJA@state.gov'; 'BondySC@state.gov'; McDonough, Denis R.; Ross, Dennis B.; 'WilliamsST2@state.gov'; 'HoodLL@state.gov'; Tahwar, Puneet; [REDACTED] Kenna, Lisa; 'MacmanusJE@state.gov'; 'S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov'; 'CatalanoE@state.gov'; 'NidesTR@state.gov'; Blinken, Antony J.; Mustafa, Herro K.; Brennan, John O.

b6 per DOS

B6

Cc: 'Barks-RugglesEJ@state.gov'; 'PosnerMH@state.gov'; 'olsonrg@state.gov'; 'GreeneDC@state.gov'; 'ZiadahSL@state.gov'; 'SmithJB2@state.gov'; 'CrowleyPJ@state.gov'; 'DjerassiAM@state.gov'; 'NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov'; 'HoltzGC@state.gov'; 'WittesTC@state.gov'; 'NullSD@state.gov'; 'SES-O@state.gov'; 'WilliamsTE@state.gov'; 'SchmiererRJ@state.gov'; 'LeBaronJE@state.gov'; 'HurtadolV@state.gov'; 'NantongoML@state.gov'; 'ScobeyMM@state.gov'; 'GrayG2@state.gov'

Subject: Re: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

+ John Brennan, this time with him

From: Tsou, Leslie

To: 'feltmanjd@state.gov' <feltmanjd@state.gov>; 'JonesDK2@state.gov' <JonesDK2@state.gov>; 'SullivanJJ@state.gov' <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; 'BurnsWJ@state.gov' <BurnsWJ@state.gov>; 'SteinbergJB@state.gov' <SteinbergJB@state.gov>; 'WellsAG@state.gov' <WellsAG@state.gov>; 'SchlicherRL@state.gov' <SchlicherRL@state.gov>; 'SandersonJA@state.gov' <SandersonJA@state.gov>; 'BondySC@state.gov' <BondySC@state.gov>; McDonough, Denis R.; Ross, Dennis B.; 'WilliamsST2@state.gov' <WilliamsST2@state.gov>; 'HoodLL@state.gov' <HoodLL@state.gov>; [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

[REDACTED] Kenna, Lisa; 'MacmanusJE@state.gov' <MacmanusJE@state.gov>; 'S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov' <S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; 'CatalanoE@state.gov' <CatalanoE@state.gov>; 'NidesTR@state.gov' <NidesTR@state.gov>; Blinken, Antony J.; Mustafa, Herro K.
Cc: 'Barks-RugglesEJ@state.gov' <Barks-RugglesEJ@state.gov>; 'PosnerMH@state.gov' <PosnerMH@state.gov>; 'olsonrg@state.gov' <olsonrg@state.gov>; 'GreeneDC@state.gov' <GreeneDC@state.gov>; 'ZiadahSL@state.gov' <ZiadahSL@state.gov>; 'SmithJB2@state.gov' <SmithJB2@state.gov>; 'CrowleyPJ@state.gov' <CrowleyPJ@state.gov>; 'DjerassiAM@state.gov' <DjerassiAM@state.gov>; 'NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov' <NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL@state.gov>; 'HoltzGC@state.gov' <HoltzGC@state.gov>; 'WittesTC@state.gov' <WittesTC@state.gov>; 'NullSD@state.gov' <NullSD@state.gov>; 'SES-O@state.gov' <SES-O@state.gov>; 'WilliamsTE@state.gov' <WilliamsTE@state.gov>; 'SchmiererRJ@state.gov' <SchmiererRJ@state.gov>; 'LeBaronJE@state.gov' <LeBaronJE@state.gov>; 'HurtadolV@state.gov' <HurtadolV@state.gov>; 'NantongoML@state.gov' <NantongoML@state.gov>; 'ScobeyMM@state.gov' <ScobeyMM@state.gov>; 'GrayG2@state.gov' <GrayG2@state.gov>

Sent: Sun Mar 13 12:59:29 2011

Subject: Re: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

+ John Brennan

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D <FeltmanJD@state.gov>

To: Feltman, Jeffrey D <FeltmanJD@state.gov>; Jones, Deborah K <JonesDK2@state.gov>; Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Burns, William J <BurnsWJ@state.gov>; Steinberg, James B <SteinbergJB@state.gov>; Wells, Alice G <WellsAG@state.gov>; Schlicher, Ronald L <SchlicherRL@state.gov>; Sanderson, Janet A <SandersonJA@state.gov>; Bondy, Steven C <BondySC@state.gov>; McDonough, Denis R.; Ross, Dennis B.; Williams, Stephanie T <WilliamsST2@state.gov>; Hood, Ludovic L <HoodLL@state.gov>; Tahwar, Puneet; [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

[REDACTED] Tsou, Leslie; Kenna, Lisa; Macmanus, Joseph E <MacmanusJE@state.gov>; 'S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov' <S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>; Catalano, Elsa <CatalanoE@state.gov>; Nides, Thomas R <NidesTR@state.gov>; Blinken, Antony J.; Mustafa, Herro K.

Cc: Barks-Ruggles, Erica J <Barks-RugglesEJ@state.gov>; Posner, Michael H <PosnerMH@state.gov>; Olson, Richard G <olsonrg@state.gov>; Greene, Douglas C <GreeneDC@state.gov>; Ziadah, Susan L <ZiadahSL@state.gov>; Smith, James B <SmithJB2@state.gov>; Crowley, Philip J <CrowleyPJ@state.gov>; Djerassi, Alexander M

26395

CONFIDENTIAL

HRC-8284

CONFIDENTIAL

b1 per DOS

(SBU) Saudi Ambassador Adel Iqbal called back

86

b6 per DOS

Subject: RE: ABZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

b6 per DOS

Subject: Re: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

Deborah K. Jonas, US Ambassador to the State of Kuwait

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28396

HRC-8285

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D

To: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J; Steinberg, James B; Wells, Alice G; Schlicher, Ronald L; Sanderson, Janet A; Bondy, Steven C; 'McDonough, Denis R.'; [REDACTED] Ross, Dennis B.

B6

[REDACTED] Williams, Stephanie T; Hood, [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

[REDACTED] Macmanus, Joseph E; S. Special Assistants; Catalano, Elise; Nides, Thomas R; Blinken, Antony J; [REDACTED] Mustafa, Herro K.

Cc: Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Posner, Michael H; Olson, Richard G; Greene, Douglas C; Zideh, Susan L; Smith, James B; Crowley, Philip J; Djerassi, Alexander M; NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL; Holtz, Greta C (NEA); Wittes, Tamara C; Mull, Stephen D; SES-O; Jones, Deborah K; Williams, Thomas E; Schmieder, Richard J; LeBaron, Joseph E; Hurtado, L Victor (Muscat); Nantongo, Miremba L; Scobey, Margaret; Gray, Gordon

Sent: Sun Mar 13 18:56:16 2011

Subject: RE: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

(SBU) Saudi Ambassador Adel Jubeir called back. He said that the forces used will be Saudi National Guard, and he expects others from the GCC to participate. He did not know the numbers. He said that he believes that the purpose is moral support as much as anything. We had the same sort of conversation I had with AbZ - discussion about the human rights/violence aspects and the fact that moderate Shia will be politically undermined by this. I cautioned him that violence could cause a U.S.-Saudi crisis.

(SBU) He distinguished the troops going in "today" from what is now on the causeway. He said that there were Bahraini demonstrators trying to close the causeway and that Saudi police have been there 6-7 hours as a result of the demonstrators.

(SBU) Adel said that Prince Saud, Saudi FM, is trying to reach Secretary Clinton to discuss this.

(SBU) I noted that I was traveling to Bahrain, and he did not react.

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D

Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:37 AM

To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Burns, William J; Steinberg, James B; Wells, Alice G; Schlicher, Ronald L; Sanderson, Janet A; Bondy, Steven C; 'McDonough, Denis R.'; Ross, Dennis B.; Williams, Stephanie T; Hood, [REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

[REDACTED] Macmanus, Joseph E; S. Special Assistants; Catalano, Elise; Nides, Thomas R; Blinken, Antony J.; Mustafa, Herro K.

Cc: Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Posner, Michael H; Olson, Richard G; Greene, Douglas C; Zideh, Susan L; Smith, James B; Crowley, Philip J; Djerassi, Alexander M; NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL; Holtz, Greta C (NEA); Wittes, Tamara C; Mull, Stephen D; SES-O; Jones, Deborah K; Williams, Thomas E; Schmieder, Richard J; LeBaron, Joseph E; Hurtado, L Victor (Muscat); Nantongo, Miremba L; Scobey, Margaret; Gray, Gordon

Subject: AbZ: Saudi and UAE forces responding to Bahraini request for help

(SBU) UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed just confirmed to me that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are sending troops into Bahrain, which he says was requested by the Bahraini government today. (I also have requested Saudi Ambassador Adel Jubeir to get back to me with the Saudi explanation.) He confirmed that troops are on the causeway to Bahrain and will enter Bahrain.

(SBU) I asked what he expected to accomplish. The basic answer is that the UAE is responding to the call to restore order. I raised the human rights concerns and my sense that Saudi and Emirati troops would provoke the hardline Shia into further action and undermine the moderate Shia, who will have no choice but to react in the same way as the hardliners. I noted that the UAE does not have a history of street protests, so I expressed (C)

28397

CONFIDENTIAL

HRC-8286

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

concern about the ability to avoid violence. He said that the UAE wasn't entering to kill people. AbZ also said that the King of Bahrain had extended his hand "too long" and that the other GCC countries would not stand by and watch others take Bahrain hostage. I asked about other GCC participation; he implied others might join, but he was non-committal. I said that, if there was violence, there could be a crisis with us; he said he understood, but that this was an internal GCC matter. I warned him that we would have to say something publicly. AbZ didn't say this explicitly, but it sure sounded, from everything that he said, that the GCC countries have had it with the demonstrations in Manama. (Ops, I wasn't taking notes, but I think this captures his major points, yes?) (C) X

(SBU) AbZ also advised me not to go to Bahrain tomorrow as planned. (I leave here in a few hours.) He added that he didn't expect big problems tomorrow. (Bahraini FM Sheikh Khalid also told the Embassy in Manama earlier that I should not travel; now we know why.)

(SBU) For my travel, I am going to proceed and try to get to Bahrain. If there is a crisis there tomorrow, I should be there to support our Embassy's work. But Embassy Kuwait: can you be prepared to receive me, if the United flight (which stops in Kuwait) is prevented from going on to Bahrain? I could see that happening.

(SBU) Jake Sullivan: depending on what happens in Bahrain, I may be forced to stay in the Gulf rather than meet up with S in Cairo and Tunisia.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] (WF) (FBI)

From: Herrington, Mark H CIV OSD OGC (US) [mark.h.herrington2.civ@mail.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2016 3:34 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE [U//FOUO] HRC Emails (B)(1) CLEAN

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

I will send you the indexes for the other documents on JWICS tomorrow. The vast majority do not contain classified DoD equities. We have some suggestions for where else to send some, if you haven't already, and there is a handful that I plan to have particular components in DoD review further.

Mark

-----Original Message-----

From: Herrington, Mark H CIV OSD OGC (US)
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2016 3:32 PM
To: [redacted] (WF) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: FW: [U//FOUO] HRC Emails (B)(1) CLEAN

b6
b7C

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Here are the DoD b(1) redactions that were asserted.

Vr/

Mark

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI, PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI, PA# 1353814 000

Total Deleted Page(s) 4
Page 16 ~ b5 per DOS,
Page 22 ~ b5 per DOS,
Page 26 ~ b5 per DOS,
Page 45 ~ b1 per DOS,

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 11/26/2010 11:59:00 AM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: MbZ call - 7:15am

Classified by Director
A.GIS/IPS, Acting. DoS on
11/3/2016 Class
CONFIDENTIAL Reason
1.4(B), 1.4(D) -- Declassify
on: 11/26/2030

In addition to note from Jeff I emailed and faxed you. Reminder Jeff spoke with Abz yesterday and Yousef has been in regular touch with many of us:

The Secretary's Call Sheet for UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed

b5 per DOS

Purpose of Call:

Background

b1 per DOS

HRC-8603

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	-719849639
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-5
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

From: Huma Abed.n
Sent: 8/10/2012 10 56 21 PM +00 00
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Updates

you must be exhausted so i will save all updates for when you get back.
for tomorrow:

- we have done the best we can putting together the activists and refugee meetings. Beth met with both groups today and can give you best brief tomorrow morning about what to expect.
- reminder that we have no press planned for either meeting since both groups have conveyed nervousness about press. we are going with the cairo plan meaning philippe will be in the room. if people are comfortable with photo or press we will decide then.
- davutoglu was more reluctant to join refugees that we had thought but he confirmed today he will be there.
- gul and erdogan are usual unpredictable meetings. both want restricted so you see the smaller manifest. phil gordon is there. liz sherwood randall sent her Turkey director Meghan as well fyi.

Message Headers:

b6 per DOS

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2012 18:56:21 -0400
Subject: Updates

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:

true
-1721702392

HRC-8605

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-3	
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true	b6 per DOS
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1	
PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:		

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 11/26/2010 11:50:13 AM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Karzai - 9:45

Classified by Director
A/GIS/IPS, Acting, DoS on
11/3/2016 -- Class
CONFIDENTIAL -- Reason:
1.4(D) -- Declassify on:
11/26/2025

b5 per DOS


The Secretary's Call Sheet for Afghan President Hamid Karzai

Purpose of Call:

HRC-8607



Background



~~U~~
U

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:

true

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:

-1800459690

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:

-5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

1

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 8/14/2011 3:42:02 AM +00:00


To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Davutoglu

This is same as call sheet you got friday before you left:
The Secretary's Call Sheet for
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu [dah-voot-OH-loo]

b5 per DOS





PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 256821089

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

From: H

Sent: 11/26/2011 9 55 22 PM +00 00

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Re khar

Can you call me?

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2011 04:17 PM
To: H
Subject: khar

b5 per DOS

The Secretary's Call Sheet for Pakistan FM Hina Rabbani Khar



Message Headers:

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Nov 2011 16:55:22 -0500
Subject: Re: khar

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:
PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

true
-1966892361
-3
true
true
1

From: "Hanley Monica R" <HanleyMR@state.gov>

Sent: 10/21/2012 12:07:20 PM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

CC: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Subject: 9am Mikati Call Sheet
Classified by DAS A.C.S., DoS on 2/29/2016 -- Class CONFIDENTIAL
Reason 1.4(D) 10/21/2027

[REDACTED] We
will keep you posted.

b5 per DOS

The Secretary's Call Sheet for
Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati [naa-jeeb mee-kot-ee]
Sunday, October 21, 2012


[REDACTED] b5 per DOS

U

X

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS


HRC-8614



~~U~~ U

Message Headers:

b6 per DOS



[Redacted]
From: "Hanley, Monica R" <HanleyMR@state.gov>
To: <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
CC: <huma@clintonemail.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Oct 2012 12:07:22.0435 (UTC)

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:
PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

true
-1539507975
-3
true
1

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 11/26/2010 8 04 34 PM +00 00


To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: UPDATED Netanyahu - 4pm

b5 per DOS

S-Netanyahu Call Sheet

HRC-8617



PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: -965582531

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
---------------------------	------

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
---------------------------	------

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1
--------------------	---

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 8/22/2011 7:32 21 PM +00 00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Re: Westerwelle Call

Ok

----- Original Message -----

From: H
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 03:28 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Westerwelle Call

Pls have this done at lower level.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2011 06:44 PM
To: H
Cc: 'monica.hanley' [redacted] <monica.hanley [redacted]>
Subject: Westerwelle Call

b6 per DOS

When we discussed yesterday, you mentioned you were prepared to move forward on this event at UNGA. Are you prepared to make this call maybe next Monday? Otherwise, I can have it done at a lower level?

The Secretary's Call Sheet for German Foreign Minister Westerwelle

b5 per DOS





PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	false
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	132331630
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-5
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

From: "Abedin, Huma" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/ABEDINH>
Sent: 8/31/2011 5:39:43 PM +00:00
To: 'hdr22@clintonemail.com'
Subject: Mullen call sheet

Classified by DAS A/GIS DoS
on 3-1-2019 Class
CONFIDENTIAL Reason
1.4(B) 1.4(D) -- Declassify on
3/1/2029

The Secretary's Call Sheet for
Admiral Mike Mullen

Purpose of Call: To discuss goals for the high-level meeting in Paris on September 1, the endgame for NATO's Operation Unified Protector, and efforts to ensure leadership/cohesion of the Transitional National Council (TNC)

Talking Points

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

§

Background: In advance of the high-level meeting in Paris tomorrow, Admiral Mullen has requested to speak with you about Libya's post-Qadhafi transition. Operation Unified Protector's Chiefs of Defense met August 29 in Doha to discuss Libya's transition following the TNC's military and political advances in Libya on August 21-22. Allies and operational partners expressed commitment to continue OUP as long as Qadhafi's forces threaten civilians. Several allies pressed the TNC for more information on their immediate military needs.

TNC National Security Advisor Bazama provided August 30 over \$150,000 in funding for the TNC team scheduled to depart for Waddan today (August 31). U.S. representatives in Benghazi are working with the TNC to finalize their plans. While regime forces are currently in charge of the security situation in Waddan, their eventual loyalty remains to be seen.

b5 per DOS

b6 per DOS

PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID: [REDACTED]
PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: true

HRC-8624

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS

AGE_ID:

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 2126245349

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

b5 per DOS

From: H

Sent: 2/20/2011 10:49:07 PM +00:00

To: Oscar Flores <Oscar@presidentclinton.com>

Subject:

Classified by Director
A/GIS/IPS DoS on
5/30/2017 Class
CONFIDENTAL
Reason 1.4(B).
1.4(D) Declassify
on 5/30/2027

Pls print.

b1 per DOS



Message Headers:

b6 per DOS

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Oscar Flores [REDACTED]
Date: Sun, 20 Feb 2011 17:49:07 -0500
Subject:

HRC-8626

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:
PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

true
-1496198389
-2
true
true
1

From: H

Sent: 5/21/2011 6 19 57 PM +00 00

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Re: Pakistan calls

Send call sheets to my house too.


----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: Saturday, May 21, 2011 01:14 PM
To: H
Subject: Pakistan calls


Did marc talk to you about making these 3 calls?

The Secretary's Call Sheet for
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani

b5 per DOS



HRC-8628




Message Headers:



From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Date: Sat, 21 May 2011 14:19:57 -0400
Subject: Re: Pakistan calls
Thread-Topic: Pakistan calls

b6 per DOS



PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:
PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:

true
-596125874
-3
true
true
1



From: H

Sent: 1/20/2011 12:48:05 PM +00:00

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Re: Mullen

Thx--is [redacted] coming at 8:15? b6 per DOS

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Thu Jan 20 07:42:47 2011
Subject: Re: Mullen

I do. Nsoulis office bldg didn't have a place. And most places around her close early so couldn't go yesterday. Will get it done today.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Wed Jan 19 23:46:09 2011
Subject: Re: Mullen

Do you still have my glasses?

----- Original Message -----


From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Wed Jan 19 21:50:35 2011
Subject: Mullen

- should take major clients taskforce brief.
- need to get money flow to ejk group in pakistan. Not flowing out of state, thinks its 40 million.

Message Headers:

b6 per DOS

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2011 07:48:05 -0500
Subject: Re: Mullen



PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	1368145078
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-3
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

From: H

Sent: 1/21/2011 9 32 15 PM +00 00

To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Re

Yes, pls.cancel Biden breakfast and call me on my berry to catch up. Thx.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Fri Jan 21 16:27:52 2011
Subject: Re:

Ok. Still waiting on calderon. If it happens, we land at 1am at andrews So I was going to cancel biden breakfast if it did. Speaking of, biden was a disaster here.

Also, lots of good progress on europe trip today. Dan smith really hopes you will stay at amb residence with him.

[REDACTED]

b5 per DOS
b6 per DOS

Mullens office called me about the 40 million for ejk in pakistan. He said he looked into it [REDACTED] so I just looped nides into conversation.

[REDACTED] they are very excited. Ill work on plane. No word from greece yet.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Fri Jan 21 16:23:18 2011
Subject: Re:

Ok on press.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Fri Jan 21 14:06:57 2011
Subject:

think we finally have everyone ok in mexico. Only new element is press. Philippe wants to do greta and cnn. Is that ok with you? We still have a meeting, press conf, lunch with espinosa. No word on calderon.

Message Headers:

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2011 16:32:15 -0500
Subject: Re:

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	830888078
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-3
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 12/19/2010 8 58 06 PM +00 00

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: Update on [REDACTED] call from kurt

Huma -- please forward to her. [REDACTED]

~~U.S.~~

U.

[REDACTED] Will report immediately

after call.

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 1990036480

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:

-5

Classified by Director
A G S PS. DoS On 6/27/2017
Class CONFIDENTIAL
Reason 1 4(D) - Declassify
on 06/27/2037

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:

true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

1

HRC-8634

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: 2/13/2011 1:02:07 PM +00:00

To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Subject: ~~SECRET~~ U Re: Reminders [redacted] points

b1 per DOS

Classified by DAS
A/G S, DoS on
09/30/2015 - Class:
CONFIDENTIAL -
Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
Declassify on:
02/11/2026

~~SECRET~~ U No specific call sheets. I faxed you the general points and just emailed those to you. We have points for [redacted] and AG that I sent you by email this am. And there is a specific call sheet for papandreu that we don't have yet.

----- Original Message -----

From: H

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Sun Feb 13 07:59:37 2011

Subject: Re: Reminders [redacted] points

b1 per DOS

I did not receive specific call sheets by fax. I have the general one you gave me Fri night and the emailed points like this and one for AG.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin

To: H

Sent: Sun Feb 13 07:33:14 2011

Subject: Reminders [redacted] points

b1 per DOS

From Jeff, he wants to talk to you about the following:

1. Pakistan [redacted]

2. GCC ministerial with S. He's able to think about this again [redacted]

3. Settlement UNSC [redacted]

4. Egypt and what he's hearing from sub-Saharan Africa [redacted]

HRC-8635

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 200154879

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE: true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6: true

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: 11/25/2011 8 23 36 PM +00 00
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Fw: Egyptian MFA on Hamas-PLO talks

Fyi for you

----- Original Message -----

From: Wells, Alice G [mailto:WellsAG@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 02:57 PM
To: Huma Abedin; S_SpecialAssistants <S_SpecialAssistants@state.gov>
Subject: Fw: Egyptian MFA on Hamas-PLO talks

Portions of 2 52 PM & 2 57
PM e mails classified by
Director A/GIS/IPS, DoS on
08-25-2017 Class.
CONFIDENTIAL Reason
1 4(B), 1 4(D) Declassify on
11-2-2026

Shapiro's assessment that [REDACTED]

b1 per DOS

----- Original Message -----

From: Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv)
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 02:52 PM
To: Sherman, Wendy R; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Hale, David M;
'Steven_N_Simon' [REDACTED] <Steven_N_Simon [REDACTED]> Walles, Jacob; Dibble,
Elizabeth L; Burns, William J; 'Robert_P_Waller' [REDACTED]
<Robert_P_Waller [REDACTED]> Sullivan, Jacob J; Wells, Alice G; Nides, Thomas R;
Rangaswamy, Roopa; Sutphin, Paul R; Patterson, Anne W; Sievers, Marc J; Blome, Donald
A; Zeya, Uzra S; Rubinstein, Daniel H; Lempert, Yael; Goldberger, Thomas H
Cc: Djerassi, Alexander M
Subject: Re: Egyptian MFA on Hamas-PLO talks

b6 per DOS

Wendy -- I sent the below report earlier to some others, should have included you. I don't
take it as definitive, but a positive indicator.

b1 per DOS

----- Original Message -----

From: Sherman, Wendy R
To: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Hale, David M; 'Steven_N_Simon' [REDACTED]
<Steven_N_Simon [REDACTED]> Walles, Jacob; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Burns, William J;

b6 per DOS

HRC-8637

'Robert_P_Waller [redacted] <Robert_P_Waller [redacted]> Sullivan, Jacob J; Wells, Alice G; Nides, Thomas R; Rangaswamy, Roopa; Sutphin, Paul R; Patterson, Anne W; Sievers, Marc J; Blome, Donald A; Zeya, Uzra S; Rubinstein, Daniel H; Lempert, Yael; Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv); Goldberger, Thomas H
Cc: Djerassi, Alexander M
Sent: Fri Nov 25 21:31:07 2011
Subject: RE: Egyptian MFA on Hamas-PLO talks

Very helpful Jeff. What is your judgment vis a vis release of tax funds as a result of these results?

-----Original Message-----

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D

Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 1:45 PM

To: Hale, David M; 'Steven_N_Simon [redacted] Waller, Jacob; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Burns, William J; Sherman, Wendy R; 'Robert_P_Waller [redacted] Sullivan, Jacob J; Wells, Alice G; Nides, Thomas R; Rangaswamy, Roopa; Sutphin, Paul R; Patterson, Anne W; Sievers, Marc J; Blome, Donald A; Zeya, Uzra S; Rubinstein, Daniel H; Lempert, Yael; Shapiro, Daniel B (Tel Aviv); Goldberger, Thomas H

b6 per DOS

Cc: Djerassi, Alexander M

b1 per DOS

Subject: Egyptian MFA on Hamas-PLO talks

X

U.

Jeffrey Feltman

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:	false
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:	1048566680
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:	-5
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:	true
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:	1

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: 3/22/2009 9 10 29 PM +00 00
To: 'humamabedin' [REDACTED]
Subject: Visit to Israel & PA

b6 per DOS

-----Original Message-----

From: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Mar 22 17 10 54 2009
Subject: Fw: Visit to Israel & PA

Classified by Director A/G S/IPS,
DoS on 04/25/2017 - Class
CONFIDENTIAL - Reason 1 4(B)
1 4(D) Declassifyon: 04 25 2027

Pls print

From: acib
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2009 16 29 08 +0000
To: (hr15@att.blackberry.net)<hr15@att.blackberry.net>, George
Mitchell [REDACTED]
Subject: Visit to Israel & PA

b6 per DOS

X U

b1 per DOS

HRC-8640

Anyway I can explain more if you're interested

TB

This email has been scanned by the MessageLabs Email Security System
For more information please visit [http //www messagelabs com/email](http://www.messagelabs.com/email)

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG: false

PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID: 817435205

PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: -5

**PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DE
VICE:** true

PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE true

_3_6:

PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS: 1

3/24/16
Serial 18

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

HRC-8835

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/24/2016

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field
CI-13

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

U Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] - CYBER - 16

U Title: (S) MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ Documents the submission of confirmed classified signatures to the United States Department of State (USDOS) and the Executive Office of the President (EOP).

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301
Declassify On: 20410324~~

b6
b7C

U Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ In an effort to fully identify the extent to which the confirmed classified email messages in USDOS and EOP mail systems, as well as all of the recipients for those emails, the FBI provided the latest electronic signatures for the confirmed classified emails to both USDOS and EOP, for searching in their respective systems.

U ~~(S//NF)~~ On 02/29/2016, SSA [REDACTED] provided the latest signatures to the US Department of Justice (US DOJ), along with an accompanying letterhead memorandum, for passage to EOP personnel. The results of any searches conducted by EOP representatives will be documented under a separate communication.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

U ~~(S//NF)~~ On 03/23/2016, SA [] provided the latest electronic signatures to USDOS Information Resource Bureau (IRM) representatives, [] via secure email. [] acknowledged receipt of the signatures on the same day. The results of any searches conducted by US DOS will be documented under a separate communication.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

HRC-8837

3/24/16
Serial 19

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

HRC-8838

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
b3
b7E

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/24/2016

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

CI-13

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

U Case ID #: (S) [redacted] -CYBER-19

U Title: (S) MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

U Synopsis: (S//NF) Computer intrusion analysis conducted on [redacted]
[redacted] IP addresses extracted from [redacted]

b7E

~~Classified By: [redacted]~~
~~Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301~~
~~Declassify On: 20410324~~

b6
b7C

U

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

b1
b3
b7E

HRC-8839

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] ~~S~~ Ub1
b3
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U

b1
b3
b7E

U Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ In support of this investigation, SA [REDACTED] devised a Microsoft Excel scripting routine to extract IP addresses from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in this investigation. Utilizing that script, writers identified a total of [REDACTED] unique, public-facing IP addresses that were used to transmit or receive one or more confirmed classified emails.

b6
b7C
b7E

U ~~(S//NF)~~ Writers then conducted open source research for each of the [REDACTED] IP addresses to identify their corresponding registrants. Given that all the IP addresses were obtained from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] most of them are likely assigned to dedicated mail servers at their respective entities. The table below depicts the [REDACTED] unique addresses that were identified in this research, along with open source registration information for each of the addresses, and the frequency that each IP address was found in the confirmed classified [REDACTED] files:

b7E

IP ADDRESSWHOIS REGISTRANT/OWNERFREQUENCY

b7E

[REDACTED]		
------------	--	--

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] ~~S~~ Ub1
b3
b7E


HRC-8840

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
b3
b7E

b7E



U: ~~(S//NF)~~ Writers then conducted logical investigative analysis on the above listed IP addresses. For this analysis, writers focused on identifying any references of [redacted] IP addresses in FBI databases, such as [redacted] Sentinel, [redacted] and [redacted]. Note: The scope of this search was limited to only that of references in FBI computer intrusion-related investigations. Investigative findings from this analysis are documented as follows:

b7E

(U) [redacted]

U: ~~(S//NF)~~ Queries for [redacted] in both Sentinel and [redacted] data sets resulted in no hits. No further information was identified to indicate that server has been victimized by a computer intrusion. Further analysis identified that [redacted] confirmed classified email message was sent from this IP address while a user was signed in to [redacted]. Therefore, the confirmed classified message may have merely transited an [redacted] IP address. The message, however, is not likely stored on a mail server associated with the service provider. No evidence of a computer intrusion on [redacted] was identified in this analysis.

b7E

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]



b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

U

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

HRC-8841

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

b1
b3
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



~~S~~ U


b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

U

(S//NF) A query of [redacted] in Sentinel, [redacted] and [redacted] yielded no results. From this data, writers did not identify any definitive indications of a computer intrusion on IP address [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted]



~~S~~ U


b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

b1
b3
b7E

HRC-8842

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~S~~ U

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
b3
b7E

~~S~~
U

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~S~~ U

HRC-8843

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
b3
b7E

U

~~S~~ U
b1
b3
b7E

U, ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on the totality of information above, writers assess there is no definitive indication of a computer intrusion compromise on IP address [redacted]

b7E

(U) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(U) [redacted]

b7E

U, ~~(S//NF)~~ IP address [redacted] was found to be referenced in [redacted] Sentinel documents related to computer intrusion classifications.

~~S~~ U

b1
b3
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

b1
b3
b7E


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

HRC-8844

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~U~~

b1
b3
b7E


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b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI
b7E per FBI

~~(S//NF)~~ IP address [redacted] is listed in a log file
documented in FBI Los Angeles investigation [redacted]
[redacted] A review of the log identified that the US DOS email address of
[redacted] had been targeted in that investigation.

b3
b7E



b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~U~~

b1
b3
b7E

HRC-8845

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U


b1
b3
b7E

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
~~S~~ U
b1
b3
b7E

(U) [redacted]



U
~~S~~
b1
b3
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~ A review of [redacted] data on 02/21/2016 revealed numerous instances in which IP address [redacted]



[redacted] Additionally, other events captured in [redacted] denote IP address [redacted] as the destination IP for various spear-phishing messages. It is unknown if any of the spear-phishing attempts were successfully delivered to recipients, as they could have been detected by US DOS at the perimeter.

b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U

b1
b3
b7E

HRC-8846

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U.

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b1
b3
b7E

(U) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ As denoted above, this analysis focused on the [redacted]
[redacted] IP addresses that were identified in the confirmed
classified [redacted] Limited analytical research was conducted
on the IP addresses [redacted]

b7E

[redacted] Given the large volume of communications that traverse
those servers on a daily basis, references of those IP addresses are
replicated heavily throughout FBI systems. No direct evidence of a
computer intrusion on any of these [redacted] were
identified in this analysis.

(U) ENCLOSURES

(U//~~FOUO~~) Enclosed for the case file is a disc in a 1A
envelope containing search and analysis results for the IP addresses
detailed above, in addition to [redacted]
[redacted]

b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] ~~S~~ U.

b1
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b7E

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Serial 38

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

HRC-8921

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/21/2016

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

CI-13

Contact: ITS/FE [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] - CYBER - 34

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED;
UNKNOWN SUBJECT OR COUNTRY;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM).

Synopsis: (U//~~FOUO~~) To summarize review of server IIS logs for January 7 - 10, 2011

~~Classified By: F41M65K83~~

~~Derived From: FBI NSIC dated 20130301~~

~~Declassify On: 20411231~~

Details: (U//~~FOUO~~) In support of captioned investigation, writer reviewed IIS logs from the Pagliano Server (QH03) for the time period January 7 - 10, 2011. Notable findings are as follows:

(U//~~FOUO~~) As background, in a review of e-mails from the Department of State (STATE) OpenNet/Unclassified mailbox belonging to Huma Abedin (ABEDIN), the writer reviewed an e-mail sent by Justin Cooper (COOPER) to ABEDIN on January 9, 2011 in which he states that he had to shut down the Pagliano server¹ because "someone was trying to hack us and while they did not get in i [sic] didn't want to let them have the chance to."²

(U//~~FOUO~~) Writer reviewed the Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) logs from the Pagliano Server for the time period January 7-10, 2011 to determine if there was any potentially related activity occurring on the server around the

¹ The "Pagliano server" (evidence item QH03) is a Dell PowerEdge 2900 server, which was set up by Bryan Pagliano and used to manage and administer e-mail accounts on the clintonemail.com, wjcoffice.com and presidentclinton.com domains.

² E-mail appears in data set [REDACTED]

b7E

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date of January 9, 2011. Windows Security Event Logs showing failed and successful logins to the server for this time period were not available for review, as the earliest date available for these logs from FBI-collected evidence was June 22, 2013.

(U//~~FOUO~~) For the time period January 7-10, 2011, there were [] events that appear to be related to scanning activity on the server. Entries containing [] indicate attempts to index web pages by a web-crawling spider [] The User-Agents [] and [] are indicative of attempts to scan the server for web application vulnerabilities. The activity related to the Internet Protocol (IP) address [] is likely also related to scanning for web vulnerabilities. All events resulted in either a 304 or 404 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code³, as indicated in the table below.

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date	time	method	[]	ip	[]	status

³ HTTP status code 304 is sent in response to a request for a document only in the case if a newer version exists than what is previously cached by the client. Status code 404 indicates that the resource requested by the client was not found.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b7E

The usernames [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attempted to log in to Outlook Web Access (OWA) from the IP address referenced above. However, in all cases, a status code of 401⁴ was returned, indicating that the login attempt failed. Furthermore, the reason code [REDACTED] contained in the [REDACTED] field indicates that the OWA login credentials for a user were not correct. The activity could potentially be related to a user forgetting his/her username or password, or entering his/her password in the username field. An analysis of additional IIS logs also indicates that legitimate users of the system successfully logged in to OWA from the IP address [REDACTED] at other times on the same day.

b7E

date	time	cs-username	ip	status
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(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 21, 2016, Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] telephonically interviewed both Bryan Pagliano (PAGLIANO) and COOPER and asked them about the January 9, 2011 e-mail. Both PAGLIANO and COOPER recalled that the e-mail was sent after COOPER received multiple alerts indicating failed login attempts to the Pagliano server. COOPER and PAGLIANO could not recall any specific targeting of individual accounts or any indications of a successful compromise on the server.

b6
b7c

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of the IIS logs reviewed for January 7-10, 2011 is included in a 1A envelope in the case file.

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